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Abstract 
The Oil and Gas (O&G) industry, which is part of the energy supply sector, can pursue a 
wide range of climate change mitigation activities, which are defined by the Fifth Assessment 
Report of International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 5AR) (2014) as “a human intervention to 
reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases (GHGs)”. However, considering the 
severe impacts of global climate change and the Paris climate agreement, which put forward a 
strong global commitment in preventing a 2-degree Celsius increase in global temperature above 
pre-industrial levels, the long term phase-out of fossil fuels and the substitution by low-GHG 
alternative energy resources appears imperative. This will contribute to the transformation and 
greening of the energy sector and, more importantly, pave a path to achieve goals 7 (Affordable and 
Clean Energy) and 11 (Climate Action) of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
The study of the investments in renewable energy that are made by O&G companies is vital 
to the sustainable development of human society as a whole. Nevertheless, it is certainly 
challenging to convince the O&G industry -whose very products result in GHG emissions (in the 
form of either carbon dioxide or other gases such as methane) - to take part in efforts to mitigate 
climate change. Thus, it is critical to comprehensively understand what can influence change in 
corporate strategies, in order for the right policies or incentives to be implemented in the industry. 
The present research embarks on an academic journey to examine corporate strategies of O&G 
companies to climate change mitigation, placing a special focus on business diversification from 
fossil fuels to renewable energy. Three National Oil Companies (NOCs) from emerging economies 
in Southeast Asia- PTT from Thailand, PERTAMINA from Indonesia and PETRONAS from 
Malaysia, were selected as case studies and serve as a starting point for the study of the wider 
picture on NOCs. The study also included two associates of PTT- Bangchak Petroleum and Thai 
Oil-, in order to provide a more in-depth picture of the specific case of Thailand.   
 This research conducted three studies to achieve its objectives. Firstly, a thorough review 
on actual renewable energy investment projects of the five companies during the first 15 years of 
21
st
 century was carried out. The results showed that all five companies have invested in renewable 
energy, but to various degrees and on a range of different technologies. All of them have produced 
and commercialized biofuels, mostly due to existence of government mandates in each of the three 
countries. However, the study also found that such investments appeared to be correlated with the 
oscillations in global crude oil prices. Solar PV only became the focus of the attention of PTT, 
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Bangchak and PETRONAS in recent years, when the cost of solar cells dramatically dropped and 
their respective governments initiated attractive Feed-in-Tariff policies. Lastly, PERTAMINA is the 
only one company involved in the development and exploitation of geothermal energy, although it 
aims to invest more in tidal, ocean, wind and solar PV in the coming years.  
 Following the development in the renewable energy projects of each company, the study 
then examined the discourses which the companies applied to justify their green investments. 
Annual reports available in the company websites were collected and a discourse analysis was run 
through the MAXQDA software. The main focus was to determine which were the most repeated 
discourses that each company used to explain their investment in particular renewable energy 
sources. Moreover, the discourses found were categorized into four different types, based on an 
analytical framework on discursive legitimacy strategies, namely authorization, rationalization, 
moral evaluation and mythopoesis. The result showed that companies manipulated various 
discourses to legitimate their low-carbon energy projects and that those discourses reflected the 
specific socio-cultural context in the home country.       
 Lastly, as the results pointed out that some companies, in particular those in Thailand, have 
been relatively more active in investing in renewable energy, the study investigated the factors that 
influence companies to invest in or divest from low-carbon energy. A novel analytical framework 
was applied to comparatively analyze all five companies from the three countries studied. The 
framework comprised three sets of factors; 1) company’s specific features i.e. ownership structure 
and role of the CEOs and shareholders, expectation on short-term and long-term economic 
advantages, view on climate change, 2) national factors i.e. government’s renewable energy and 
climate change policy, country’s resources, social movement on environmental issues, and 3) global 
factors i.e. world crude oil prices, discovery of shale oil and gas, cost of technology, and peer 
influences. Secondary data as well as primary data from semi-structured interviews in three 
countries were used in this analysis. Country specific context and company features were 
highlighted as important factors for all companies that were analyzed, and which appear to have 
more influences than global factors. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1    Background and problem statement   
The present research embarks on an academic journey to examine the corporate 
responses of the Oil and Gas (O&G) industry to climate change mitigation, placing a 
special focus on business diversification from fossil fuels to renewable energy. The O&G 
industry, which is part of the energy supply sector, can provide a major contribution to 
global climate mitigation efforts, which are defined by the Fifth Assessment Report of 
International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 5AR) (2014) as “a human intervention to 
reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases (GHGs)”. Some potential 
mitigating options include energy efficiency improvements, fugitive emission reduction in 
fuel extraction as well as in energy conversion, transmission and distribution systems, fossil 
fuel switching, carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology installation, alternative and 
renewable energy development as well as planting of forest to increase carbon sinks. 
However, although the aforementioned approaches could potentially reduce GHG 
emissions, some of them may have side effects, in term of encouraging a lock-in to fossil 
fuel products. Considering the severe impacts of global climate change and the Paris 
climate agreement, which put forward a strong global commitment in preventing a 2-degree 
Celsius increase in global temperature above pre-industrial levels and to limit the 
temperature rise even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius, the long term phase-out of fossil fuels 
and the substitution by low-GHG alternative energy resources appears imperative.  
 The study of the investments in renewable energy that are made by O&G companies 
is vital to the sustainable development of human society as a whole, as they could 
contribute to the transformation and greening of the energy sector and more importantly 
pave a path to achieve goals 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy) and 11 (Climate Action) of 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).  From a brief look, it seems that renewable 
energy would be disruptive and even radical technology for the business as usual of O&G 
companies. However, in fact some major the US and EU-based O&G companies have 
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invested in low-carbon energy, which could be traced back since the first oil shock in 1970s. 
T
2 
and Associates (2013) recorded investment volume in climate change mitigation 
technology by energy sector, other industries and the federal government from 2000-2012 
and found that the US-based O&G companies had invested the highest up to an amount of 
US$165.4 billion or around 49 percent of the total investment of US$ 336.3 billion in the 
North American market. 7 percent of US$ 165.4 billion or US$ 11.4 billion was allocated 
for non-hydrocarbon technology i.e. wind, biofuels, solar PV, geothermal, as well as 
landfill digester gas. Considering huge financial capacity, O&G companies appear to be 
one of key players in promoting renewable energy technologies.     
 While being criticized as an exploiter, a polluter and a lobbyist, the industry also is 
perceived to hold positive roles as an economic developer, an innovator and a self-regulator 
in private governance. As a result, some scholars have advocated for a constructive 
approach when dealing with these corporations. Such authors include, for example, Levy 
and Jones (2007) who suggested that policy makers should harness and steer these 
corporations’ resources toward sustainable development. Nevertheless, it is certainly 
challenging to convince the O&G industry -whose very products result in GHG emissions 
(in the form of either carbon dioxide or other gases such as methane)- to take part in efforts 
to mitigate climate change. Thus, it is critical to comprehensively understand what can 
influence change in corporate strategies, in order for the right policies or incentives to be 
implemented in the industry.          
 However, academic literature appears to have limitations in capturing the rapid 
changes that are taking place in the 21
st
 century. Volatility of crude oil prices, the discovery 
of shale oil and gas, new global climate change agreements, not to mention the global 
movement to divest from fossil fuels, are a few examples of changing worldwide 
phenomena that are affecting corporate strategies in the development of renewable energy. 
This represents a substantial gap in the literature, and highlights the need for academia to 
catch up with the rapid changes taking place in industry.      
 On top of that, majority of the existing literature investigated the green business of 
US and EU-based multinational O&G companies; namely ExxonMobil, Chevron, BP, Shell, 
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Statoil, and Total (Levy and Kolk, 2002; Ceres, 2004; Davis, 2006; Pinkse and Buuse, 
2012; Miller,2013; Csomos, 2014; Johnson, 2015) with a few exceptions from Penha 
(2011) and Puliver (2007).  Moreover, news articles from well-known and respected 
newspapers and weekly magazines like the Economist, the Guardian and Bloomberg have 
scrutinized the same group of major O&G companies. Our knowledge on green 
investments done by O&G companies was thus built upon a small group of cases and was 
limited to the contexts of the abovementioned regions.     
 The present research thus aims to expand the horizon of this subject matter through 
enlarging case studies to cover a greater number of National Oil Companies (NOCs). NOCs, 
as Victor (2007) pointed out, represent around 80% of world oil reserves and account for 
73% of production, while the reserves of International Oil Companies (IOCs) have been 
declining and have thus have to move to areas where exploration and production are 
challenging. As Penha (2011) pointed out, O&G reserves are an important factor that 
determines whether they would invest in renewable energy or not. Saudi Aramco, NIOC, 
PDVSA and CNPC had bigger O&G reserves than some IOCs but did not invest or had 
little investment volume in renewable energy whereas Shell, BP and Total have put efforts 
into multiple green technologies such as solar PV, wind and biofuels. Nevertheless, special 
attention should be paid to NOCs in developing countries, where the dilemma between 
improving energy security to maintain economic growth and alleviate poverty and investing 
in sustainable energy to reduce GHG emissions is acute.  To what extent NOCs in emerging 
economies welcome the development of disruptive renewable energy technologies appears 
to be under-examined in literature. The present research proposes that behaviours, business 
strategies of NOCs as well as factors influencing their behaviours are different from those 
of IOCs because of specific characteristics as shown in Table 1. As will demonstrate later, 
it is crucial that we are aware of the heterogeneity of this incumbent industry. 
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Table 1  Main differences between NOCs and IOCs 
Issues IOCs  NOCs 
Ownership structure Private investors (shareholders) Government owns between 51% and 100% of 
shares 
O&G reserves Earn license to do business in oil wells 
in various countries 
National law of some countries give authority for 
NOCs to manage all O&G reserves in the 
countries 
Legal authority  No  Some NOCs are regulators for all O&G 
exploration and production activities i.e. 
PETRONAS (Malaysia) 
Mission Obtain maximum profits and return 
them to shareholders 
-   Profit making 
-   Comply with government policy 
-   Secure energy supply for the country 
Relations with 
government  
Private sector VS government  - Government officials are appointed to be 
part of board of executives 
- CEOs report directly to Prime Minister  
Examples of 
companies 
ExxonMobil, BP, Shell, Total, 
Chevron 
Saudi Aramco, GasProm (Russia), PetroChina,     
PTT (Thailand), PERTAMINA (Indonesia), 
PETRONAS (Malaysia) 
 
Another important gap in literatures is that little analysis was carried out on the 
discourses that O&G companies have used to legitimize their business diversification from 
fossil fuels to renewable energy sources, given the fact that such renewable energy 
technology is not their core business (Livesey, 2002; Livesey and Kearins, 2002; Breeze, 
2012). Understanding how the O&G companies justify their renewable energy investment 
through discourses will not only expand knowledge on the communication strategies that 
the companies apply to gain legitimacy from their audiences but also on discursive factors 
for diffusing renewable energy in societies.         
 To fill in these research gaps, the present study chose to target three NOCs from 
emerging economies in Southeast Asia- PTT group from Thailand, PERTAMINA from 
Indonesia and PETRONAS from Malaysia. These three NOCs are selected as a starting 
point for the study of NOCs in the bigger picture. The study also included two associates of 
PTT- Bangchak Petroleum and Thai Oil- for an in-depth investigation of the case of 
Thailand.  The three NOCs are a major actor in the economies of their respective countries. 
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Besides, they were only three companies from Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia which 
were ranked by Fortune Global 500, a list of top 500 companies in the world in term of 
business profits, as 125
th
, 146
th
 and 230
th
 respectively (Fortune Global500, 2016). Once 
convinced to have a goal in low-carbon energy investment, these three NOCs as well as 
their associates will help their home countries untapped renewable energy potential. Not to 
mention that doing so will create new job employment and increase accessibility to 
electricity of people in remote areas.           
 Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia have recently submitted their Intended Nationally 
Determined Contribution (INDC) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) declaring their GHG reduction targets and already existing policies to 
promote clean and renewable energy in their energy mix
1
. It is therefore important to 
examine how these three NOCs and their associates have positioned themselves amid the 
strong urge for national energy security and climate change mitigation efforts of their 
respective national governments. The findings from the three NOCs and associates will 
certainly enhance understanding of corporate strategies of O&G companies operating in 
developing countries. More importantly, as one of five underlying principles of ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC) Blueprint 2025 is to enhance connectivity and sectoral 
cooperation, lessons learned from the cases of PTT, PERTAMINA and PETRONAS will 
provide a model for other NOCs in the rest seven Southeast Asian countries. Last but not 
least, by attempting to close the gaps in literature that have been highlighted earlier, the 
author hopes that this thesis will help the sustainable development of human society, and 
further the field of Sustainability Science.    
 
 
 
                                                          
1
Thailand intends to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 20% from the projected business-as-usual (BAU) level by 2030 
(INDC, 2015), Indonesia will reduce 26% of its GHG emissions against BAU scenario by 2020 (INDC, 2015) and 
Malaysia aims to cut down its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions intensity of GDP by 45% by 2030 relative to the 
emissions intensity of GDP in 2005 (INDC, 2016). 
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1.2    Research objectives 
Considering the severe impacts of global climate change and the Paris climate 
agreement, which put forward a strong global commitment in preventing a 2-degree Celsius 
increase in global temperature above pre-industrial levels, the long-term phase-out of fossil 
fuels and the substitution by low-GHG alternative energy resources appears imperative. As 
a result, the present study aims to examine exclusively the role of O&G companies in 
contributing to mitigate climate change through renewable energy investment. Three 
National Oil Companies (NOCs) from Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia and their 
associates are chosen as case studies to fill in the gap in literature which studied mostly on 
western International Oil Companies(IOCs) and major NOCs from Middle East and major 
countries like China and Russia.  Through these novel case studies, the present study 
expects to enhance understanding on the way of thinking and corporate strategies of O&G 
companies, which operate under specific socio-political and economic contexts of 
developing countries. The following part presents the main research objectives and three 
sub-objectives.   
 
Main objective: To examine corporate strategies to climate change mitigation of oil 
and gas companies in Southeast Asia, with special focus on business diversification 
from fossil fuels to renewable energy  
From this goal, three sub-objectives were defined: 
Sub-objective 1:   To examine renewable energy development projects of state-owned 
oil and gas companies and associates in Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia in the first 
15 years of 21
st
 century 
This sub-objective aims to add knowledge on the renewable energy investment of 
O&G industry. The existing literature suggested that world major O&G companies have an 
on-off relation with renewable energy. Some major IOCs (such as ExxonMobil) are even 
opposing renewable energy developments, by stating that they are not profitable and 
outside the role of O&G companies. Understanding the renewable energy investment 
activities and changes throughout years of five O&G companies from Thailand, Malaysia 
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and Indonesia is thus important in order to compare investing behaviors of major world 
O&G companies.    
Sub-objective 2:   To examine discourses or language-in-use of state-owned oil and gas 
companies and associates in justifying renewable energy investment 
The sub-objective 2 addresses the gap in existing literature which has not yet 
studied the discourses that O&G companies used to legitimizing their renewable energy 
investment. The findings of discourse study are important because it provides a potential 
solution to address ‘behavioral challenges’, one of three sets of socio-technical barriers for 
renewable energy diffusion or penetration (Dulal et al., 2013; Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006; 
Painuly, 2001; Reddy and Painuly, 2004; Sovacool, 2009; Sovacool et al., 2011). Discourse 
study reveals how the O&G companies promoted and justified new renewable energy 
sources to the public given the fact that they are not conventional energy like fossil fuels.  
 
 Sub-objective 3:   To investigate factors that influence state-owned oil and gas 
companies and associates to invest in or divest from renewable energy  
The third sub-objective pushes forward the knowledge on factors which influence 
O&G corporate behaviors and decision-making on global climate change mitigation in 
particular renewable energy investment. The present study aims to test if factors found in 
the existing literature can be applied with NOCs and their associates from developing 
countries given the fact that most of them were usually used to study firm behaviors from 
western and developed countries. Moreover, the study aims to fill in the gap in existing 
literature which has limitations in capturing rapid changes that are taking place in the 21st 
century in particular global phenomena such as very low crude oil prices, discovery of 
shale oil and gas, new global climate change agreements and global movement to divest 
from fossil fuel companies. 
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1.3    Research questions 
 
Sub-objective 1:   To examine renewable energy development projects of oil and gas 
companies in Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia in the first 15 years of the 21
st
 century 
Specific research questions: 
1.1 Do O&G companies in Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia invest in renewable 
energy? 
1.2 What sources of renewable energy have been prioritized by each O&G company? 
 
Sub-objective 2:   To examine discourses or language-in-use of oil and gas companies 
in justifying renewable energy investment  
Specific research questions: 
2.1 What are discourses each O&G company applies to justify a given source of 
renewable energy? 
2.2 What sort of discursive legitimation strategies are used to justify a given renewable 
energy by O&G companies in Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia? 
2.3 What are the implications of discourse study for renewable energy diffusion?  
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Sub-objective 3:   To determine the factors that influence state-owned O&G 
companies to invest in or divest from renewable energy at both the domestic and 
international level 
Specific research questions: 
3.1 What are factors which influence O&G companies in Thailand, Malaysia and 
Indonesia to invest in renewable energy?  
3.2 How are factors influencing National Oil Companies (NOCs) to invest in renewable 
energy different from those influencing O&G companies studied in existing 
literature (western International oil companies (IOCs) and major NOCs) 
3.3 What are characteristics of O&G companies which are the most and the least likely 
to conduct renewable energy investment?  
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1.4   Structure of dissertation 
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Chapter 2 Literature review on O&G 
companies and climate change mitigation 
 
2.1  Introduction 
Climate change mitigation, which is the sum of humanity’s efforts to curtail 
greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions, has caused controversy in the industries that rely 
heavily on fossil fuels. Among them is the O&G industry, which is allegedly “one of the 
most powerful and global business sectors today and its activities and products are directly 
linked with rising greenhouse gas emission” (Hove et al., 2002, p.3). Since the beginning of 
the GHG abatement effort it has been widely considered that climate change was a threat to 
the O&G industry, and thus a hostile response from this industry is not unexexpected. 
 Anti-climate change corporate responses can be traced back to the period of time 
leading to Kyoto Protocol. In 1989 major O&G companies in the USA formed the ‘Global 
Climate Coalition’ (GCC), an organiation aimed at lobbying US Congress not to pass 
regulation on the reduction of  greenhouse gas emissions (Kolk and Levy, 2001). The GCC 
together with the American Petroleum Institute (API) acted against mandatory climate 
change policy by the US and international community by employing two different sets of 
strategies: “raising questions about and undercutting the prevailing scientific wisdom on 
climate change in order to cast doubts in the mind of the public and policy-makers on the 
existence of a problem, and attacking the policy proposals on economic grounds”  (Hove et 
al., 2002, p.5). These two lobbying groups were part of what McCright and Dunlap called 
the ‘American conservative movement’, which was a major reason why the USA did not 
ratify Kyoto Protocol (McCright and Dunlap, 2003).       
 The GCC started to lose part of its lobbying power when some of its members 
decided to leave the group. British Petroleum (BP) was the first company to withdraw from 
the GCC in 1996, followed by Royal Dutch Shell in 1998; while US-based major O&G 
companies such as ExxonMobil still participated until the end of the GCC in 2002 (Kolk 
and Levy, 2001).  After the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 the world witnessed a 
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clear divergence of corporate responses to climate change between European and American 
Multinational O&G corporations, resulting in a ‘Trans-Atlantic divide’, as Rowlands 
pointed out in his article “Beauty and the Beast? BP’ and Exxon’s position on global 
climate change” (Rowlands, 2000). In addition, in the middle of these two extremes some 
other major companies have chosen ‘wait-and-see’ stance on global climate change (Hove 
et al., 2002). However, as issues related to climate change have matured, recent trends in 
literature have started to reflect an increasing convergence of corporate responses regarding 
the positive manner in which they respond to climate change mitigation (Kolk and Levy, 
2004).            
 The O&G industry is one of central players regarding many environmental issues, 
not only those directly related to global climate change. While being criticized as an 
exploiter, a polluter and a lobbyist, the industry also is perceived to hold positive roles as 
an economic developer, an innovator and a self-regulator in private governance. Thanks to 
their enormous economical, organizational and technological capacity, some scholars have 
advocated for a constructive approach when dealing with these corporations. Such authors 
include, for example, Levy and Jones (2007) who suggested that policy makers should 
harness and steer these corporations’ resources toward sustainable development. 
Nevertheless, it is certainly challenging to convince the O&G industry -whose very 
products result in GHG emissions (in the form of either carbon dioxide or other gases such 
as methane)- to take part in efforts to mitigate climate change. Thus, it is critical to 
comprehensively understand what can influence change in corporate strategies, in order for 
the right policies or incentives to be implemented in the industry.  In this chapter, two 
different groups of literature are reviewed. The first group includes authors that have 
examined factors that can influence the corporate responses of O&G companies to climate 
change mitigation. The second group includes those who investigate exclusively issues of 
renewable energy investment or divestment in renewable energy by O&G companies.
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2.2 Literature on factors that can influence O&G corporate responses to 
climate change  
As O&G companies are major players whose operations directly affect and get 
affected by climate change mitigation efforts, a sizeable number of authors have attempted 
to expand knowledge on the subject matter. In order to conduct a comprehensive literature 
survey on the matter, the author first targeted literature that exclusively examined climate 
change strategies in the O&G industry, by using specific key words such as “O&G 
industry”, “O&G MNCs (Multinational Corporations)”, “global climate change”, 
“corporate responses to climate change” and “GHG emissions reduction”. Then, more 
general key words were applied to expand the scope of literature from articles merely 
concerning O&G industry and climate change strategies to the O&G industry and 
environmental strategies, to firms and the corporate responses to global climate change, to 
firms and the environmental responsibility, and finally, at the broadest scope, to firms and 
corporate strategies. In addition, from the references in the articles found through the E-
journal database, further material was obtained. The literature reviewed covered a wide 
range of publications, including the European Management Journal, Global Strategic 
Management, Climate Policy, Business and Politics, Global society, Global Environmental 
Politics, Strategic Management Journal, European Accounting Review, Academy of 
Management Journal, Journal of International Management and Business Strategy and 
Environment. No limitation was set on the date of publication of the journal papers, in 
order to find as many journals as possible. The literature survey phase of the research was 
considered to be concluded when no further determinants could be found and the repetition 
of the majority of the determinants took place.     
 The present research categorized literature into five groups, based on the different 
key words that were used while searching. They were 1) O&G and climate change 
strategies, 2) O&G and CSR and environmental strategies, 3) Firms and corporate 
responses to climate change and global warming, 4) Firms and CSR and environmental 
responsibility and 5) Firms and Corporate strategies. The articles that fell into each group, 
and the name of journal in which they were published is shown in Figure 1.   
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Figure 1 Literature examining factors that can influence corporate responses to climate 
change 
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2.2.1   Results and discussion on the reviewed literature 
2.2.1.1   Literature in the first group examining O&G industry and their 
climate change strategies  
The authors in the first group shared a common interest in finding what caused 
divergent corporate climate strategies between major US-based and EU-based O&G 
corporations. All of the reviewed literature in this group first attempted to explain the 
hostile perception of the O&G industry towards global climate change prior to the adoption 
of the Kyoto Protocol; then raised the case of BP and Shell (major EU-based companies) 
which took the first moves to adopt more proactive climate strategies, while their American 
counterpart, ExxonMobil, still pursued an antagonistic approach. A number of determinants 
were debated to shed light on the puzzle of the different climate policies pursued by US-
based and EU-based companies, which get referred to as the ‘Oceans Apart’ (Levy and 
Newell, 2007) or ‘Trans-Atlantic divide’ (Rowlands, 2000).  The main factors discussed in 
the literature included 1) company-specific features, such as CEO’s policy or CEO’s 
speech, which suggested supporting standpoint to climate change, organizational structure 
(degree of decentralization), main products (whether the company relied more on oil or 
natural gas), R&D research team, economic situation and market position, experience in 
renewable energy (RE) investment (US-based company experienced negatively in RE), 2) 
institutional environment of the home country, such as government climate policy or 
incentives on RE investment, societal concerns about climate change/environmental issues, 
relationships between business and government, 3) international issues such as the global 
climate regime (complexity and uncertainty of climate change issues), global oligopolistic 
structure of O&G industry, and an intense interaction of CEOs of O&G companies in the 
international arena (a process of osmosis).  
Although all determinants in the three sets were seen to be interrelated and 
distributing to the corporate climate strategy, the home country factors were given special 
importance in explaining why EU-based companies pursued proactive strategies while US-
based counterparts took adversarial approaches. Company specific features were considered 
less influence since major O&G corporations generally possessed similar organizational 
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features. Lastly, international issues have become increasingly predominant, as the climate 
strategies of O&G companies appear to have started to converge after Kyoto Protocol was 
implemented. 
Two critical gaps were found when reviewing the literature in this group. Firstly, 
home country factors were exclusively analyzed, while host country’s institutional 
environment was overlooked. Most of the literature examined corporate climate strategies 
at the headquarters of major American and European O&G companies i.e. ExxonMobil, BP 
(BP Amoco), Shell, Texaco, TotalFinaElf, and Statoil, and argued that “a multinational 
company (unlike states) can require its branch offices in various countries to comply with 
corporate policy-which is likely to reflect the policy of its home country” (Skjærseth and 
Skodvin, 2001, p.61). From this logic, it was assumed that O&G companies would take 
proactive approaches to climate change mitigation if their home country’s government or 
civil society was very concerned about global climate change, and would have reactive 
responses if the home country factors were not strong on the issue.  However, there was 
rarely a study of the climate change mitigation strategy of the branches of major O&G 
companies in other countries; especially developing countries, to test such assumptions. 
Also, the majority of the literature also neglected to analyze host country factors.  
Nevertheless, a study by Tuodolo (2009) investigated whether NGOs’ collaborative 
strategy with O&G companies can shape corporate social responsibility (CSR). Shell was 
chosen as a case study given the fact that many NGOs have established a collaborative 
relationship with this company through projects such as biodiversity conservation or 
HIV/AIDS prevention. Examining the operation of Shell in Nigeria, Tuodolo (2009) 
concluded that NGOs’ collaboration with the company appeared to benefit Shell’s image 
more than society, as the local communities in the Niger Delta area have severely suffered 
from the activities of Shell; namely 3,213 oil spills incidents, discharged drilling waste, gas 
flaring, and intra- and inter-communal conflicts (p.537-538). Although his study did not 
specially focus on corporate climate strategy, it offered an empirical case showing how 
branches of O&G corporations in developing countries may not necessarily have the same 
policy as their headquarters in developed countries.  
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 Secondly, companies from developed countries, either in the US or Europe, were 
the sole targets of studies. Thus, little is known about companies whose country of origin is 
from emerging economies or developing countries in other continents such as Asia. 
Essentially, the understanding of the determinants of corporate climate change strategies 
have been built upon the examination of a small number of major O&G companies from 
the US and European countries. This has created a critical gap in the disciplinary of, to 
name a few, business management, institutional theory, international relations, and climate 
change studies. One interesting exceptional case was Pulver (2007), who studied how 
developing-country O&G firms chose to adopt a proactive climate strategy, drawing upon a 
case study of Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex). According to his findings, home country 
factors (Mexican political-cultural context) did not explain why Pemex chose a cooperative 
climate strategy as Mexico was then “decades away from mandating greenhouse gas 
reductions” (p.241). Rather, it was the ‘industry peers and industry leaders’ that played a 
more important role. Pemex (peer) followed BP’s proactive climate strategies (leader) and 
imported “climate protection norms and practices” (p.252), aiming to become a world class 
company (p.248). The fact that Pemex pursued a cooperative climate strategy proposed an 
alternative possibility to the study of climate strategies in the O&G industry in developing 
countries, where the ‘race-to-the-bottom’ had been one of the prevailing discourses. 
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2.2.1.2   Literature in the second, third, fourth and fifth group examining O&G 
industry and environmental responsibility, firms and corporate responses to climate 
change, firms and corporate environmental responsibility and CSR, and firms and 
corporate strategies respectively 
Literature reviewed in the 2
nd
, 3
rd
,4
th
 and 5
th
 group shown in Figure1 has broader 
study scope than those in the 1
st
 group. The broadest one is the study of firms (in particular 
MNCs) and the determinants for their corporate strategies. Interestingly enough, the present 
study found that a broader study scope does not necessarily mean that a larger number of 
determinants are covered. Much of the literature in this group conducted an in-depth 
investigation on one or a few specific determinants; while some had proposed multi-
determinants which were not so distinctive from those already mentioned in the first group. 
Some examples of journal papers which studied one or several determinants are a) Sharma 
(2000), who studied ‘managerial interpretations’ (whether firm managers interpreted 
environmental issues as a threat or opportunity) as a determinant for a proactive or reactive 
corporate environmental strategy of 99 O&G companies in Canada, b)  Kolk et al. (2008), 
who analyzed Financial Times 500 firms and pointed out the importance of institutional 
investors (investment banks and pension funds in the UK and other regions) in encouraging 
firms’ disclosure of climate change activities through the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), 
which is a well-known voluntary carbon disclosure and reporting mechanism, and c) Reid 
and Toffel (2009), who investigated activist groups and government actors as factors that 
drove 524 firms listed in S&P 500 index to disclose climate change activities. 
Regarding examples of authors who studied multiple determinants, a) Bansal and 
Roth (2000) studied 53 firms in UK and Japan and proposed three key determinants for 
ecological responsiveness, which were competitiveness (firms expected to gain long-term 
profitability), legitimation (firms complied with legislation, norms, values or beliefs), and 
ecological responsibility (firms acted out of a sense of obligation, responsibility or 
philanthropy rather than out of self-interest; environmental protective was the right thing to 
do or a feel-good issue), b) Kolk et al.(2001) examined Fortune Global 250 firms, 
suggesting that the nationality and business sector of firms influences the frequency of 
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environmental reporting (firms whose country of origin had strict legislation and active 
environmental social movement, as well as being located in non-financial sectors, will 
result in a higher frequency of environmental reporting), c) Okereke (2007) took UK FTSE 
100 companies as an empirical case study and concluded that profits and external pressures 
from government, NGOs, investors, market shift, and O&G price were motivations and 
drivers for corporate carbon management, d) Jeswani et al.(2008) conducted a massive 
study sending questionnaires to 1028 companies in the UK and 450 companies in Pakistan 
(with 108 and 72 returns, respectively), and drew the conclusion that owners, company 
management and regulatory agencies had a strong influence, while employees, competitors, 
industrial associations, insurance companies, clients or customers, financial institutes and 
NGOs were considered to have a low influence on corporate responses to climate change , 
and e) Suttipun and Stanton (2012) randomly selected 75 from the 500 companies listed on 
SET 2007 (Stock Exchange of Thailand) to find out the factors that influenced the amount 
of environmental disclosure and suggested five key determinants including size of 
company, type of industry, ownership status, country of origin of the company and 
profitability.   
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2.2.1.3   Comparing literature between the 1st group and the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th groups  
The first apparent difference is the methodology used by authors in the 1
st
 group and 
2
nd
-5
th
  groups regarded the targets of study and research approaches. It appears that authors 
in the 2
nd
, 3
rd
, 4
th
, 5
th
 group have taken larger samples than those in the 1
st
 group in term of 
the number of companies and sectors. Firms that were the targets of study in the 2nd group 
were more diverse in country of origin, not only including those in the US or EU. They 
included for example Canada (Sharma, 2000), Japan (Kolk et al., 2001), Pakistan (Jeswani 
et al., 2008) and Thailand (Suttipun and Stanton, 2012). In addition, the 2
nd
 group literature 
examined a wide range of sampling, drawing up a ‘theory’ through a deductive research 
approach. In the opposite, the 1
st
 group literature thoroughly investigated a small number of 
O&G companies and generalized the understanding of the determinants that influence 
climate strategies of O&G industry based on an inductive approach, which resulted in the 
critical gaps mentioned in section 3.2.1.  However, the 1
st
 group literature managed to 
obtain insights from key stakeholders in O&G companies by interviewing CEOs and 
management; whereas the 2
nd
, 3
rd
, 4
th
, 5
th
 group relied more on secondary data analysis such 
as corporate environment reports and quantitative approaches, such as a questionnaire 
surveys.  In addition, the 1
st 
group followed the change in climate strategy of major O&G 
companies; and took into account the ‘time’ variable. The results drawn by the 2nd, 3
rd
, 4
th
, 
5
th
 group literature lacked this chronological context; thus leading to ambiguity of the 
findings as time passes.            
 The second difference is the determinants. The present study found one journal 
paper in the 2
nd
, 3
rd
, 4
th
, 5
th
 group literature that touched upon the host country factors which 
were overlooked by the 1
st
 group. Sethi and Elango (2000) proposed in their framework for 
analyzing the country of origin influence on MNCs strategy that the host country has the 
“bargaining power that provides a country with the wherewithal with which to influence an 
industry’s overall global strategy and structure in ways that are more beneficial to the needs 
of the host country” (p.295). According to them, the host country context can influence to 
some extent the corporate strategies of MNCs. However, whether this finding would apply 
to the climate change strategies of O&G companies has not yet examined. 
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2.2.2  Gaps in the literature  
The existing literature has focused on attempting to examine the variety of factors 
that can enhance knowledge on the behavior of O&G companies regarding climate change 
mitigation. A number of determinants from literature, both specifically examining O&G 
industry’s climate change strategies and more general corporate strategies, were illustrated 
in section 2.2.1. The factors that were considered by other authors were comprised of 
tangible variables and normative factors (norm, values, culture and regime), and are related 
to diverse actors i.e. O&G companies (size, profitability, nationality, CEOs, employees, 
ownership status, organizational structure, main products, renewable energy investment), 
state actors (home country and host country’s government), and non-state actors (NGOs, 
consumers, company competitor or counterparts, industrial association).  Finally, some 
factors relate to the international level as a majority of O&G companies are MNCs 
(international industrial association, other industries, peer companies and leaders). However, 
the present study found that there is one major gap in literature, as all these studies 
generally focus on the individual corporate responses of each O&G company to climate 
change. While individual efforts are important, the collective activities on climate change 
mitigation among companies in the same or across industries is vital if climate change is to 
be addressed at the macro level.        
 To fill in this gap Chaiyapa et al. (2016) investigated the factors that can influence 
the establishment of sectoral approaches, essentially a possible form of collective action by 
companies in the oil and gas industry to climate change mitigation. Sectoral approaches 
activities would represent a concerted group effort by companies in the sector to intensify 
climate change mitigation efforts. If well-established they have the potential to addressing 
competitiveness distortion as well as carbon leakages, which result from the uneven 
distribution of responsibility to reduce GHG emissions between developed and developing 
countries under the Kyoto Protocol. O&G companies in the upstream industry in Thailand 
were the focus of the study, thus offering an analysis of the climate change strategies of 
local branches of major multinational oil and gas companies, as compared to those of 
Thailand’s national company. Finally, the authors conducted an online questionnaire and 
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semi-structured interviews with company and non-company respondents and found that the 
government of Thailand was considered the most influential actor and should take the 
initiative in establishing sectoral approaches in the upstream oil and gas industry. Company 
respondents pointed out that they were willing to comply with government policy and 
preferred a sectoral agreement with Thai government.    
 Nevertheless, there is some rooms for further investigation on sectoral approaches 
to climate change mitigation in the upstream oil and gas industry. Chaiyapa et al. (2016) 
suggested that the number of company respondents as well as data collecting more data 
from company headquarters would be an interesting path of future research, in order to 
examine in more depth factors related to the International Relations model. Changing the 
area of study from Thailand to other developing countries was another of the suggested 
potential research directions, examining whether the governments of other developing 
countries can be considered to be the main determinant of the upstream oil and gas 
companies. Last but not least, the transnational sectoral approach among companies across 
countries such as in Southeast Asian region was identified by Chaiyapa et al. (2016) as an 
attractive research topic. As the region established the ASEAN Economic Community 
(AEC) in 2015, it might be potentially possible for a transnational sectoral approach to be 
established amongst member countries.    
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2.3    Literature examining renewable energy investment and divestment 
of O&G companies  
Some of the literature in this group overlapped with those reviewed in section 2.2, 
as renewable energy investment is one of climate change mitigation activities that O&G 
companies have pursued. To name a few examples, Levy and Kolk (2002) and Pulver 
(2007) both referred to the renewable energy development projects of O&G companies in 
their studies of what determined corporate responses to climate change. However, besides 
these there is also a number of other authors who have specifically focused on the 
renewable energy projects that have been undertaken by fossil fuel companies. The purpose 
of these studies ranged from merely reviewing actual renewable energy development and 
commercialization projects of major O&G companies (Csomos, 2014), examining how the 
companies integrated solar PV business in their organizational structure (Pinkse and Buuse, 
2012), to critically examining why the companies entered and left the renewable energy 
business (Davis, 2006; Penha, 2011; Miller,2013; Johnson, 2015). Additionally, Schweitzer 
(2015) crosschecked rhetoric and actions to find out if O&G companies put into practice 
their discourses on sustainability.  
2.3.1     Results and discussion on the reviewed literature  
Similar to the literature highlighted in section 2.2, most of the literature in this 
section investigated the green business of USA and EU-based multinational O&G 
companies; namely ExxonMobil, Chevron, BP, Shell, Statoil, and Total. Penha (2011) was 
an exception as the author chose as case studies O&G companies which had a high ranking 
in Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, thus covering both International Oil Companies (IOCs) 
such as BP, Chevron, ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, Shell, Total and National Oil 
Companies (NOCs) like Gazprom (Russia), PDVSA (Venezuela), Saudi Aramco (Saudi 
Arabia), Statoil Hydro (Norway), and Eni (Italy). Chaiyapa et al. (2017) pushed the 
boundary of the subject matter to cover climate change mitigation activities of O&G 
companies in Thailand and found that most of them did not actually invest in renewable 
energy. Rather, most of the companies studied by Chaiyapa et al. (2017) undertook basic 
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mitigation activities such as preparing a GHG inventory, improving energy efficiency, 
elaborating GHG reduction targets, or conducting reforestation efforts. The study noted that 
Thailand’s national oil company, PTT, was the only one among the five companies 
analyzed that invested in various alternative and renewable energy projects. The rest were 
foreign companies that had not yet shown any interest in diversifying their energy portfolio. 
 The study of the investments in renewable energy that are made by O&G companies 
is vital to sustainable development, as they could contribute to the transformation and 
greening of the energy sector, helping the transition to a low-carbon energy future. 
However, academic literature appears to have limitations in capturing the rapid changes 
that are taking place in the 21
st
 century. Volatility of crude oil prices, the discovery of shale 
oil and gas, new global climate change agreements, as well as the global movement to 
divest from fossil fuel are a few examples of changing world-wise phenomena that is 
affecting corporate strategies in the renewable energy business. It appears that most up-to-
date knowledge on the subject matter has been mostly written in the form of news articles 
in particular those published by the Economist, the Guardian, and Bloomberg, rather than 
published as the academic literature. Thus, in the present thesis the author reviewed both 
academic literature and news articles to design an analytical framework on factors that 
could influence renewable energy investment/divestment of O&G companies in the course 
of the 21
st
 century. See more detail in Chapter 3.  
2.3.2      Gaps in the literature 
Academic literature and media have long scrutinized big oil multinational 
corporations from both sides of Atlantic Ocean and the renewable energy investments or 
divestments they have made, which can be traced back to the first oil shocks in the 1970s. 
Since then the world has kept on changing rapidly, especially in the first 15 years of the 21
st
 
century, which caused major changes in the way that O&G companies invest in renewable 
energy. However, it should be noted that so far academic literature has not moved fast 
enough to capture those changes, which represents a substantial gap in literature, and 
highlights the need for academia to catch up with the rapid changes taking place in the 
industry.    
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The present research thus aims to expand the horizon of this subject matter. First, 
the case studies must be enlarged to cover National Oil Companies (NOCs), particularly 
those that are operating in developing countries. NOCs, as Victor (2007) pointed out, 
represent around 80% of world’s proven reserves; while International Oil Companies 
(IOCs) have been experiencing decreasing reserves and have been pushed to move to areas 
where O&G exploration and production are challenging. In addition, special attention 
should be paid to NOCs in developing countries, where the dilemma between improving 
energy security to maintain economic growth and investing in sustainable energy to reduce 
GHG emission is acute.  To what extent NOCs in emerging economies welcome the 
development of disruptive renewable energy technologies appears to be under-examined in 
literature.           
 More importantly, there seems to be a wide gap in literature regarding a lack of 
analysis on the discourses that O&G companies have used to legitimize their business 
diversification from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources, given the fact that such 
renewable energy technology is not their core business. A number of authors have applied 
and carried out a discourse analysis on government energy policy. For example, Andrews 
(2005) outlined how the discourse on energy security was one of the main rationales behind 
the US federal energy policies from 1954 to 2003. Lovell (2008) took the case of low 
energy housing in the UK to illustrate the influence of the discourse on an innovation 
journey, stating that sustainable housing innovation became narrowly reframed as a low-
carbon or low-energy housing as climate change emerged as a dominant part of the UK’s 
policy agenda in late 1990s. Scrase and Ockwell (2010) analysed the UK’s energy policy 
reviews in 2006-2007 and found that the discourse on energy security was particularly 
emphasized and used consistently to promote nuclear power as an important option for the 
UK’s energy supply. Otherwise, Eckersley (2016) conducted a comparative discourse 
analysis to examine how German and Norwegian governments have relied heavily on a 
discourse of Green Growth to legitimate their climate change policies and diplomacy.  
 However, to date there has been little effort to analyse the discourses of the private 
sector, in particular O&G companies (Livesey, 2002; Livesey and Kearins, 2002; Breeze, 
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2012). Conducting a discourse analysis on the strategy of O&G companies regarding 
renewable energy investment is significant for at least two reasons. First, as many scholars 
have attempted to understand what could be the driving factors and barriers for renewable 
energy diffusion or penetration (Dulal et al., 2013; Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006; Painuly, 
2001; Reddy and Painuly, 2004; Sovacool, 2009; Sovacool et al., 2011), the findings from a 
discourse analysis on the investments in renewable energy of O&G companies can provide 
another missing piece of the total picture. The second reason lies around the argument that 
O&G companies could play a crucial role in the transition to low-carbon development in 
low and middle income countries.  Essentially, it is crucial to understand the rhetoric or 
discourses which companies have used to explain their motivations, as this can help explain 
the way in which the executives in these companies think. Such findings are undoubtedly 
beneficial for policy makers to attempt to harness the huge resources of companies –even 
those in the O&G sector- to help in the sustainable energy development of human society. 
By attempting so solve the gaps in literature that have been highlighted in the present 
chapter, the author hopes that this thesis will help the sustainable development of human 
society, and further the field of Sustainability Science.    
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Chapter 3 Research methodology  
 
3.1   Targets of study (ASEAN’s major O&G companies) 
 The present study aims to expand the study of O&G industry and its renewable 
energy investment by including National Oil Companies (NOCs) from developing 
countries. As the starting point, three NOCs in three Southeast Asian countries; namely 
PTT from Thailand, PERTAMINA from Indonesia and PETRONAS from Malaysia, were 
chosen as case studies. This is due to the fact that they are primary energy suppliers of their 
respective countries which are top three countries in term of oil and gas production as 
shown in Table 2 (adopted from data IEA, 2013).  Moreover, all three companies were 
listed in the Fortune Global 500 as the top 500 companies in the world in term of revenues 
and profits. They are only three companies from Southeast Asia that were ranked in the list. 
Besides, the present study included two associates of PTT; Thai Oil and Bangchak for an 
in-depth analysis of Thailand case. It is noted that PTT has many other associated 
companies. Yet the study chose to include only Thai Oil and Bangchak because they are 
only two O&G associates of PTT which have invested in renewable energy. In so doing, 
the present study aims to examine whether associate companies operating in the same 
country have similar or different corporate strategies to climate change mitigation. Details 
of each company are presented in Table 3. 
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Table 2 Oil and gas reserves and productions in Southeast Asian countries 
 
Table 3 Detail of each company studied  
          
 
                                                          
2
 tcm stands for trillion cubic meter, bcm stands for billion cubic meters and bd/d stands for kilo barrels of oil per day 
Country 
ranks 
Natural gas proven 
reserves (tcm)2 
Natural gas 
production in 2011 
(bcm) 
Oil proven reserve 
(Billion barrel) 
Oil production in 2012 
(kb/d) 
1 Indonesia 3.1 Indonesia 81 Vietnam 4.4 Indonesia 889 
2 Malaysia  2.4 Malaysia 56 Malaysia 4.0 Malaysia 674 
3 Vietnam  0.7 Thailand 28 Indonesia 2.7 Thailand 393 
4 Brunei  0.4 Brunei 13 Brunei 1.1 Vietnam 356 
5 Thailand 0.3 Vietnam 9 Thailand 0.5 Brunei 140 
6 Philippines 0.1 Philippines 4 Philippines 0.1 Philippines 34 
  Rest of ASEAN 0.5 Rest of ASEAN 12 Rest of ASEAN 0.1 Rest of ASEAN 17 
  Total of ASEAN 7.5 Total of ASEAN 203 Total of ASEAN 12.9 Total of ASEAN 2503 
Share   
of World 
3.5% 6.0% 0.8% 2.9% 
Companies Rank in Fortune Global 500 
(2016) 
Ownership structure Listed in stock 
market 
PETRONAS 125th 100% owned by government No 
PTT 146th 51% owned by government Yes 
PERTAMINA 230th 100% owned by government  No 
Thai Oil No PTT holds  49.10% of shares Yes 
Bangchak No PTT held 27.22%  (until2016) Yes 
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3.2   Scope of study  
Content: The present research aims to investigate how five major O&G companies 
in Southeast Asian countries can contribute to mitigate global climate change, by focusing 
on the renewable energy investment as it is one way to achieve the targets of the Paris 
agreement, the Sustainable Development Goals and to lead to a transition to a low-carbon 
energy future. Thus, the research exclusively examined the actual renewable energy 
projects and the language that companies used to justify their investments in green energy. 
The researcher acknowledges that the role of O&G companies is not necessarily limited to 
investment in renewable energy in order to reduce GHG emissions, and that renewable 
energy technology itself is currently being studied regarding both potential and actual 
social, economic and environmental impacts. However, the former was investigated already 
in the previous work of Chaiyapa et al. (2017); the latter is beyond the scope of this study. 
 Study period: The period for the study in sub-objective 1-2 was fixed to 2001-2015. 
The researcher collected the first year of annual reports which are available in the 
companies’ websites, until the year 2015. For the study in sub-objective 3, the data 
collection was finished in December 2016. All interview data from stakeholders in 
Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia reflected perceptions/opinions and situations at the time 
in which the interviews were conducted.  
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3.3   Methodology for sub-objective 1 
To achieve sub-objective 1, a thorough review on actual renewable energy 
investment projects of the five companies, namely PTT, Thai Oil, Bangchak, PETRONAS 
and PERTAMINA, during the first 15 years of 21
st
 century was carried out. The present 
study collected all available secondary data of companies i.e. annual reports, sustainability 
reports to review their actual renewable energy projects. Then the findings were 
crosschecked with the data found in news articles in online newspapers and websites of 
private organizations such as biofuels associations in respective countries. Moreover, 
primary data from semi-structured interviews with company respondents and other 
stakeholders were also collected to obtain more up-to-date and insightful information in 
addition to what was written in the companies’ reports. Table 4 presents an interviewees list 
from Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia.  
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Table 4 Interviewees list in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia 
Country 
 
Stakeholders 
Thailand 
 
 
Malaysia Indonesia 
O&G companies 
 
 
PTT Public Co., Ltd. 
 Executive Vice President, PTT Research 
and Technology Institute 
Global Power Synergy Public Co., Ltd. 
 Division Manager, Corporate Strategy 
Division 
Bangchak Petroleum Public Co., Ltd. 
 Vice President, Corporate Sustainability 
Development Office 
Thai Oil Public Co., Ltd. 
 Vice President-Strategic Planning 
 
PETRONAS 
 Head(Macro), Strategic Research 
 Manager, Energy &Environment, 
Strategy Research, Corporate Strategy  
PERTAMINA 
 New & Renewable Energy 
Business, Gas Directorate 
PERTAMINA Geothermal Energy 
 Secretary of Board of Commissions 
Government offices 
 
 
 Bureau of Biofuel Development 
Department of Alternative Energy 
Development and Efficiency, Ministry of 
Energy of Thailand (3 persons) 
 Renewable Energy Expert, Department of 
Alternative Energy Development and 
Efficiency Ministry of Energy (2 persons) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Under Secretary, Biofuel Division, 
Ministry Of Plantation Industries and 
Commodities Malaysia 
 Assistant Secretary, Biofuel Division (2 
persons) 
 Assistant Director, Renewable Energy 
Technology Division, Sustainable 
Energy Development Authority 
Malaysia (SEDA) 
 Deputy Director of Program Various 
New Energy and Renewable Energy, 
Director General of New, Renewable 
Energy and Energy Conservation 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral 
Resources 
 Head of Division for Analysis and 
Evaluation Bioenergy Program, 
Directorate Bioenergy  
 Deputy Director for Technical and 
Environmental Regulation and 
Compliance, Directorate General of Oil 
and Gas (Migas) 
 Preparation and Evaluation of 
Geothermal Concession Area Division, 
Directorate of Geothermal  
 Commercial Attache, U.S.  Commercial 
Service, US Department of Commerce        
  (3 persons) 
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Country 
 
Stakeholders 
Thailand 
 
 
Malaysia Indonesia 
Scholars/research 
institutes/ NPOs 
 
 
 
 Thai researcher, Asia Pacific Energy 
Research Centre (APERC) The Institute of 
Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ) 
 Lecturer of Energy Division, King 
Mongkut’s University of Technology 
Thonburi, Bangkok 
 Board of Director, Technical Petroleum 
Training Institute (Former Director 
General of Department of Alternative 
Energy Development and Efficiency) 
 Analyst, Petroleum Institute of Thailand 
(PTIT) 
 
 Senior Lecturer Department of Mechanical 
Engineering, Faculty of Malaya, University 
of Malaya 
 Malaysian researcher, Asia Pacific Energy 
Research Centre (APERC) The Institute of 
Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ) 
 Agency for the Assessment 
and Application of Technology (BPPT)  
 Indonesian research, Asia Pacific 
Energy Research Centre (APERC) The 
Institute of Energy Economics, Japan 
(IEEJ) 
Private sector 
 
 
 
 Director, Unitrio Technology Limited 
(Solar PV installment company) 
 President, Association of Ethanol 
Producers of Thailand 
 
 Deputy President, Malaysian Biodiesel 
Association (MBA) 
 
 
 
 
 President, Asosiasi Produsen Biofuel 
Indonesia 
 NGOs 
 
 
 
 Greenpeace Southeast Asia 
 Green World Foundation 
 
 
 Executive Director, Centre for Environment, 
Technology &Development Malaysia 
(CETDEM) 
 
 
                     nil 
Others    One interviewee prefers not to be revealed 
both name and affiliation. 
 
In total (persons) 17  
 
10 11 
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3.4   Methodology for sub-objective 2 
The study conducted discourse analysis examining the ‘rhetoric’ or ‘reasons’ for 
each company to make investments in renewable energy by employing the MAXQDA 
software, which was chosen due to its powerful visualization tools, which suits the research 
objectives well.  It is important to note that MAXQDA only facilitates (re)reading and 
rearranging of materials, rather than automating the analysis. Hence, all analysis and 
interpretation processes were conducted by the authors, based on a grounded theory 
approach which involves coding, identifying recurrent patterns or themes, and finally 
building up a cohesive representation of the data (Warren and Karner, 2010).  
 The study analysed the annual reports of five O&G companies, namely PTT- a 
state-owned company of Thailand and two of its associates- Bangchak and Thai Oil, 
PERTAMINA – a state-owned company of Indonesia and PETRONAS- a state owned 
company of Malaysia. The annual reports do not only illustrate overall business operations 
but also include speeches and messages from CEOs. These annual reports were available 
from company websites, and the present study made use of all which are available online 
until the 2015 annual report, the latest published at the time of writing.  PTT and Thai Oil 
were listed in the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) in 2001 and 2004 respectively, and 
thus their annual reports started in these years. Bangchak was listed in SET since 1994, but 
despite the best efforts by the researcher, only annual reports from 2002 could be accessed.  
As of December 2016 Bangchak’s website only holds annual reports from 2007. 
PERTAMINA and PETRONAS are not listed in the Stock Exchange; thus they are not 
obliged to publish annual reports. Table 4 presents the annual reports collected from each 
company’s website. 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
Table 5 Annual reports of five companies studied 
Company Annual reports Number of reports 
PTT 2001-2015 15 
Bangchak 2002-2015 14 
Thai Oil 2004-2015 12 
PERTAMINA 2006-2015 10 
PETRONAS 2008-2015 8 
Total 59 
 
To answer research question No.1 in sub-objective 2 “what are discourses each oil 
and gas company applies to justify a given source of renewable energy?”,the present study 
ran a discourse analysis starting by identifying key words regarding different types of 
renewable energy i.e. biofuels (gasohol
3
, biodiesel
4
), solar PV, wind, geothermal, ocean, 
tidal, biogas
5
 and key conjunctions reflecting causes of action i.e. ‘to’, ‘in order to’, ‘so 
that’, ‘for’.  Sentences or phrases which had such key words embedded were recorded as 
discourse fragments. Then, the authors conducted a thematic coding to group all related 
discourse fragments under a theme or a discourse strand by 1) systematically identifying 
key words that occurred repeatedly, such as ‘government’, ‘environment’, ‘HM the King’, 
‘farmers’ or 2) interpreting the meanings of those sentences. To give some examples, the 
discourse fragments “the innovation could respond to the government policy” (PTT, 2008), 
                                                          
3
 Gasohol, “a gasoline extender made from a mixture of gasoline (90%) and ethanol (10%; often obtained by fermenting 
agricultural crops or crop wastes) or gasoline (97%) and methanol, or wood alcohol (3%). Gasohol has higher octane, or 
antiknock, properties than gasoline and burns more slowly, coolly, and completely, resulting in reduced emissions of 
some pollutants, but it also vaporizes more readily, potentially aggravating ozone pollution in warm weather. Since 1998 
many American automobiles have been equipped to enable them to run on E85, a mixture of 85% ethanol and 15% 
gasoline” (The Columbia Encyclopedia, 2016).  
 
4 Biodiesel, “a fuel made from natural, renewable sources, such as new and used vegetable oils and animal fats, for use in 
a diesel engine. Biodiesel has physical properties very similar to petroleum-derived diesel fuel, but its emission properties 
are superior. Diesel blends containing up to 20% biodiesel can be used in nearly all diesel-powered equipment, and 
higher-level blends and pure biodiesel can be used in many engines with little or no modification” (The Columbia 
Encyclopedia, 2016). 
 
5 Biogas: “a mixture of methane and carbon dioxide resulting from the anaerobic decomposition of such waste materials 
as domestic, industrial, and agricultural sewage. The decomposition is carried out by methanogenic bacteria (see 
methanogen); these obligate anaerobes produce methane, the main component of biogas, which can be collected and used 
as an energy source for domestic processes, such as heating, cooking, and lighting” (The Columbia Encyclopedia, 2016). 
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“investment on palm oil plantation is in line with government policy on alternative energy 
and global warming caused by oil consumption”  (PTT, 2009, 2010) were grouped under 
the discourse strand “Response to government policy”; while the discourse fragments 
“gasohol replaces gasoline and biodiesel replaces diesel”, “promoting alternative energy 
like gasohol, bio-diesel and NGV for greater self-reliance” and “E85 gasohol, with a higher 
ethanol content, will lead to less dependence on imported fuels” were grouped under the 
discourse strand “Enhance energy security and lessen imported oil” (PTT, 2007, 2008, 
2010).           
 Following the work of Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999) and Erkama and Vaara 
(2010), the present study then categorised discourses found in the annual reports of each 
company into four discursive legitimation strategies. This method is to answer research 
question No.2 in sub-objective 2, “what sort of discursive legitimation strategies are used to 
justify a given renewable energy by oil and gas companies in Thailand, Indonesia and 
Malaysia?”. Table 6 shows the four types of discursive legitimacy strategies with the 
explanation on what the legitimacy was drew upon.  
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Table 6 Discursive legitimation strategies 
 
After Van Leeuwen and Wodak proposed four categories of discursive legitimation 
strategies in their work in 1999, many other scholars have further studied and advanced the 
four fundamental categories by adding additional categories or changing the labels of the 
original ones. The work of Ekama and Vaara (2010) is one example of attempts to push 
forward the knowledge on discursive legitimation strategies. In their work, the authors 
renamed Authorization, Rationalization and Moral evaluation strategies as Ethos, Logos, 
and Pathos respectively in order to emphasize the rhetorical aspect of discourses rather than 
their semantic functions which Van Leeuwen and Wodak used in their work. As for the 
Mythopoesis strategy, the authors divided it into two sub-types; namely Authopoiesis and 
Cosmo. It is noted that there are other studies that proposed other types of legitimation 
strategies. Drawing upon Van Leeuwen and Wodak’s work, Vaara and Tienari (2008) 
studied discursive legitimation strategies of Multinational Corporations. However, they 
Grammar of legitimation 
(Van Leeuwen and Wodak 
1999) 
Legitimacy was drew 
upon 
Rhetorical strategies 
(Erkama and Vaara 
(2010) 
Examples 
Authorization References to authorities Ethos 
-   Persons (experts, 
ministers, CEOs) 
-    Laws, regulations, 
policies, Bible 
 
Rationalization 
References to knowledge 
claims or argument 
Logos - Economic benefits 
- Financial performance 
Moral evaluation References to value system Pathos 
-    Fairness 
-    Human equality 
Mythopoesis 
Legitimation achieved by 
narratives, stories on the 
past or the future 
Authopoiesis - Business plan 
 
Cosmo 
-    Future 
-    Inevitability of   
globalization 
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proposed five strategies instead of four; namely they added Normalization which is 
separated from Authorization in order to “emphasize the importance of strategies used to 
render specific actions or phenomena normal or natural”. Vaara (2014) studied how media 
in Finland did legitimation, delegitmation and relegitimation on the Eurozone crisis. The 
author identified more types of legitimation strategies, which are Position-based 
authorization, Knowledge-based authorizations, Rationalizations, Moral evaluations, 
Mythopoiesis
6
 and Cosmology. The aforementioned works demonstrate that the 
understanding on discursive legitimation strategies is ongoing research and open for new 
interpretations. However, the present research chose to follow the four types of discursive 
legitimation strategies of Van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999). This is because while these are 
the fundamental concepts, the new type of legitimation strategies that other scholars have 
added on are more like sub-types of those four basic categories.  
3.4.1 Strength of discourse analysis on annual reports 
The use of annual report is a well-established unit of analysis in discourse studies. 
Particularly in organizational legitimacy theory scholars have used annual reports as raw 
data to run discourse analysis, for example, the study of legitimation strategies in annual 
reports of O&G companies after the Deepwater Horizon incident (Breeze, 2012), and the 
study of discourses in CEOs’ letters written in annual reports (Hyland, 1998). Annual 
reports are official documents of companies. In each annual report, there are a wide range 
of contents, ranging from CEOs’ speeches and financial fact sheets to descriptions of 
business operations for core businesses and new projects they are implementing. PTT, Thai 
Oil and Bangchak are listed in the stock market; thus, every year the companies are 
organizing Annual General Meeting (AGM) which serves as a platform for the companies 
to meet their shareholders. However, only shareholders are invited to participate and what 
the companies say in the AGM is not shared to the public. Thus, annual reports are among a 
few available sources of information regarding the performance of companies and their 
operations, which anyone can access. In addition, a literature review in discourse studies 
                                                          
6
 In the work of Vaara (2014), the term is spelled as Mythopoiesis; while in the work of Van Leeuwen and Wodak(1999) 
it was written as Mythopoesis (without-i).  
38 
 
indicates that scholars have used either annual reports or sustainability reports (Han Onn 
and Woodley, 2014). However, the five companies examined in this study just started 
producing sustainability reports recently (PETRONAS in 2007, PTT in 2008, Thai Oil and 
Bangchak in 2009 and PERTAMINA). As a result, the number of sustainability reports 
from these companies is not sufficient to trace back their green energy investments in the 
past 15 years, which is the focus of sub-objective 1.  
3.4.2 Limitations of discourse analysis on annual reports 
The discourse analysis on annual reports is based on the idea that the public are 
obtaining the messages that the companies convey in their annual reports. However, in 
reality people in general are unlikely to read the report, while investors and NGOs are the 
most likely to follow and investigate the performance of the companies through annual 
reports. Consequently, the discourse the companies used in annual reports may not be able 
to influence the wide public acceptance or awareness of renewable energy projects.   
 Moreover, the contribution of discourse studies is to reveal the communication 
strategies which O&G companies used to promote or justify their new green energy 
products, though what the companies used as a reason for their green investment cannot be 
regarded as an actual rationale for them to take action. This limitation is common in 
existing literature regarding applied discourse analysis on secondary data, such as the 
sustainability reports of the mining industry (Han Onn and Woodley, 2014). To clarify the 
limitation of discourse analysis, the present study sought consultation with an expert in the 
discipline, Florian Schneider, who kindly explained as following: 
“Discourse analysis itself can never fully establish what specific intentions 
are or what the people engaged in discourse are actually thinking. From a 
strict discourse-theoretical perspective, these intentions and thoughts do 
not really matter. All that matters is how different agents shape the ‘truths’ 
of the topic. From that perspective, the documents you are analyzing aren’t 
interesting because they tell you what the companies are actually doing. 
They are interesting because they demonstrate how the companies ‘make 
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sense’ of what they are doing. The focus here is on their conceptual labour 
and how this discursive work informs conceptions of green energy, 
production processes, etc. Whether their statements are genuine or ‘just’ 
PR is secondary. At any rate, if we wanted to establish intentions or deep 
thoughts about such things, we would have to do so through other research 
approaches, for example trick questions in surveys, psychological 
experiments, etc” (Schneider, 2016). 
As a result, in the study of sub-objective 3, the researcher applied a different methodology 
to investigate factors that influence O&G companies to invest in or divest from low-carbon 
energy. 
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3.5 Methodology for sub-objective 3 
The study began with a review on existing literature both academic journal, books 
and news articles from well-known business newspapers/magazines i.e. the Guardian, the 
Economist and Bloomberg since 2000 to 2017 to identify all factors, which are matter for 
decision-making of O&G companies for renewable energy investment. As majority of those 
literature examined a small group of major O&G companies such as ExxonMobil, Shell, 
BP, Total, Statoil, Saudi Aramco, the factors identified are those which influence world 
major IOCs from the western developed world and NOCs from the middle east. The present 
study thus aims to examine whether these factors can be applied with five O&G companies 
from Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia or not, and whether there are novel factors that are 
specific to NOCs and its associates from developing Southeast Asian countries.  
 The factors were grouped into three sets in an analytical framework in order to 
analyze the data systematically. The criteria of grouping is based on works of Skjærseth 
and Skodvin (2009) and Chaipaya et al. (2016). Three groups are company’s specific 
features, national factors and global factors. The first group- Company’s specific features- 
proposes that company’s own characteristics influence its behavior, which is in this case a 
renewable energy investment. The first group comprises of ownership structure and role of 
CEOs and shareholders, short-term economic advantages, long-term economic advantages, 
compatibility of RE to core expertise, corporate social responsibility, lesson learned from 
experiences in renewable energy business, and view on global climate change. 
 The second group-National factors, proposes that “corporations are affected by a 
social demand for environmental protection, governmental supply of climate policies and 
the political institutions linking supply and demand (Skjærseth and Skodvin, 2009). These 
national factors are discussed only to factors at home countries of the O&G companies and 
not including those in the host countries where they have business operation. They are 
national policy and incentive on renewable energy and climate mitigation policy, country 
O&G reserves and resources on renewable energy, and civil society.   
 The third group-Global factors, proposes that corporate strategies of O&G 
companies get affected by the international factors and phenomenon, be them global 
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divestment movement, development and cost of RE technology, world crude oil prices, 
global climate change agreement, peer influence among companies in industry and 
discovery of shale oil and gas. Overview of factors in the analytical framework is shown in 
Table 7.  It is noted that the factors under a column Tier 1 are those found in the literature; 
while Tier 2 factors are created to show a theme which Tier 1 factors have commonly.  For 
example, shortage of capital, maturity of company’s operation and carbon intensity of 
company (company’s O&G reserve and production) are the factors which were studied in 
the literature. However, the present study grouped them together because they affect the 
short-term economic advantage of the O&G companies.       
 To investigate the factors which influence five O&G companies in Thailand, 
Malaysia and Indonesia to invest in renewable energy (research question No.1 in sub-
objective 3), the present study applied both secondary data and primary data. The semi-
structured interviews with various stakeholders in three countries (see Table 4) were 
conducted to obtain such primary data. Interview data from company respondents were 
crosschecked with data from non-company respondents i.e. government authorities, NGOs, 
academics and private renewable energy companies. In addition, to answer research 
question No.2 in sub-objective 3, the present study discussed first how a given factor 
affected major O&G companies (western IOCs and major NOCs from Middle East). Then 
how five O&G companies in the case study were influenced by the given factor were 
illustrated. Finally, the study recorded all characteristics of O&G companies which are the 
most and the least active in renewable energy investment to build a model (research 
question No.3 in sub-objective 3).  The study proposes that the model can be a stepping-
stone for scholars and policy makers to predict corporate strategies in renewable energy 
investment of other NOCs companies in developing countries and O&G companies in 
general. However, a greater number of case studies certainly enhance a projection ability of 
the model. The study encourages for further research on O&G companies in other 
developing countries.    
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Table 7 Analytical framework to examine factors that influence renewable energy 
investment of O&G companies 
Group Tier one Tier two 
Company 
specific 
features 
 
• CEO’s leadership and vision 
• Ownership structure 
• Shareholder pressure 
 
 Ownership structure and role of CEOs and 
shareholders 
• Shortage of capital 
• Maturity of company’s operation 
• Carbon intensity of company 
(Company’s O&G reserve and production) 
 Short-term economic advantages 
• View on profitability of renewable energy 
• View on future energy mix 
 
 Long-term economic advantages 
• Compatibility of renewable energy to  core 
expertise 
 Compatibility of renewable energy to core 
expertise 
• Company respond to public criticism 
 
 Corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
• Experience loss in renewable energy investment  Lesson learned from past experiences in 
renewable energy business 
• Acknowledge that global climate change is real 
 
 View on global climate change 
National 
factors 
• National policy and incentive on renewable 
energy and climate mitigation policy 
 National policy and incentive on renewable 
energy and climate mitigation policy 
• Country’s oil and gas reserve 
• Country is importer or exporter of energy 
• Country’s RE resources 
 Country O&G reserves and renewable energy 
resources 
• Social movement on environmental issues 
 
 Social demand for environmental conservation 
• Business-government relations 
 
 Business-government relations 
Global factors 
• Volatility of world crude oil prices 
 Volatility of world crude oil prices 
 
• Discovery of shale oil and gas 
 Discovery of shale oil and gas 
 
• Development and cost of renewable energy 
technology 
 Development and cost of renewable energy 
technology  
 
• Global divestment movement 
• The unburnable, stranded assets notion 
 
 Global movement to divest from fossil fuels 
companies 
• Global climate change agreement 
 
 Global climate change agreement 
• Companies follow leaders in the industry 
 
 Peer influence among companies in industry  
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3.6   Relationship of the three sub-objectives of the study  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Relationship of the three sub-objectives of the study 
 
 Relationship between sub-objective 1 and 2 
After a thorough review on actual renewable energy projects done by O&G 
companies in the first 15 years of the 21
st
 century in sub-objective 1, the study identified 
the discourses that the five O&G companies used to explain why they invested in each type 
of renewable energy. The discourse analysis revealed that O&G companies applied 
different discourses varying to the type of renewable energy and that those discourses 
changed over time.  
 
Sub-objective 1 and 2: The study identified all 
discourses that the companies used to explain 
their investment in each type of renewable 
energy. 
Sub-objective 1 and 3: Findings from 
sub-objective 1 serve as benchmarking to 
find the most and the least active 
companies in renewable energy 
investment, while sub-objective 3 
examines how to induce O&G 
companies to increase investment in 
renewable energy. 
Sub-objective 2 and 3: Revealing differences between what the companies said and 
what drives companies to take action.  
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 Relationship between sub-objective 1 and 3 
The study recorded actual renewable energy projects of the five O&G companies 
studied since 2001 until 2015 and conducted benchmarking among them to find which 
companies are the most active and the least active in diversifying their business portfolio 
from fossil fuel to renewable energy. Listing of investment activities among the five 
companies served as a reference for investigating what factors can influence companies to 
invest in renewable energy. In return, the findings from sub-objective 3 enhance 
understanding on why some O&G companies are more active in renewable energy 
investment than others. Additionally, the policy suggestions can be drawn to encourage 
O&G companies in each country to increase their green energy business.   
 Relationship between sub-objective 2 and 3 
Due to the fact that discourse analysis only reveals the communication strategies of 
O&G companies in gaining legitimacy on their new renewable energy projects, the study 
on influential factors in sub-objective 3 provides knowledge on what are the actual 
incentives for O&G companies to make decisions in investing.  The findings of sub-
objective 2 and 3 can be compared to reveal differences between what the companies say 
and what actually drives them to take action. As the results in Chapter 5 and 6 show, some 
discourses found in companies’ annual reports, i.e. government policy and economic profits, 
are referred to as important factors for the companies when making decisions to invest in 
renewable energy business. However, some discourses appear unrecognized, i.e. the King’s 
initiative in biofuel production and helping farmers secure their incomes. In addition, there 
are some factors that are important to decision-making process, though the companies do 
not mention them in their annual reports i.e. pressure from shareholders and business-
government relations. 
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Chapter 4 Renewable energy investments of 
ASEAN’s major O&G companies 
 
4.1     Investment by Thailand’s O&G companies 
4.1.1    Biofuels (biodiesel and gasohol) 
Biofuels (gasohol and biodiesel) have been the prime focus of investments in 
renewable energy by Thailand’s O&G companies, and this was first mentioned in the 2002 
annual reports of both PTT and Bangchak. In 2003, both PTT and Bangchak started selling 
Gasohol 95 (10% of ethanol) at their service stations in Bangkok. Along with expanding 
the number of service stations that offer such products, PTT and Bangchak have made 
constant efforts to offer their customers new products. Gasohol E20 and E85, as well as B2 
and B5 biodiesel, started to be sold by PTT and Bangchak service stations from 2008 and 
2009, respectively. Bangchak started running a marketing strategy by introducing the 
Gasohol Club Card in 2006, which was followed with the Gasohol Club Lady Card in 
2011
7
. PTT, rather than using price promotion, has continuously attempted to introduce 
new fuel products, which their annual reports suggesting that these provide better 
performance regarding engine maintenance and environmental conservation.  
 Thai Oil’s main business activities relate to the refining of oil, and it does not 
participate in the retail market (as opposed to PTT and Bangchak). Nevertheless, Thai Oil 
has engaged in ethanol and biodiesel production. Starting in 2005, slightly later than the 
other PTT and Bangchak, Thai Oil took a bold step on biofuels development by signing a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with partners for a joint study to establish an 
ethanol producing plant which would have a capacity of 1 million litres per day (the largest 
facility in Thailand and the world’s largest ethanol plant using cassava as the primary 
feedstock at the time). The company also established a joint venture with Padaeng Industry 
Plc. and Petrogreen Co., Ltd. in 2007 to set up Maesod Clean Energy Co., Ltd. as the first 
ethanol producer from sugarcane in Thailand, with a capacity of 200,000 liters per day. 
                                                          
7
 The card provides a special discount of 0.2 baht per litre for members who fill their cars with gasohol. 
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Later in 2008, Thai Oil Ethanol Co., Ltd. was established to facilitate investments in 
ethanol production from cassava, with a capacity of 500,000 liters per day. In 2011 Thai Oil 
Ethanol acquired a 21.28% share in Ubon Bio Ethanol (UBE) Co.,Ltd. with Bangchak 
obtaining a further 21.28%. The UBE plant, located in Ubon Rachathani province, has a 
capacity of 400,000 liters per day, producing ethanol from fresh cassava and cassava chips 
supplied by local farmers. With such a large supply of ethanol and limited domestic 
demand at the time, Thai Oil Ethanol considered starting to export ethanol to other 
countries whose governments had enforced ethanol-blending in gasoline policy (such as the 
Philippines, which according to Thai Oil’s 2011 annual report would raise the rate of 
ethanol blending from 5% to 10% by February 2012).      
 Similar to Thai Oil, Bangchak also started the production of ethanol and biodiesel. 
Apart from acquiring shares in Ubon Bio Ethanol, in 2008 Bangchak made a joint 
investment with Universal Absorbent and Chemical Company Limited (UAC) to construct 
a 1,000 million baht-biodiesel plant (approximately $US 33 million). This plant is known 
as the “Bangchak Biofuel Company Limited” at Bang Pa-In, Ayutthaya province, running 
biodiesel production from crude oil palm, with a capacity of 300,000 liters per day. In 2012 
the plant was improved to raise its capacity to 360,000 liters per day.    
 PTT is not directly involved in the running of any ethanol and biodiesel production 
plants. Nevertheless, it has focused on developing non-crop plants for biofuel production by 
actively cooperating with a variety of external organizations. This includes crops such as 
jatropha and algae, which PTT claims can reduce the risk of shortages in raw-materials that 
could arise from using agricultural products for biofuel production (PTT, 2008). The 
Petroleum Product and Alternative Fuels Research Department vice-president, Arunrat 
Wuttimongkolchai, announced at a press conference that the institute had been given 
around 3% of PTT’s profits for research and technology (Aquino, 2015), which amounted 
to 1,426.6 million baht in 2014 (approximately $US47 million).       
 Another interesting development in PTT’s biofuels business strategy was its 
investment in palm oil plantations in Indonesia. In this sense, Bangchak has also invested in 
palm oil plantation since 2012, though only within Thailand (together with the Bank of 
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Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives, to convert abandoned orange farms to palm oil 
plantations). Thai Oil has not pursued any investments in palm oil plantations.  PTT Green 
Energy Co., Ltd. (PTTGE), a wholly owned subsidiary of PTT, was established in 2007 in 
Singapore to oversee the palm oil business. PTTGE acquired 1.2 million rai (192,000 
hectares of landbank), mainly located in Kalimantan, Indonesia for palm oil plantation. It 
has also started to operate crude palm oil production facilities at Pontianak on West 
Kalimantan and Palembang on Sumatra island, with a capacity of 45 tons/hours and 30 
tons/hours, respectively (PTT, 2012). However, PTT’s annual report in 2014 recorded that 
PTTGE had experienced losses from impairment of operating assets, amounting to THB 
2,816 million. The palm oil plantation project was considered ‘costly and unprofitable’, and 
eventually the company decided to sell 95% of the shares of Mitra Aneka Rezeki (MAR), 
the subsidiary of PTTGE that was established to operate PTT's palm plantation and palm-
oil refinery business in Indonesia, to Prasada Jaya Mulia (The Nation, 2014). Moreover, in 
2015 PTTGE signed a Share and Purchase Agreement (SPA) to sell 77.56% of its shares in 
Chancellor Oil Pte.Ltd., which ran palm oil business through PT. First Borneo Plantations 
(PT FBP) in Indonesia (PTT, 2015). The situation on biofuels has apparently not been so 
positive for PTT recently. According to a key respondent interview at PTT the company 
decided to shut down its algae biodiesel R&D project, in which the company had invested 
around 800 million baht during the course of the past decade. The interviewee stated the 
reason for this cancellation is that the algae-based biodiesel has never succeeded in 
reaching the commercialisation stage (PTT interviewee, August 2016).   
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4.1.2    Solar PV and wind energy 
Thailand’s geographical location along the equator offers a plentiful supply of solar 
PV power –with an average radiation of 18.2 MJ/m2/day- and wind energy. Content 
analysis of the annual reports suggested that PTT, Thai Oil and Bangchak have responded 
differently to the country’s plentiful resources. Thai Oil only once mentioned solar and 
wind energy, more specifically in their annual report in 2009. As a response to the then 
government’s alternative energy policy, Thai Oil became a partner of the MFC Energy 
Fund- a team of energy and financial sectors established in 2007-, allowing it to access data 
on various types of alternative and renewable energy for use in future investment. Such 
data was crucial for Thai Oil to reduce risks regarding entering new energy businesses, 
though no further details were later provided on any investment on solar and wind energy. 
Thus, it would appear that all of their efforts to date have been on the development of 
biofuels.   
For PTT and Bangchak, the active development and commercialization of solar PV 
did not come about until recently. PTT’s solar PV development was first mentioned in its 
2007 annual report, which explained that the company had installed a total of 243 solar 
cells -generating 180 watts of power- at the roof of service pumps at a gasoline station in 
Samutprakan province. PTT continued installing solar cells at its service stations in other 
locations, but more concrete investment on solar PV began with the establishment of 
Global Power Synergy Co., Ltd (GPSC) in 2013, which was considered PTT’s power-
business flagship. GPSC entered into a joint venture with Thai Solar Energy Co., Ltd. 
(TSE) to form Thai Solar Renewable (TSR), in which GPSC holds 40% of shares and TSE 
60%. TSR founded Siam Solar Energy 1 (SSE1), which aimed to generate 80 MW from a 
total of 10 photovoltaic solar power plants in the provinces of Kanchanaburi and 
Suphanburi by investing more than 7 billion baht (approximately US$ 233 million) (TSE, 
2011). Recently, PTT invested in the 20.8-MW Ichinoseki Power 1 through GPSC, 
generating electricity to utilities companies in Japan (PTT, 2015). This project shows that 
PTT sought business opportunities in the Solar PV industry overseas. A key informant from 
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GPSC explained that the company invested overseas because of limited quota on Solar PV 
Feed-in-Tariff (FiT) from the government of Thailand (PTT interviewee, August 2016).  
Bangchak appears to have also actively pursued investments to develop and 
commercialize solar PV in the power generation business. In 2009-2010 the company, with 
a 4,200-million-baht loan (approximately US$ 120 millions) from the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB), launched an investment in photovoltaic (PV) power generation project called 
‘Sunny Bangchak’. Bangchak Solar Energy Co., Ltd., (BSE), a wholly owned subsidiary, 
was founded to run the project, which was comprised of three phrases. The first phase was 
a 38 MW-solar farm located in Bang Pa-In district in Ayutthaya province, which became 
operational in 2012. The second phase, 32MW, in Bamentnarong district, Chaiyaphum 
province and Bang Pa-Han district, Ayutthaya province was completed in 2013. In the 
same year, the company signed a 118-MW power purchase agreement (PPA) with the 
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) and the Provincial Electricity 
Authority (PEA). As a result, the third phase was launched at locations that were close to 
the previous phases, in the provinces of Prachinburi, Chaiyaphum and Nakhon Ratchasima, 
in order to reach 118 MW of power generation. For this, the company received an adder 
rate from the government, which was as high as 8 baht per kWh (approximately US$ 0.3). 
The company considered the project as a big success, considering the total revenue being 
2,692 million baht (approximately US$ 82 million) over electricity sales of 232 million 
kWh. In 2015, Bangchak underwent a big organizational restructure by founding BCPG Co. 
Ltd., a wholly owned subsidiary, to operate all renewable-energy power generation 
business and investment, including the solar farms under the operation of Bangchak Solar 
Energy Co., Ltd (Bangchak, 2015). Moreover, the Extraordinary Meeting No.1/2015 
approved BCPG to be listed in the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) in 2016 in order to 
raise funding, with an initial public offering (IPO) for up to 30% of the paid-up capital.  
Both PTT and Bangchak have given wind energy much less attention than solar 
power. PTT indicated that it had made some small investments in activities related to wind 
energy during the early years analysed in this study, carrying out a joint study in 2007 with 
Electricity Generating Co., Ltd. (EGCO), Wind Energy Generating Co., Ltd.  (WEGCO), 
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and Eurus Energy Japan Corporation (EURUS), regarding “investigating the feasibility of 
developing Thailand’s first commercial wind-energy power generation project on the 
southern seaboard, with a capacity of 35 MW”.  PTT eventually signed “a letter of 
agreement with the Provincial Electricity Authority (PEA) for a wind farm project with a 
generation capacity of 5 - 10 megawatts (MW) in the South and the East. Commercial 
operations are expected to begin in 2014 to replace 2.3 - 4.5 million litres of oil every year” 
(PTT, 2010). Nevertheless, in the 2014 annual report the company did not report any 
further details on the aforementioned wind farm project. Rather, most of their activities 
regarding wind energy were fields visits to countries like Turkey, Greece and Portugal, 
which according to them “greatly benefited the directors in exchanging views with experts 
in leading energy companies overseas, fostering understanding of energy, and the 
government policy on energy from other countries in order to formulate strategies, 
especially the trend of the renewable energy business”.     
 Similarly, Bangchak conducted a field study concerning wind energy, but the 
location was not identified in their annual report (Bangchak, 2009). Nevertheless, while it 
was experiencing the negative impacts of the highly volatility in oil prices, Bangchak’s 
annual reports in 2010 and 2011 set a goal to restructure its then revenue stream of 70%: 
30% between refining and marketing businesses to be 50% : 20% : 30% for refining, 
marketing and new businesses by 2015. Wind energy, together with solar power plants, 
palm-oil biodiesel production and palm oil plantations were included as potential 
candidates in the new emerging businesses. Interestingly, according to Bangchak annual 
reports in 2013 and 2014, the goal was dramatically adjusted to 50% refining income and 
50% for emerging clean energy businesses by 2020. However, wind energy seems to be 
seen as a much smaller venue for income than biofuels or solar PV.  
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4.1.3    Hydropower and biogas from wastes 
Amongst the three companies, only PTT has invested in hydropower energy so far.  
Hydropower was mentioned for the first time in the 2011 annual report, though investment 
appears to be different from other low-carbon energy sources. Instead of directly investing 
in R&D, conducting feasibility studies, organizing field visits to energy projects abroad, or 
even launching new facilities, PTT made an indirect investment through a subsidiary which 
acquired equity in another company. As explained in PTT’s 2011 annual report, PTT 
International Co., Ltd., (PTTI), a wholly-owned PTT’s subsidiary, established Natee 
Synergy Company (NSC), which acquired a 25% equity in a hydropower project in Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic, together with the main investor, Xayaburi Power Company 
Limited (XPCL). In 2012, PTTI took 40% of shares in the Namk-Lik-1 project, a 64.7 MW 
hydropower plant in Laos (which is expected to be completed in late 2016).                   
 Both PTT and Thai Oil have developed biogas from waste, starting from 2010 and 
2013, respectively. PTT’s part in biogas projects is mostly as a purchaser, though Thai Oil 
has been involved in the production and commercialization of biogas from cassava waste, 
which fuels a 5.6 MW electricity power generation project that sells power to the grid 
through the Provincial Electricity Authority (PEA) from Q1/2015 (Thai Oil, 2013). This 
project constituted an internal cooperation amongst Thai Oil’s subsidiaries, manifesting that 
the company has both vertically and horizontally expanded into low-carbon energy 
businesses. Not only was biofuel developed, but the company utilized the waste to generate 
electricity for sale. Thai Oil’s annual report in 2014 explained its integrated business 
cooperation among subsidiaries and associates companies, “NP Bio Energy Co., Ltd., was 
founded by Ubon Bio Ethanol Co., Ltd., to generate biogas from dried cassava pulp, 
residue from ethanol production of Ubon Bio Ethanol and from tapioca starch production of 
Ubon Agricultural Energy Co., Ltd.”. 
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4.2     Investment of Indonesian O&G company: PERTAMINA  
4.2.1    Biofuels (biodiesel) 
For PERTAMINA biofuel development is currently limited to biodiesel. In 2006 the 
company launched a biofuel development project which complied with the government 
policies known as the “Presidential Regulation No.5/2006 on National Energy Policy” and 
“Presidential Instruction No.1/2006 on Provision and Utilization of Biofuel” 
(PERTAMINA, 2006). On May 20, 2006 PERTAMINA started sales of B5 Bio Solar in 
Jakarta, followed by Surabaya and Denpasar. Bio Premium and Bio Pertamax (ethanol 3-
5%) started to be sold on August 13th 2006 in Malang and on December 11th 2006 in 
Jakarta, followed by Surabaya, Malang and Denpasar (ESDM, 2008).  PERTAMINA’s 
committed to biofuel production in 2007, when the company revised its vision to become a 
world class national oil company with the mission to conduct “core business in oil, gas and 
biofuel in an integrated manner, based on string commercial principles” (PERTAMINA, 
2007).  PERTAMINA conducted a study on a Biodiesel Plant with 15,000 liter/day 
capacity using palm oil or Jatropha as raw materials. However, the project was cancelled in 
2007 and replaced with a cooperation program in biodiesel and bioethanol with external 
organizations such as SK Corp, Mitsui, and EMR and BPPT (PERTAMINA, 2007). In 
2010, after a prolonged price dispute between PERTAMINA and ethanol producers, 
PERTAMINA decided to stop sales of bioethanol (namely Bio Premium and Bio Pertamax. 
GAIN, 2010). The lower prices offered to ethanol producers by PERTAMINA was the 
main reason why the factories did not want to supply ethanol to PERTAMINA.   
 Despite the existence of many challenges that originate from volatile prices of 
feedstock and crude oil, PERTAMINA has responded and complied with the government’s 
blending rate of biofuels, which has been adjusted many times through regulation of the 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources. The latest adjustment was made in March 2015, 
which have set ambitious targets on both biodiesel and bioethanol as shown in Table 7 
(adapted from GAIN, 2016). 
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Table 8 Blending mandate of biofuels according to Regulation of the Ministry of Energy 
and Mineral Resources No.12 issued in March 2015 
 
Biodiesel mandate (minimum) 
Sector April 2015 2016 2020 2025 
Transportation, Public Service Obligation (PSO) 15% 20% 30% 30% 
Transportation, Non-PSO 15% 20% 30% 30% 
Industry 15% 20% 30% 30% 
Electricity 25% 30% 30% 30% 
Bioethanol (minimum) 
Transportation, Public Service Obligation (PSO) 1% 2% 5% 20% 
Transportation, Non-PSO 2% 5% 10% 20% 
Industry 2% 5% 10% 20% 
 
Note: Public Service Obligation (PSO) for biodiesel is a subsidized fuel for road vehicles. 
It is uniquely sold through PERTAMINA. Non-PSO refers to unsubsidized fuel sold 
through private sector shops. The Public Service Obligation (PSO) for ethanol is a 
subsidized fuel used by small scale industries, fishing and agriculture (GAIN, 2016).  
To be able to cover the national goal for biofuel blending rates in the next 10 years, 
PERTAMINA has felt the need to launch an enormous investment plan in biofuel projects. 
For instance, PERTAMINA plans to invest US$ 200 million in the state owned plantation 
company, PTPN, to develop palm oil plantations (Biofuel digest, May 11, 2015). To 
comply with the B15 mandate implemented in 2015, PERTAMINA signed contracts with 
11 companies which would supply approximately 1.84 million liters of fatty acid methyl 
ester. This supply was used to produce B15 from November 2015 to April 2016 
(PERTAMINA, 2015). In addition, the company planned to invest over US$ 480 million to 
produce Bio-aviation turbine fuel and build a jet fuel refinery that could produce up to 26 
million liter /year using palm oil (aiming to start production in 2017), as stated by the 
Manager of Technology and Product Development, Directorate of New and Renewable 
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Energy, PERTAMINA, Andianto Hidayat (ANTARA News, 2015). Last but not least, at 
the PERTAMINA Energy Forum 2016, held on 13-14 December 2016, the company also 
showcased various biofuel development plans at different sites throughout the country (see 
Figure 2). These included a bioethanol Project from Napier Grass in West Java with a 
capacity of 76,000 kl/year, the Green Diesel Project in Riau using crude palm oil (CPO), 
palm stearin, palm fatty acid distillate (PFAD) as feedstock with capacity of 420,000 
kl/year, and pilot plant for Micro Algae in Yogyakarta. 
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4.2.2    Geothermal 
Indonesia is blessed with an abundant geothermal potential, estimated to be around 
40% of the total world’s potential. Unlike other types of renewable energy, geothermal has 
been included in PERTAMINA’s core upstream business (together with oil and gas) since 
the company was established.  PERTAMINA has been conducting geothermal exploration 
and production activities since 1974, resulting in over 70 geothermal areas generating 
electricity. In 2000, PERTAMINA was ordered to return 16 out of 31 of its geothermal 
working areas to the government by the Presidential Decree No. 76/2000. Later in 2003, 
with the Governmental Regulation No.31/2003, PERTAMINA was assigned to transfer 
geothermal business to a subsidiary, which was established three years later as PT 
PERTAMINA Geothermal Energy (PGE). In addition, PERTAMINA set up a new 
subsidiary called PT PERTMINA Drilling Services Indonesia in 2008 to run drilling 
service on exploration and production of both O&G and geothermal (PERTAMINA, 2008). 
PERTAMINA and its subsidiaries only conduct geothermal exploration and production 
activities domestically mainly, as Indonesia possesses a huge geothermal potential and the 
government is trying to achieve an ambitious target to supply 10,000 MW of electricity to 
meet the high domestic power demand through a second phase of fast-track projects 
(PERTAMINA, 2009. Around 3,900 MW from this 10,000 MW-target was planned to 
come from geothermal power plants (PERTAMINA, 2011).   PERTAMINA, through PGE, 
has operated geothermal production facilities through own-operation and Joint Operating 
Contracts (JOCs). Under JOCs, PGE is entitled to earn PGE production allowances at the 
rate of “2.66% for Darajat JOC and 4% for the Salak, Wayang Windu, Sarulla and Bedugul 
JOCs of the JOC contractors’ annual net operating income as  calculated in accordance with 
the JOCs” (PERTAMINA, 2015).                                                                    
 According to the latest annual report available at the time of writing this thesis, PGE 
as of 31 December 2015 operates 4 geothermal working areas and 7 development projects 
throughout Indonesia. Table 9 presents PGE’s geothermal projects, which are divided into 
two categories, namely those operated by itself and those with JOCs. 
56 
 
Table 9 Geothermal working areas of PERTAMINA Geothermal Energy (PGE) as of 31 
December 2015 
 
Own operations 
Working area Location Field status 
Gunung Sibayak-Gunug Sinabung Sibayak, North Sumatera production 
Gunung Way Panas Ulubelu, Lampung production 
Kamojang-Darajat Kamojang, Jawa Barat/West Java production 
Lahendong Lahendong, Sulawesi Utara/North 
Sulawesi 
production 
Lumut Balai dan Marga Bayur Lumut Balai/South Sumatera Development 
Karaha-Cakrabuana Karaha,/West Java Development 
Sungai Penuh Sungai Penuh, Jambi Exploration 
Hululais Hululais, Bengkulu Exploration 
Gunung Iyang Argopuro Argopuro/East Java Exploration 
Kotamobagu Kotamobagu/ North Sulawesi  Exploration 
Joint Operation Contracts (JOCs) 
Working area Location Field status Contractors 
Cibeureum - Parabakti Salak, Jawa Barat/   
West Java 
Production Chevron Geothermal Salak   
Ltd 
Pangalengan  Wayang Windu, Jawa   
Barat/West Java 
Production Star Energy Geothermal  
(Wayang Windu) Ltd. 
Kamojang-Darajat Darajat, Jawa Barat/   
West Java 
Production Chevron Geothermal   
Indonesia Ltd.   
Gunung Sibualbuali Sarulla, Sumatera   
Utara/North Sumatera 
Development   Sarulla Operation Limited 
Tabanan  Bedugul, Bali  Exploration Bali Energy Ltd. 
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4.2.3   Other renewable energy sources 
Apart from biofuel and geothermal, PERTAMINA has aimed to move towards 
other types of new and renewable energy business. By referring to the changing global 
development policies, PERTAMINA decided to set a new vision in 2011 to become a 
‘World Class National Energy Company’. The construction of Waste Power Plant (PLTSa) 
using municipality waste (around 2,000 tons per day to generate electricity of 138 MW, of 
which 120 MW will be sold) was mentioned in the 2012 annual report as the first types on 
non-geothermal or biofuel renewable energy projects. This project is located at the 
Integrated Waste Disposal site in the Bantargebang, Bekasi area and aimed to start 
operation in 2016 (PERTAMINA, 2012).  PERTAMINA underwent restructuring through 
the establishment of the Directorate of New and Renewable Energy (NRE) in November 
2014, which later in May 2015 included gas business and was changed to the Directorate of 
Gas, New& Renewable Energy (GNRE) (PERTAMINA, 2014, 2015).     
 The new department supervises gas business ranging from gas commerce to 
downstream (except gas exploration and production) and renewable energy development 
projects, which are divided into renewable energy for power plant and renewable energy as 
non-conventional biofuel. Renewable energy for power plants includes mini and micro 
hydro, biomass energy, solar PV, wind energy, and marine energy, whereas non-
conventional biofuel covers green diesel, bioethanol and bioavtur (PERTAMINA, 2015). 
However, in its 2015 annual report the company stated clearly that most of its renewable 
energy activities were still in the research and planning phase. Documents obtained during 
the PERTAMINA Energy Forum 2016, held on 13-14 December 2016 at Ritz Carton 
Pacific Place Hotel, Jakarta, Indonesia displayed various renewable energy plans in 
multiple sites throughout the country. Figure 3 presents future investment plans of 
PERTAMINA in various sites. 
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Figure 3 PERTAMINA’s new and renewable energy development projects (Adopted from material received during the 
PERTAMINA Energy Forum 2016, held on 13-14 December 2016 at Ritz Carton Pacific Place Hotel, Jakarta, Indonesia 
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4.3      Investment of Malaysian O&G company: PETRONAS 
4.3.1   Biofuels (biodiesel)  
PETRONAS took part in biodiesel development as early as the 1980s. After the 
Malaysian Palm Oil Board (MPOB) initiated the palm oil based biodiesel laboratory in 
1982, the result they obtained were so promising that a pilot plant was constructed in 
collaboration from PETRONAS in 1984. This pilot plant produced 3,000 metric tonnes of 
palm oil methyl ester per year. Although in the following years there were a number of 
testing, stationary engine evaluation and even field trials, biodiesel in Malaysia did not 
really make a breakthrough until the government implemented the Fifth Fuel Policy in 2001 
and National Biofuel Policy in 2005 (see more detail of policies in Appendix G).  
According to PETRONAS’ own data sources, the very first activity on biofuel that can be 
traced back in the annual report was in 2007, where PETRONAS signed an agreement with 
Battelle Memorial Institute of the US, Battelle-Japan Corporation and Mitsubishi 
Corporation for setting up a renewable energy laboratory at PETRONAS Research Sdn 
Bhd’s premises in Bangi, Selangor. The first phase of research was focused on bio-fuels 
and products from oil palm waste (PETRONAS, 2007). In 2009, PETRONAS’s wholly 
owned subsidiary: PETRONAS Dagangan Berhad (PDB) which runs a retail business on 
O&G products, delivered B5 to the Ministry of Defense and Dewan Bandaraya Kuala 
Lumpur in accordance with the Malaysian Biofuel Industry Act 2007 (PETRONAS, 2009).  
PDB was the first oil company which ran a test drive with B5 and the result were 
considered to be positive (Borneo Post, 2010).       
 In developing biodiesel, PETRONAS was given financial supports from both 
MPOB and the government of Malaysia. In 2010 funds worth RM1 million were allocated 
by MPOB to each oil company to set up infrastructure for B5 biodiesel blending facilities, 
including PETRONAS, Shell, BHP, ExxonMobil and Chevron (Adnan, 2010). Starting on 
June 1, 2011 five of PETRONAS’s service stations, together with one of Shell in Putrajaya, 
sold B5 biodiesel for the same price as of normal diesel (at RM1.80 per liter, Lim, 2011). 
Later on, in an attempt to boost biodiesel usage and help companies comply with its 
mandate, the government provided a fund of RM300 million through MPOB to construct 
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more blending facilities nationwide. PETRONAS Dagangan Bhd (PDB), Shell Malaysia 
Trading, Petron (formerly Esso Malaysia Bhd), Boustead Petroleum Marketing and 
Chevron Malaysia Ltd. collaborated in such an attempt, by incurring other costs such as the 
blending and transportation costs (Borneo Post, 2010). Early in 2016 the Ministry of 
Plantation Industries and Commodities pushed forward for a B10 biodiesel mandate. Oil 
companies are required to reset blending ratio and find the necessary supply of palm methyl 
ester. In August 2016, PETRONAS Dagangan Bhd launched Dynamic Diesel Euro 5 in six 
service stations in Klang Valley and two in Johor Bahru. When asked about the progress in 
producing and supplying B10, a PETRONAS Fuel engineer, Mr. Mohamad Hariz Abd Aziz, 
stated that the government needs to have an agreement with the car manufacturers on the 
issue of warranty before implementing B10 mandate. PETRONAS has no difficulty in 
producing B10, but so far only Mercedes Benz Malaysia showed confidence on the 
compatibility of their diesel car engine with B10 biodiesel (Tong, 2016). 
4.3.2    Solar PV 
PETRONAS has explored other types of renewable energy, in particular solar PV. 
The landmark of its Solar PV development program started in January 2010 when it signed 
a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Mitsubishi Corporation to conduct Solar PV 
demonstration projects in Malaysia (PETRONAS, 2010). The aim was to test different 
solar technologies and find out which type was suitable for Malaysia’s climate. In this 
regard, two of PETRONAS’s facilities installed solar panels. The first one was the Solar 
PV demonstration project with a 685 kWp capacity installed on the rooftop of Suria 
KLCC’s shopping mall. It was officially launched in 2012 to supply electricity to Suria 
KLCC, meeting 30% of its power demand (PETRONAS Sustainability Report, 2012). The 
solar rooftop on Suria KLCC was in 2013 awarded the first runner-up in the Commercial 
Based On-Grid Category of the ASEAN Energy Award (PETRONAS, 2013).  
The second one was at two new service stations; namely PETRONAS Solaris Putra 
and PETRONAS Solaris Serdang. Apart from those mentioned earlier, PETRONAS also 
runs a solar farm that sells power to the national grid. PETRONAS, through its wholly 
owned subsidiary, PETRONAS Power Sdn Bhd (PPSB) PPSB won a bidding to have 10.2 
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MWp FiT quota from the Sustainable Energy Development Authority (SEDA) in 2011. The 
quota was for PPSB to generate electricity from solar PV as an Independent Power 
Producer (IPP) (PETRONAS Sustainability Report, 2011). In late 2013, the Solar IPP 
project in Gebeng, Kuantan, Malaysia was complete and started operation. The project can 
produce around 12 GWh of energy per year, which is enough to supply 4,500 households 
with electricity, and help reduce emissions by approximately 8,000 tons of CO2 equivalent 
annually (PETRONAS Sustainability Report, 2013).     
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Table 10 Milestone of biofuel development projects of PTT, Bangchak, Thai Oil, PETRONAS and PETAMINA in the past 15 
years 
Year PTT Bangchak Thai Oil PETRONAS PERTAMINA 
2003 Started sale of Gasohol 95 
(E10) in Bangkok 
Started sale of Gasohol 95 (E10) 
in Bangkok 
   
2004      
2005   Signed MOU to establish 
ethanol producing plant from 
cassava 
  
2006  Running Gasohol Club Card, a 
special discount of 0.2 baht per 
liter for members  
  - Started sales of Bio Solar 
(B5), Bio Premium (E3-5) and 
Bio Pertamax  (E3-5)  
2007 Set up PTT Green 
Energy(PTTGE) investing in 
palm oil plantation in 
Kalimantan, Indonesia  
 Joint venture to set up 
Maesod Clean Energy 
Co.,Ltd., the first ethanol 
plant from sugarcane in 
Thailand, with capacity of 
200,000 liters per day  
-In November signed an 
agreement with Battelle 
Memorial Institute of the US, 
Battelle-Japan Corporation and 
Mitsubishi Corporation in 
setting up a renewable energy 
laboratory at PETRONAS 
Research Sdn Bhd’s premises in 
Bangi, Selangor. The first 
phrase of research will focus on 
bio-fuels and products from oil 
palm waste 
- 10 December 2007, PT 
Pertamina introduced its new 
vision:   
“To Become a World Class 
National Oil Company 
With a mission is  to perform he 
core business in oil, gas and 
biofuel in an integrated manner, 
based on strong commercial 
principles 
2008 -Started sale of Gasohol E20, 
E85 and B2 and B5 in 
Bangkok 
- Conducted R&D on non-
crop plants to produce 
biodiesel such as jatropha and 
algae 
Joint venture to set up Bangchak 
Biofuel Co.,Ltd. running 
biodiesel production from crude 
oil palm with a capacity of 
300,000 liters per day 
Established Thaioil Ethanol 
Co., Ltd. produced ethanol 
from cassava with a capacity 
of 500,000 liters per day 
-49% of retail network in 
Thailand started selling gasohol 
(Annual report) 
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Year PTT Bangchak Thai Oil PETRONAS PERTAMINA 
2009  -Started Sale of E85 
-Installed biodiesel unit using 
used cooking oil with a capacity 
of 20,000 liters per day. 
 -PETRONAS Dagangan Berhad 
(PDB), a retailer for O&G 
products, delivered B5 to 
Ministry of Defense and Dewan 
Bandaraya Kuala 
Pumpur(DBKL) in support of 
the Malaysian Biofuel Industry 
Act 2007 
-Petronas Dagangan was the 
first oil company that had 
initiated a test-run on B5 
mandate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010 Expanded the sale of E85 
outside Bangkok 
 -Thaioil Ethanol Co.,LtD. 
acquired 50% of share in 
Sapthip Co.,Ltd producing 
cassava based ethanol with a 
capacity of 200,000 litres per 
day. 
- PETRONAS, Shell, BHP, 
ExxonMobil and Chevron were 
allocated with a start-up fund 
worth RM 1mil each by the 
Malaysian Palm Oil Board 
(MPOB) to set up infrastructure 
for B5 biodiesel blending 
facilities 
-Stopped sales of bioethanol 
due to prolonged price dispute 
between PERTAMINA and 
ethanol producers  
 
2011 PTTGE had a net ownership 
of 1,085,989 rai of land used 
for palm oil plantation. The 
company conducted feasibility 
study to invest in plam oil 
plantation in Myanmar and 
Cambodia. 
-PTTGE Service Netherlands 
BV (PTTGE BV) acquired a 
75% shareholding of 7 
companies of PT Kalapataru 
Investama (PT KPI) operating 
palm oil business in Indonesia 
-Acquired a 21.28% shares in 
Ubon Bio Ethanol Co,Ltd., using 
cassava with a capacity of 
400,000 litres per day 
-Thaioil Ethanol Co., Ltd. 
acquired a 21.28% shares in 
Ubon Bio Ethanol Co. Ltd., 
using cassava with a capacity 
of 400,000 liters per day 
-Sapthip Co.Ltd. entered a10-
year ethanol agreement with 
PTT (2011-2021) 
-The Malaysian government 
had set June 2011 for oil 
operators in the country to start 
selling biodiesel commercially. 
- June 1, From today, however, 
it is available at point of retail: 
B5 biodiesel will be sold at the 
six petrol stations – five from 
Petronas and one from Shell – 
located in Putrajaya, the first 
location in the Central Region 
to deploy the fuel. It was priced 
at the equivalent of petroleum 
diesel, at RM1.80 per litre**** 
- Set a new vision of the 
company, “To Become a World  
Class National Energy 
Company”. with the mission of 
running  the business of oil, gas 
and new and renewable energy 
in an  integrated manner, based 
on strong commercial 
principles. 
 
64 
 
Year PTT Bangchak Thai Oil PETRONAS PERTAMINA 
2012 - PTTGE had a net ownership 
of 1.2 million rai of land used 
for palm oil plantation 
-PTTGE began Crude Palm 
Oil planting, around 35,600 
tons has been produced 
-Converted 1,200 rai of 
abandoned orange farms to palm 
oil plantation  
- Increased capacity of Bangchak 
Biofuel Co.,Ltd to 360,000 liters 
per day. 
-Ubon Bio Ethanol Co.Ltd., 
board approved 300 million 
Baht to modify the plant 
operation to use molasses as 
another raw material. 
   
2013 -PTTGE produced 55,095 
tons of CPO to this date 
-Participated in promoting the 
use of B7 in Bangkok Mass 
Transit Authority (BMTA) 
-Approved 1,400 million baht 
budget to build second biodiesel 
unit with a capacity of 450,000 
liter per day, which would 
increase Bangchak’s combined 
production of   
biodiesel to 810,000 liters per day 
-Maesod Clean Energy 
Co.,Ltd. increased a capacity 
to 230,000 liters per day  
-In November 35 depots 
nationwide with in-line 
blending facilities were set up 
by Government, together with 
participating petroleum 
companies, namely Petronas 
Dagangan Bhd, Shell Malaysia 
Trading, Petron (formerly Esso 
Malaysia Bhd), Boustead 
Petroleum Marketing and 
Chevron Malaysia Ltd. This 
was to produce B5 biodiesel*. 
The government provided a 
budget of RM300Millionfor the 
construction. Other costs such 
as blending and transportation 
costs would be absorbed by oil 
companies in the country 
 
2014 PTTGE experienced losses, 
and was closed the operation.  
(source: online news) 
-The second biodiesel unit under 
construction at 
Bang Pa-In Terminal, Phra 
Nakhon Si Ayuttaya province, 
using raw palm oil as feedstock., 
expected to finish in 2016 
-Planed to acquire a 150,000 liters 
per day ethanol plant in 
Chachengsao province, expected 
 -B5 program was complete in 
peninsular Malaysia in March, 
but not yet nationwide because 
the delay  of construction of 15 
blending facilities in the states 
of Sabah and Sarawak and the 
federal territory of Labuan in 
East Malaysia  
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Year PTT Bangchak Thai Oil PETRONAS PERTAMINA 
to realize commercial sale in 2015 
2015 -PTTGE signed a Share
 and Purchase 
Agreement (SPA) to dispose 
its entire investment of 
77.56% in Chancellor Oil 
Pte.Ltd.,which operated a 
palm oil business through 
PT. First Borneo Plantations 
(PT FBP) in Indonesia. 
- PTTGE Singapore disposed 
the shares, transferring 
liabilities and advance 
investment payment of 
PT.Mitra Aneka 
Rezeki(PT.MAR) to Harvey 
BayOverseas(HBO) on 9 
June2015 (PTT, 2015) 
-Continue the acquisition of the 
ethanol plant in Chachengsao 
province 
  -Planned to invest US$ 200 
million with the state owned 
plantation company, PTPN, to 
develop palm oil plantation 
(Biofuel digest, May 11, 2015 
-Signed a contract with 11 
companies to supply approx. 
1.84 million liters of fatty acid 
methyl ester. to PERTAMINA, 
in order to produce B15 from 
November 2015 to April 2016 
(Kurniawan, 2015) 
 
2016 - Shut down R&D 
project on algae 
(interview) 
  - August 2016, PETRONAS 
Dagangan Berhad announced 
the availability of their 
Dynamic Diesel Euro 5, which 
will be currently sold alongside 
their Euro 2M diesel. At the 
time of launch, only six 
Petronas stations in the whole 
of Klang Valley and two in 
Johor Bahru carry the higher 
quality diesel fuel 
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Table 11 Milestones on solar PV, wind energy, hydropower and biogas development projects of PTT, Bangchak and Thai Oil, 
PETRONAS and PERTAMINA in the past 15 years 
Year PTT Bangchak Thai Oil PETRONAS PERTAMINA 
2006     Established PT PERTAMINA 
Geothermal Energy (PGE) to 
manage business activities in 
geothermal. PERTAMINA has 
a 90% shares and PT 
PERTAMINA DANA Ventura 
has 10% shares 
2007 -Installed a total 243 solar cells 
generating 180 watts of power at the 
roof of service pumps at a gas station 
- Joint study on wind energy power 
generation project on the Southern 
seaboard with a capacity of 35 MW 
    
2008      
2009  -Took a loan from Asian Development 
Bank to launch Bangchak Solar 
Energy Co.,Ltd operating solar farm 
projects comprising of three phrases.  
- Conducted a field study on wind 
energy 
Became a partner of MFC 
Energy Fund, allowing it 
to access data on 
renewable energy for use 
in future investment 
  
2010 Signed a letter of agreement with 
Provincial Electricity Authority for a 
wind farm project with a capacity of 
5-10 MW. (the project was not taken 
placed at the end) 
Restructured the revenue sources to 
have 50%: 20%:30% for refining, 
marketing and new business in green 
energy (i.e. Solar PV) by 2015 
 - January 2010 when 
PETRONAS signed a 
Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) 
with Mitsubishi 
Corporation to conduct 
the Solar PV 
demonstration projects in 
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Year PTT Bangchak Thai Oil PETRONAS PERTAMINA 
Malaysia 
2011 PTT International Co.,Ltd 
established Natee Synergy Company 
 (NSC) which acquired a 25% equity 
in a hydropower project in Laos  
  - PETRONAS Power Sdn 
Bhd(PPSB), secured 
10.02 MWp of FiT quota, 
allowing PETRONAS to 
run the first Solar 
Independent Power 
Producer project, 
expected to be complete 
by 2014 
-With a Mitsubishi 
Corporation, installed the 
Solar PV Demonstration 
Project on the rooftop of 
Suria KLCC shopping 
complex with a capacity 
of 685 kWp.  
Set a new vision “to become a 
World Class National Energy 
Company”, moving towards 
new and renewable energy 
2012 PTT International Co.Ltd took 40% 
of shares in the Namk Lik-1 project, 
a 64.7 MW hydropower plant in 
Laos 
The first phrase of solar farm with 38 
MW was started.  
 -Launched the rooftop 
solar PV system at Suria 
KLCC shopping mall, 
generating more than 600 
MWh which supplied 
about 30% of the 
shopping mall’s demand. 
-Installed solar PV at two 
service stations: Solaris 
Putra and Solaris Serdang 
 
 
Plans to build a Waste Power  
Plant (PLTSa) in the Integrated  
Waste Disposal site in the 
Bantargebang, Bekasi area 
 
2013 Set up Global Power Synergy 
Co.,Ltd (GPSC) to run power 
business. GPSC started joint venture 
-The second and third phrase with 32 
MW and 118 MW were started. 
NP Bio Energy Co., Ltd., 
was founded by Ubon Bio 
Ethanol Co., Ltd., to 
-Solar Independent Power 
Producer (IPP) project in 
Gebeng, with a capacity 
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Year PTT Bangchak Thai Oil PETRONAS PERTAMINA 
in Solar farm generating 80MW  - Restructured the revenue sources to 
be 50% refining income and 50% for 
energy clean energy business by 2020 
generate biogas from 
biogas from cassava waste 
which fueled a 5.6 MW 
power sold to the 
Provincial Electricity 
Authority 
of 10 MWp. Energy 
produced is sold to 
domestic use which could 
supply up to 4,500 
households. The project 
is under 
Infrastructure&Utility 
department. 
-Solar rooftop on Suria 
KLCC’s shopping mall 
won a first runner-up 
award at the ASEAN 
Energy Award 2013                        
2014    -Acquired 30% of shares 
in Pacific Light Power 
Pvt Ltd in Singapore 
Established Directorate of New 
and Renewable Energy (NRE)  
2015 - Invested in the 20.8-MW 
Ichinoseki Solar Power 1 in Japan, 
which is set to distribute electricity 
to  utility companies in Japan.  
- Global Power Synergy Public 
Company Limited (GPSC) 
completed IPO of its shares and 
started the first  
trading day on 18 May 2015 at THB 
27 per share. 
- Extraordinary Meeting No. 1/2558 
approved to establish BCPG Co., Ltd.  
to operate renewable-energy power 
generation business and investment, 
including the operation of phase 1 (38 
megawatts, MW) of the solar power 
generation (“Sunny Bangchak”) 
project, also granted an approval for 
BCPG to list on the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (SET) with an IPO (initial   
public offering) for up to 30% of the 
paid-up capital planned for the 
beginning of 2016. 
nil nil Restructured the NRE and 
changed to the Directorate of 
Gas, New and Renewable 
Energy (GNRE) 
. 
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4.4   Conclusions  
The study summarized various investment activities of PTT, Thai Oil, Bangchak, 
PERTAMIAN and PETRONAS in Table 12.  The investment activities can be carried out 
in the forms of R&D, commercialization, and even CSR activities. Moreover, in biofuel 
production, the companies may engage in various steps during biofuel supply chain. From 
Table 12 it is found that PTT and Bangchak have involved in many investment activities. 
The companies entered the upstream biofuel industry through palm oil plantation; whereas 
Thai Oil, PERTAMINA and PETRONAS did not have such investment. Moreover, 
Bangchak and PTT did R&D on 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 generation of biofuel, an activity which Thai 
Oil, PERTAMINA and PETRONAS have less or no investment in.  Finally, yet 
importantly, the solar PV installation capacity which Bangchak and PTT have are much 
higher than that of PETRONAS; whereas PERTAMINA has not yet installed any solar PV 
panels at the time which this research was conducted. The findings in this chapter will be 
used in the chapter 6 that investigates factors that influence O&G companies to invest in 
renewable energy. Further explanation why PTT and Bangchak are relatively more active 
in renewable energy than the other three companies are also illustrated in Chapter 6. 
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Table 12 Overview of renewable energy investment activities of PTT, Bangchak, Thai Oil, 
PERTAMINA and PETRONAS 
 
Company R&D Type of energy crop 
plantation 
Commercialization Corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) 
PTT  2nd and 3rd 
generation of 
biofuels 
• Palm oil  
(Sumatra, 
Indonesia) 
 E10, E20, E85, B5, 
B7 
 Solar PV (100 MW) 
 Hydropower (Laos) 
 Biogas  
 Small hydropower 
 Solar roof 
 Wind  
 Biofuels for farming 
vehicles 
Bangchak  2nd and 3rd 
generation of 
biofuels 
• Palm oil 
(Thailand) 
 E10, E20, E85, B5, 
B7 
 Solar PV (182 MW) 
 Biofuels from used 
cooking oil 
Thai Oil  Nil  • Nil  Biofuels (ethanol 
production) 
 Small hydropower 
 Solar rooftop 
PERTAMINA  Pilot projects 
on biofuel 
production 
• Nil  B15 
 Solar PV (plans) 
 Geothermal  
 (over 700 MW) 
 No data 
PETRONAS  Solar PV • Nil  B10 
 Solar PV (10 MW) 
 No data 
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Chapter 5: Discourse analysis on rationales to 
invest in renewable energy ASEAN’s major 
O&G companies 
 
5.1     Introduction 
The focus of this chapter is first on the discourses that O&G companies used the 
most repeatedly to justify their investment in any given renewable energy sources. The 
present study analyzed the discourses on the annual reports of PTT, Thai Oil, Bangchak, 
PETRONAS and PERTAMINA, which are all available in the companies’ website. Details 
on how to conduct discourse analysis and the data sources are presented in Chapter 3. In 
section 5.2, the rationales for investing in each type of renewable energy of each company 
were summarized from the annual reports, and placed into particular themes or discourse 
strands as shown in all tables in the section. It should be noted that in each Table those 
years in which there are no annual reports available for analysis are painted in grey color. 
The years painted in white color refer to those were no discourses were found on renewable 
energy. However, this should not mean necessarily that in those years there were no 
development or investment activities.  Rather, the company may have conducted such 
activities, but they did not mention them in their annual reports.             
 In section 5.3, the present study carried out an in-depth discussion on discourses of 
Thailand O&G companies (PTT, Bangchak, Thai Oil) which appear to employ a wide 
range of discourse on their renewable energy investment. PETRONAS and PERTAMINA 
used few discourses in their annual reports, and thus there is not sufficient data for 
discourse analysis. Then in section 5.4, the discourses on each type of renewable energy 
employed by all five companies were categorized into four discursive legitimacy strategies; 
namely Authorization, Rationalization, Moral evaluation and Mythopoesis.  Because five 
companies have different focus on which type of renewable energy projects, the study 
selected top three sorts to present in this chapter- biofuel, solar PV and geothermal.  
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5.2     Discourses to justify the rationale to invest in renewable energy  
5.2.1    PTT 
As presented in Chapter 4, PTT has invested and developed various types of 
renewable energy; namely, biofuels (gasohol and biodiesel), solar PV, wind energy, 
hydropower and biogas. The present research identified the discourses found in the annual 
reports that PTT used to explain the reasons to investment and develop activities in each 
type of renewable energy source. PTT’s annual reports from 2001-2015, which were 
available in the company website, were analyzed through the process explained in Chapter 
3. The results of the discourses on biofuels, Solar PV, wind energy, hydropower and biogas 
are shown in Appendix A. Table 13 presents an overview of biofuel discourses by years 
without the quotes from annual reports, so that the dynamic of discourse strands by years 
can be seen clearly.   
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Table 13 Summary of discourses on biofuel investment of PTT 
           Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
 
     
                                                              
Year 
 
Discourse  
PTT Biofuels 
 
2
0
0
1 
2
0
0
2 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Respond to government policy (4) 
 
               
Environmental reason   
(8) 
 
               
Help farmers (3)  
 
 
               
Help alleviate consumers’ burden 
esp. during high crude oil prices  (3) 
               
Be a leader in RE business and 
active R&D and establish viable 
sustainable business (5)  
               
Build self-reliance and national 
energy security from lowering oil 
imports (9) 
               
Follow HM the King’s initiative (2)                
Reduce risk of raw material 
shortage from using agricultural 
products (1) 
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5.2.2    Bangchak  
As can be seen from Chapter 4, Bangchak has been very active in diversifying their 
business portfolio to become an energy company. For more than a decade the company has 
invested in various types of renewable energy. Biofuels (gasohol and biodiesel) and Solar PV 
have been both developed and commercialised by the company. Given this fact, the present 
study found a large number of discourses used to justify the green investment in Bangchak’s 
annual reports from 2002-2015. Like PTT, those years in which there are no annual reports 
are painted in grey colour in each table; while those years in which the study did not find 
discourses on such renewable energy are painted in white. Table 1 and 2 in Appendix B 
present discourses on biofuel and solar PV investment respectively; whereas Table 14 and 15 
show the summary of discourses on biofuel and solar PV investment without the direct 
quoted sentences.  
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 Table 14 Summary of discourses on biofuel investment of Bangchak 
Year 
 
 
Discourse strands 
2
0
0
1 
2
0
0
2 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Respond to government policy 
(16) 
               
Environmental and health reasons (11) 
               
Enhance national energy security by 
lowering oil imports (9) 
               
For business sustainability, diversify 
income risk, and be a leader in RE (17) 
               
Be a responsible company, run business 
model with benefit to environment and 
social development( 6) 
               
Help alleviate consumers’ burden esp. 
during high crude oil prices (2) 
 
               
Thailand has potential as an agricultural 
country (1) 
 
               
Follow HM the King’s initiative on 
biofuels project and self-sufficient 
philosophy (8) 
               
Enhance Thailand to step forward in the 
era of RE (1) 
 
               
Respond to demand from consumers (3) 
               
Help farmers (8) 
 
               
           Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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Table 15 Summary of discourses on solar PV investment of Bangchak 
 
 
           Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
 
     
                                         Year 
 
Discourse strands 
2
0
0
1 
2
0
0
2 
2
0
0
3 
2
0
0
4 
2
0
0
5 
2
0
0
6 
2
0
0
7 
2
0
0
8 
2
0
0
9 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Enhance national energy security by lowering 
oil imports (1) 
 
               
Be a responsible company, run business model 
with benefit to environment and social 
development (2) 
 
               
For business sustainability, diversify income 
risk, and be a leader in RE 
(19) 
               
Environmental and health reasons (6) 
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5.2.3   Thai Oil  
Among the three Thai O&G companies in this present study, Thai Oil has strived 
the most to maintain a vision of mostly being an oil refinery company. It has, however, 
invested in biofuel production by conducting joint ventures with other partners, including 
Bangchak. The present study analyzed Thai Oil’s annual reports from 2004-2015, available 
in the company website. Table 1 in Appendix C presents discourses on biofuel investment of 
Thai Oil; while Table 16 summarizes discourses by years without the direct quotes.  
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Table 16 Summary of discourses on biofuel investment of Thai Oil 
 
 
 
 
                                               Year 
Discourse  strands  
2
0
0
1 
2
0
0
2 
2
0
0
3 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Respond to government policy (9)                
Environmental reasons (4)   
 
               
Help farmers (2) 
 
               
Enhance national energy security by 
lowering oil imports (3) 
 
               
See business opportunity and become 
a leader (5) 
 
               
Adhere to business objectives with 
environmental and social  
responsibility (3) 
               
Enhance quality of life of 
Thai people (1) 
 
               
           Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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5.2.4    PERTAMINA 
The two major concrete types of renewable energy investment that PERTAMINA is 
carrying out relating to geothermal and biofuels (biodiesel) energy sources. The company, 
as presented in Chapter 4, has only become active in new renewable energy investment in 
the past few years, and many projects remain in the research and development phase i.e. 
Solar PV, wind and ocean energy. Thus, the present research identified mostly discourses 
that the company used to explain their investment on geothermal and biofuels. The annual 
reports from 2006-2015 were collected from the company website and a discourse analysis 
was conducted on them. Table 1 and 2 in Appendix D present discourses on geothermal and 
biofuels investment respectively; while Table 17 and 18 summarize discourses on 
geothermal and biofuels in years without direct quotes. 
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Table 17 Summary of discourses on geothermal of PERTMAINA 
           Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
 
     
Year 
 
 
Discourse strands 
2
0
0
1 
2
0
0
2 
2
0
0
3 
2
0
0
4 
2
0
0
5 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Respond to government policy (7) 
 
 
               
Enhance national energy resilience 
(3) 
 
               
Geothermal is upstream business of 
PERTAMINA (4) 
 
               
Mitigate the risk of decreasing oil and gas 
reserve (5) 
               
Economic prosperous and enhance well-
being of Indonesia people (8) 
 
               
GHG emission reduction and obtaining 
CER climate credits (4) 
 
         
 
      
Growth and profits for company (2) 
 
 
               
Company vision (6)                
Potential geothermal in Indonesia (5)                
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Table 18 Summary of discourses on biofuel investment of PERTMAINA 
Year 
 
 
Discourse strands 
2
0
0
1 
2
0
0
2 
2
0
0
3 
2
0
0
4 
2
0
0
5 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Respond to government policy (8) 
 
 
               
Company mission (5) 
 
 
               
Mitigate the risk of decreasing oil and gas 
reserves(7) 
 
               
Economic prosperous and enhance well-
being of Indonesia people (3) 
 
               
GHG emission reduction and obtaining CER 
climate credits (1) 
 
               
Business opportunity for company (1) 
 
 
               
 
 
           Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
 
     
82 
 
5.2.5    PETRONAS 
Among the five companies analyzed, PETRONAS committed the least to invest in 
renewable energy, with these investments related to biofuels (biodiesel) and solar PV. 
However, the volume seems not to be as significant, as the company maintains its visions to 
be ‘a leading O&G multinational of choice’ (PETRONAS, 2015). As a result, the present 
research found only a small number of discourses on renewable energy in PETRONAS annual 
reports 2008-2015. Table 19 presents discourses on biofuels with direct quoted sentences.  
Table 20 summarizes discourse on solar PV without direct quoted sentences and Table 1 in 
Appendix E shows discourses on solar PV with directed quoted sentences.
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Table 19 Discourses on biofuel investment of PETRONAS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                              Year 
  
 
Discourse  strands 
2
0
0
1 
2
0
0
2 
2
0
0
3 
2
0
0
4 
2
0
0
5 
2
0
0
6 
2
0
0
7 
2
0
0
8 
2009 
2
0
1
0 
2
0
1
1 
2
0
1
2 
2
0
1
3 
2
0
1
4 
2
0
1
5 
Respond to government 
policy 
        - PETRONAS Dagangan Berhad marked 
its first  biodiesel (B5) delivery to Ministry 
of Defense  (MINDEF) and Dewan 
Bandaraya Kuala Lumpur   
(DBKL), an initiative in support of the 
Malaysian  Biofuel Industry Act 2007 
 
      
           Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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Table 20 Summary of discourses on solar PV investment of PETRONAS 
 
           Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
 
     
Year 
 
 
Discourse strands 
2
0
0
1 
2
0
0
2 
2
0
0
3 
2
0
0
4 
2
0
0
5 
2
0
0
6 
2
0
0
7 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Positive results for business (2) 
 
 
               
Reduce GHG emissions (2) 
 
 
               
Respond to Government policy(1) 
 
 
               
Sustainability commitment (4) 
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5.3   Discussion on discourses used by Thailand O&G companies 
Through MAXQDA the study identified and recorded the discourses that PTT, 
Bangchak and Thai Oil employed to legitimize their green energy investments. The study 
paid close attention to any given discourses which were found repeatedly. Figure 4, 5 and 6 
show an overview of the discourses used by each company, as explained in the remaining 
part of this section.  
5.3.1     PTT: A diverse discourse player 
 
 
Figure 4 shows that PTT employed a wide range of discourses to justify their 
investment activities in biofuels, solar PV, wind, hydropower and biogas from waste. Also, 
it is clear that PTT has employed more diverse discourses regarding the development of 
 Figure 4 PTT’s discourses on renewable energy investment 
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biofuels than other renewable energy sources, as the company prioritises biofuels over 
other types of renewable energy. This was done by stating that (in order of ranking 
regarding the number of times that a certain discourse was employed) biofuels are 1) 
environmental friendly, particularly regarding air quality improvement, 2) cheaper than 
normal gasoline, and they serve as alternative fuels to gasoline and diesel, 3) enhance 
Thailand national energy security and lessening the country’s burden on importing oil, 4) a 
response to government policy, 5) following HM the King’s initiative and 6) generating 
income for Thai farmers. 
Interestingly, it was not until 2008 that the company started to replace the 
‘environmental friendly-air quality improvement’ discourse with ‘environmental friendly-
addressing global warming’ discourse.  This change can be seen from this excerpt from the 
2008 PTT annual report, which states that “May 30, 2008: PTT and Toyota Group joined 
hands in the research and development of a new diesel technology called Bio-
Hydrogenated Diesel or BHD, the first of its kind in Thailand (…) The innovation could 
respond to the government policy and, more importantly, is environment friendly through 
reduction of global warming” (PTT, 2008). The “environmental friendly-addressing global 
warming” discourse was continuously mentioned in all annual reports between the years 
2009 and 2011, going as far as having the company point out that global warming was 
being caused by oil consumption. “Investment in this area (oil palm planting) was made 
through PTT Green Energy Co., Ltd. (PTTGE), (…) in the production of biodiesel as an 
alternative energy in line with the government policy on alternative energy and reduction 
of global warming caused by oil consumption” (PTT, 2010). 
The “National energy security- reducing imported oil” discourse was employed 
when talking about other types of renewable energy, beside biofuels. However, biofuels 
seem to hold an important status within the company. A message from the board of 
directors, written in the 2008 annual report, intended to send a message to stakeholders and 
clearly stated that “gasohol and biodiesel sales were the public’s other choices in the 
collective efforts for greater self-reliance” (PTT, 2008). Statements like ‘reduce the 
national burden of long term oil imports’, ‘less dependence on imported fuels’ or ‘lower 
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petroleum imports’ were found repeatedly in annual reports between the years 2005 and 
2008. However, the discourse on energy security was dropped and substituted with a 
discourse reasoning that biofuels are cheaper and can serve as a replacement for 
conventional gasoline and diesel. Later, in their annual reports between 2010 and 2014, the 
company reiterated the discourse that biofuels are cheaper than conventional fuels, stating 
that PTT continued to promote biofuel energy as an alternative option (where gasohol and 
biodiesel would replace gasoline and diesel, respectively). The other three discourses that 
PTT used to justify their investment on biofuels highlighted that these were a response to 
government policy, followed HM the King’s initiatives and helped increase the income of 
Thai farmers. Although the discourse on HM the King was found with less frequency than 
the other discourses mentioned previously, it noteworthy to mention that it was used in 
2003 when the company first started selling gasohol at gas stations. This discourse is 
unique to biofuels development and is related to the monarchy, an important socio-political 
institution in Thailand. Interestingly, PTT combined this discourse with other socio-
political ones (‘helping Thai farmers’), as can be seen clearly from excerpts from annual 
reports:  
Regarding how they were following initiatives from HM the King and helping to 
increase Thai farmers’ income, they mentioned how they were aiming, “to provide a less 
expensive alternative for users of 95-octane gasoline, support His Majesty the King’s efforts 
in promoting alternative energy, and help provide more income for Thai farmers; PTT 
offered gasohol at 12 locations in Bangkok. PTT first offered gasohol at its Head Office 
station. It was the first oil company to do so in Thailand” (PTT, 2003).  
Regarding how they were following HM the King and responding to the 
government’s policy discourse, part of one of the reports reads: “recognizing its role as the 
national oil company, PTT is committed to supporting the government’s energy policy in 
various aspects: security of supply, promotion of alternative forms of energy to cut imports, 
and promotion of economical and efficient use of energy. Above all, PTT is committed to 
laying down a solid foundation for sustainable energy management in line with His Majesty 
the King’s sufficiency approach, a royal initiative for Thailand (PTT, 2006). 
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Although PTT’s annual reports do not provide much detail on HM the King’s 
initiative on biofuels and how Thai farmers obtained benefits from such developments, the 
company did refer to various government policies and measures which directly promote 
investment in biofuels. Examples of this include “the policy on a single commercial 
biodiesel grade with a 4% to 5% mixture of palm oil (B100), depending on the internal 
palm oil market” (PTT, 2011), “ethanol consumption of 2012 rose by 13.0% as a result of 
the government’s price intervention to reduce oil fund contribution from gasoline-gasohol 
mixture at a lower rate than for pure gasoline. More and more people have turned to 
gasohol 91 and gasohol 95” (PTT, 2012), “because of the first-car scheme and the 
abolishment of sale of gasoline 91 from January 1, 2013, more vehicles will flood the 
traffic system and higher consumption of gasohol is unavoidable” (PTT, 2012), and 
“biodiesel (B100) consumption soared by 23.7% to 3.5 million litres per day as the 
Department of Energy Business increased blending requirement of B100 in diesel from 5% 
to 7%” (PTT, 2014). 
Finally, PTT used several conventional discourses for the remaining renewable 
energy sources that they mention (solar PV, wind, biogas from waste and hydropower), in 
the same manner as they did with biofuels. The discourse on ‘enhancing national energy 
security’ and ‘producing environmentally friendly products’ was among the most 
commonly employed. Typically, solar PV and wind energy were mentioned in the same 
statement, usually under the label of ‘clean energy’. However, it should be noted that the 
solar PV projects that PTT mentioned in its annual reports were those conducted by 
Bangchak, its associate company. However, what appeared to be different were the 
discourses used to justify PTT’s investment on biogas from waste and hydropower. Biogas 
from waste has been portrayed as an alternative fuel to both oil and natural gas for vehicles, 
particularly in for rural areas where NGV fuel stations cannot be built, and where biogas 
from waste water or animal manure was promoted as a potential energy source. The 
company presented information showing a large potential for biogas to substitute diesel or 
natural gas. Finally, the hydropower project was also justified by a rather novel discourse, 
stating that it could generate income for Thailand as a country. According to PTT’s 2013 
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annual report, “In addition, GPSC (Global Power Synergy Public Company Limited) has 
expanded investment in the ASEAN region, such as hydropower plant in Laos, to generate 
revenue for Thailand”. GPSC is an associate company of PTT which was established in 
2013, engaging in electricity, steam and water supply for industries in Thailand (essentially, 
it generates electricity from natural gas, solar energy and hydropower). It should be noted 
that PTT, although investing abroad in various projects such as palm oil plantation in 
Indonesia, did not employ this discourse of generating revenue for the country for any other 
energy sources. This finding suggests that the company does not randomly form discourses 
to justify each type of renewable energy, but rather that these are carefully thought out and 
form part on an internal logic within the company.    
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5.3.2     Bangchak: A company in transition  
 
 
Figure 5 Bangchak’s discourses on renewable energy investment 
 
Figure 5 shows that in order to legitimize its biofuels investment Bangchak 
employed a combination of discourses that were similar to those used by PTT. Namely 
discourses mentioned a response to government policy, biofuels being a cheaper alternative 
to normal gasoline, biofuels enhance national energy security by reducing imported oil, 
biofuels help Thai people cope with rising oil prices, biofuels were initiated by HM the 
King and helping increase farmers’ incomes, and that biofuels are environmental friendly 
and prevent health problems resulting from the consumption of used cooking oil. However, 
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an interesting characteristic of Bangchak’s discourses is that many of them appear together, 
and thus it is difficult to judge which single discourse is the most frequent. For example, 
extracts from its reports mention how:“expansion of sales of Bangchak Gasohol 95 at 99 
service stations in Bangkok Metropolitan to honour His Majesty the King for the royal 
initiative on gasohol promotion project in Thailand, to support the Clean Oil policy of the 
government and to promote more utilization of Gasohol 95 especially in big cities with 
heavy traffic” (Bangchak, 2003),,or “2007 was the auspicious year as His Majesty the 
King celebrated his 80
th
 birthday[…] He is determined to ensure most subjects who are 
farmers to be able to stand on their own feet under the sufficiency economy philosophy. 
[…] the company has integrated the philosophy into business operations and we have 
produced and marketed crops-based gasohol and biodiesel upon the initiative research at 
His Majesty’s Chitralada Palace” (Bangchak, 2007), and “the company is always aware of 
the importance of the renewable energy, especially ethanol and biodiesel which contributes 
to the country’s energy security, reduction of foreign currency losses from oil imports, and 
supports of local agricultural sector in terms of local employment and improve their quality 
of living” (Bangchak, 2009).          
 The aforementioned discourses show that Bangchak employed a wide range of 
rationales, including economic, social, political, and environmental and health aspects, for 
justifying the development and commercialization of biofuels. However, in the first period 
(before 2007) none of the discourses employed referred to any benefits that the company 
could expect for itself. Nevertheless, such discourses started to appear in the second period, 
when the company introduced a solar power plant project into an ongoing biofuels business 
as part of its “Greenery Excellence Vision”.       
  When oil prices started to increase in 2007-2008, the company became aware that 
its business structure was vulnerable to the volatility of oil prices, and a number of novel 
discourses that were not present in the first period started to appear. These included 
becoming a carbon neutral company, achieving alternative and renewable energy leadership, 
risks diversification from the volatility of oil prices, and sustainable development. In the 
second period, the company has mentioning solar power plants, palm oil biodiesel plants, 
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palm planting, and ethanol plants as emerging green businesses. Through renewable energy 
investment, Bangchak appeared certain that it would achieve its goal to become a carbon 
neutral company; and that its carbon dioxide emissions would be reduced by more than 
50% from its business-as-usual model by 2015 (Bangchak, 2013). In addition, renewable 
energy was considered as a means for Bangchak to diversify income risks away from its 
conventional oil business. Bangchak (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014) claimed that these 
clean energy businesses provide a steady source of income and have lower risks than 
refining oil, and thus were carried out to add value to their business in order for the 
company to achieve sustainable growth.       
 To summarize, Bangchak considered that to sustain its energy business it needs to 
expand into clean energy and become the leader in alternative and renewable energy. The 
message was never this clear in annual reports of PTT and Thai Oil. An explanation for this 
emphasis on economic discourses is that Bangchak has been a Public Company Limited 
since 1994, with PTT holding 27.22% of its shares and the rest being held by private 
shareholders (iBizChannel, 2015). PTT has never appointed any chief officers to become 
management executives in the Board of Directors of Bangchak (unlike what they did with 
Thai Oil). In essence, Bangchak has been operating rather independently from PTT, which 
has resulted in them having a more focussed business approach and the need to return 
profits to private shareholders, helping to explain why economic discourses were given 
more importance than socio-political ones. 
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5.3.3    Thai Oil: A complying corporate citizen 
 
 
Figure 6 Thai Oil’s discourses on renewable energy investment 
 
Due to a high level of investment in biofuels (mainly ethanol) production, most of 
Thai Oil’s discourses on renewable energy are related to this type of energy (Figure 6). 
Unlike the variety of discourses used by PTT, Thai Oil’s rationale for pursuing biofuels 
was more focused, centred around (ranked in order of the number of times it appears in 
their annual reports between 2004 and 2014): 1) addressing government policy, which 
promotes biofuels usage to enhance energy security by reducing imported energy, 2) 
seeking business opportunities from exporting ethanol, 3) biofuels are environmental 
friendly, reducing pollution/emissions and reducing global warming, and 4) production of 
biofuels helps to improve and stabilize revenue for the agriculture sector.   
What appears to be special for the case of Thai Oil is that the use of discourses 
regarding compliance with government policy for promoting biofuels outnumbered the use 
of all other discourses. This appears to be because the majority of its shares (49.10%) are 
held by PTT, which is a state-owned company. Furthermore, many members of the top 
management of PTT or the Ministry of Energy are typically appointed to become board 
members or top management in Thai Oil (as shown in annual reports, see The Board of 
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Directors, 2015). The company appears to think that government policy regarding the 
development of alternative energy, and especially biofuels, is beneficial to its business, and 
has sought to invest more in this sector. This has resulted in Thai Oil creating joint ventures 
with other companies to establish new ethanol and biofuel production plants and boost 
production capacity. The company has aimed high, as stated in its 2010 annual report, with 
regards to developing an ethanol business from agricultural supplies in Thailand, 
attempting to make the country an ethanol hub for the regional market. The 2011 annual 
report showed that biofuel production projects had become the company’s long-term 
strategic plan for alternative energy and ethanol market development. 
Discourses on ‘environmental friendly’ and ‘increase income of agriculture sector’ 
were employed by Thai Oil, in the same manner as with PTT. However, the discourse on 
‘biofuels are cheaper than normal gasoline’ and ‘following the HM King’s initiative’ were 
not found in Thai Oil’s annual reports. This could be due to the company not having a 
distribution market, and instead being exclusively engaged with the midstream industry, as 
suggested in its vision that the company aims to be “a leading fully integrated refining and 
petrochemical company in Asia Pacific (Vision, 2015). Hence, there is no need to employ 
discourses which could impact end-consumers, such those on retail prices and on HM the 
King. As for the discourse on following HM the King’s initiative, the study found that the 
company referred to the “Sufficiency Economy”, which was introduced by HM the King, 
when it illustrated Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities. One example is 
Umphang Energy Town Project in Tak province, which Thai Oil launched as a tribute to 
HM the King on the occasion of his 84
th
 Birthday Anniversary. The project aimed to 
enhance the living standard of villagers who lived far away from the power grid by setting 
up renewable energy development projects such as a Pico-Hydro Power plant, cooking 
biogas production, and biomass energy production. To do so Thai Oil has cooperated with 
various organizations, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the 
Ministry of Energy of Thailand, and Energy for Environment Foundation (E for E), in 
launching renewable energy development projects in rural areas of Thailand. However, it 
has done so as part of CSR projects, which are not the focus of the present study.  
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5.4      Discursive legitimation strategies  
5.4.1     Discursive legitimation strategies for biofuel investment 
 
 
Figure 7 Discursive legitimation strategies for biofuel investment of PTT, Bangchak, Thai 
Oil, PERTAMINA and PETRONAS 
 
To legitimize biofuel products, five O&G companies applied all four types of 
discursive legitimation strategies as shown in Figure 7. Authorization strategy, in particular 
‘referring to government policy’, was used by all five O& companies. Only PTT and 
Bangchak from Thailand referred to HM the King as an important authority figure in order 
to acquire legitimacy on their biofuel products. This discourse is unique for Thailand O&G 
companies as the discourse on ‘following the King’s initiative’ makes sense only in the 
specific socio-political context of Thailand.      
 Rationalization strategy, which proposes that legitimacy is obtained through a 
reference to business profits or to rational issues, was widely used by O&G companies to 
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promote biofuel products.  Bangchak, Thai Oil and PERTAMINA highlighted that biofuel 
products provide them business sustainability or positive economic profits. PTT, Thai Oil, 
Bangchak  claimed that biofuel can enhance national energy security by lowering oil 
imports while PERTAMINA promoted biofuel to address the decrease of crude oil reserves 
in Indonesia. Moreover, Bangchak made a rational choice to do biofuel business by 
referring to the fact that Thailand has huge supply of energy crops i.e. sugar cane and 
cassava, a good material for ethanol production.        
 Moral evaluation strategy proposing that legitimacy can be drawn upon social 
values or norms of the society was used by four companies. PTT, Thai Oil and Bangchak 
from Thailand claimed that their biofuel business increased incomes of Thai farmers. This 
is based on the social perception that Thai farmers are usually poor and uneducated. Thus, 
the fact that the companies purchase energy crops from those farmers show that they have 
sympathy on those poor farmers and that the biofuel business helps uplifting the well-being 
of those farmers. Similar to the claim about helping farmers, PTT and Bangchak also 
claimed that their biofuel products lessened the burden of Thai consumers during the time 
of high crude oil prices. This discourse was found only during a short period from 2007-
2008 when the world crude oil prices went over US$ 120 per barrel. Thai Oil from 
Thailand did not use this discourse because the company does not have service stations. 
Lastly, PERTAMINA claimed that biofuel production which is one of their core businesses 
enhanced the well-being of Indonesian people. It is noted that PERTAMINA applied 
discourse on ‘developing well-being of Indonesian people’ to not only biofuels but also 
their core businesses in O&G and new energy businesses as a whole.    
 Mythopoesis strategy suggests that legitimacy is obtained through stories or 
narratives about the past or the future as well as business plans. The discourses which fall 
under this Mythopoesis strategy are environmental concerns about global climate change 
and the company’s business plans or missions. PTT, Thai Oil, Bangchak and PERTAMINA 
applied the former discourse saying that biofuels reduce GHG emissions and air pollution. 
Only Bangchak incorporated biofuel business in their mission in conducting business which 
is responsible to society and environment. Under this mission, Bangchak has actively 
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pursued many renewable energy investment projects, especially solar PV in which the 
company applied a number of discourses as will be shown in the next section.    
5.4.2     Discursive legitimation strategies for solar PV investment 
 
 
 
Figure 8 Discursive legitimation strategies for solar PV investment of PTT, Bangchak, and 
PETRONAS 
 
Solar PV has recently been invested by the O&G companies studied. The discourses 
on solar PV were found only in the annual reports of PTT, Bangchak and PETRONAS. 
Thai Oil invests in solar PV business through a joint venture with PTT. As a result, the 
company does not explain their solar PV investment in annual reports. PERTAMINA has a 
plan to set up solar farms in various sites throughout the country as presented in Figure 3; 
however the company does not attempt to legitimize their solar PV projects in annual 
reports.    
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Among the three companies, only PETRONAS applied Authorization strategy to 
gain legitimacy on solar PV project by referring to the government policy. Rationalization 
strategy was used by PTT, Bangchak and PETRONAS. Bangchak claimed that solar PV 
provided business sustainability by diversifying its income sources. The company claims 
that there is a risk in oil business due to volatility of world crude oil prices while the solar 
PV business is a low risk and low return project which can offer business sustainability to 
the company. During the time of high crude oil prices in 2007-2008, Bangchak obtained 
income from solar PV business to complement decreased revenue from its oil business. In 
addition, Bangchak referred to the high electricity demand as another way to gain 
legitimacy for solar PV business. Lastly PTT, Bangchak and PETRONAS claimed that 
solar PV offers positive economic profits.       
 Mythopoesis strategy was used by PTT, Bangchak and PETRONAS. First of all, 
these three companies applied discourses on environmental concern and global climate 
change mitigation to legitimize solar PV projects. Solar PV is portrayed to be a clean 
energy which releases zero GHG emissions when generating electricity. Another type of 
discourse under Mythopoesis strategy is business plan and company mission. Bangchak set 
a mission to be a responsible company for society and environment; while PETRONAS has 
claimed that it follows the sustainability principle through conducting solar PV business.  
 Moral evaluation strategy was not used by all five O&G companies studied. The 
present study assumes that it is because of the nature of solar PV business. The O&G 
companies usually generate electricity and sell to the grid which is managed by utility 
companies. The O&G companies do not have to engage with a wide public as they do in the 
biofuel business. Consequently, the companies do not apply moral evaluation strategy to 
gain legitimacy on solar PV business.  
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5.4.3     Discursive legitimation strategies for geothermal investment 
  
 
 
Figure 9 Discursive legitimation strategies for geothermal investment of PERTAMINA 
 
Only PERTAMINA has so far invested in and produced electricity from geothermal 
energy. The present research thus only has discourses applied by PERTAMINA. In order to 
obtain legitimacy on geothermal projects, PERTAMINA applied four types of discursive 
legitimation strategies. Rationalization strategy was applied the most. PERTAMINA 
claimed that geothermal offers positive business profits, referred to the fact that Indonesia 
has huge geothermal resources while facing a decrease of oil reserves, and finally referred 
to the fact that geothermal is the company’s core business in upstream sector.   
 Authorization argument which PERTAMINA applied includes the discourse on 
‘complying with government policy’. After Indonesia became a net oil importer in 2005 
100 
 
and had to leave OPEC because it could not meet the production quota in 2008, the 
government of Indonesia has intensively urged the national oil company to find alternative 
energy sources so that national energy security can be achieved; PERTAMINA’s 
geothermal business serves the government policy in that sense. Moral evaluation strategy 
was also applied through the discourse on developing well-being of the people of Indonesia. 
This discourse is identical with PERTAMINA’s discourse in biofuels. Thus, the Moral 
evaluation strategy is not unique for the geothermal case. Lastly, Mythopoesis strategy was 
used through the discourse on GHG emissions reduction. Geothermal is portrayed as one of 
the clean energy sources.  
5.5    Conclusions and policy implications  
The present study found that Thailand’s O&G companies have been active in the 
development of renewable energy in recent years, mostly in biofuels and solar energy. By 
reviewing annual reports from the past 15 years it is clear that PTT, Thai Oil and Bangchak 
have made solid efforts during the last decade to develop and commercialize biofuels. PTT 
and Bangchak have also pursued investment in solar PV from 2010, and have spent a large 
amount of resources on solar farm projects to generate electricity for the grid under a 
contract with the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) and Provincial 
Electricity Authority (PEA). Thai Oil focused on the production of ethanol and biogas from 
waste, which were also used to generate electricity that was fed into the grid. Finally, PTT 
has also shown an interest in hydropower projects in Laos and wind power in the southern 
and eastern seaboard of Thailand, though the company did not show further progress on 
these projects in any recent annual reports.        
 The fact that all three O&G companies in Thailand have invested so much in 
biofuels is logical given that biofuels align well with their conventional core business. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that all three companies have attempted to legitimize 
their investment in biofuels by using socio-political rationales. Discourses on following 
HM the King’s initiative, as well as helping increase the income of farmers, are unique in 
justifying biofuel projects in the annual reports of Thai O&G companies. In other words, 
companies referred to the most powerful political figure in the country to gain legitimacy 
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for their new products. This strategy is very interesting, as it highlights the role of socio-
political discourses on renewable energy development and diffusion, in particular at the 
early stages in their development and commercialisation. In addition, as a state-owned 
company and associate companies of a state-owned company, PTT, Bangchak and Thai Oil 
used discourses on responding to government policy and enhancing national energy 
security as primary reasons to invest in renewable energy. Reference to economic reasons, 
such as those concerning business sustainability and responding to volatile oil prices, came 
only after reference to socio-political issues and national energy security.    
 Understanding how companies think is crucial to harnessing their vast resources 
into a direction that can help bring about a transition to a low-carbon energy future. The 
present work drew four important policy implications and suggestions from the case study 
of Thailand’s O&G companies. First, the government can clearly have a profound impact 
on business strategy, considering the fact that all three companies referred to government 
policy and the rhetoric of ‘national energy security’ and ‘reducing national burden from 
importing oil’ to justify their green business. As a result, the government should continue 
sending companies a clear message and policy direction regarding alternative and 
renewable energy promotion. Otherwise, there is the risk that these companies could divest 
from the sector, in a similar way what happened with O&G companies in OECD countries 
after the governments withdrew subsidies for renewable energy when the oil prices went 
down in the 1980s.         
 Second, Bangchak has showed great ambition to become a leading company in 
renewable and alternative energy, seeing how it has restructured its business portfolio over 
the years to reduce the risk from the high volatility of oil prices. However, how the 
company will react to current oil prices of around US$ 50 per barrel remains to be seen. 
The author thus proposes that there should be a continuous examination on the renewable 
energy business strategy of O&G companies for a longer period of time, in order to observe 
any potential changes over longer time-scales. This will provide a better picture of the long-
term business strategy, which is vital to promote efforts to transition to a low-carbon energy 
future Third, as discourses not only shape one’s view of the world and reality, but also 
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produce or construct social roles, responsibilities and identities (Eckersley 2016), the 
government may induce companies to contribute to the transition to low-carbon energy 
development by referring to them as energy companies rather than as O&G companies. 
Media should also run a campaign to raise public awareness and urge these businesses to be 
recognised as ‘energy companies’. The discourse on being an ‘Energy Company’ would 
hopefully bind O&G companies into transforming their operations to meet their new 
identity and responsibilities.          
 Fourth, the discourse on following HM the King’s initiative on biofuel development 
is unique to Thailand and played a crucial role in Thai consumers accepting biofuel 
products. This finding is particularly interesting, though it is difficult to suggest that other 
countries should implement it, as it is clearly specific to Thailand’s socio-political context. 
However, it serves as an example of a socio-technical approach, and Sovacool (2009) 
suggested that for any new technology to be successfully introduced it requires not only to 
be technologically successful, but also to have socio-political backing. Thai companies 
gained legitimacy on their biofuel products by referring to HM the King, as the monarchy 
(particularly under the previous kind) is an important and respected institution in the 
country. Authorization, (van Leeuwen and Wodak, 1999), could thus be seen to be a 
powerful discursive legitimation strategy for introducing and diffusing renewable energy.  
 In conclusion, the study applied a discourse analysis on renewable energy business 
strategies of O&G companies in Thailand and revealed discursive dimensions beneficial for 
understanding the way of thinking of PTT as well as of two of its associate companies. 
Through the insights obtained from the case of Thailand the author believes that the same 
methodology could be used to further examine other case studies, in particular 
multinational O&G companies like BP, Shell, Chevron, or ExxonMobil. Discourse analysis 
can thus shed light on the underlying rationales of the investment in and divestment from 
renewable energy that O&G companies conduct, which would certainly push forward 
knowledge on the discursive differences between O&G companies in developed and 
developing countries. As a result, policy makers would be able to better formulate 
discursive strategies to introduce and diffuse renewable energy technology in their societies.   
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Chapter 6 Factors that influence ASEAN’s 
major O&G companies  
 
6.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, the present study investigates factors that influence five O&G 
companies namely: PTT, Thai Oil, Bangchak, PERTAMINA and PETRONAS, attempting 
to draw comparisons with other major O&G companies that were described in existing 
literature. The factors discussed here were taken from the analytical framework presented 
in Table 7 in section 3.5 “Methodology for sub-objective 3”. The study first described 
Company specific features, followed by National factors and Global factors. Both interview 
data and secondary data from official documents and company reports were used to discuss 
how a given factor affects the corporate strategy of each of the five O&G companies to 
invest renewable energy. The names of all interviewees are kept anonymous, and only their 
affiliation and gender (where they gave consent to do so) are presented.  
6.2 Company specific features  
6.2.1    Ownership structure and the role of CEOs and shareholders 
6.2.1.1 Ownership structure 
Penha (2011) made an observation that state-owned companies (100% owned by the 
government) i.e. Saudi Aramco, NIOC (Iran), and CNPC (China) did not invest or had less 
investment in renewable energy than those private-owned companies such as BP, Shell and 
Total. Hence, the author proposed that ownership structure of companies could be one of 
factors to determine if O&G companies will steer their resources into renewable energy 
business. The present study examined this assumption with five O&G companies- PTT, 
Thai Oil, Bangchak, PERTAMINA and PETRONAS. The findings are corresponding to 
the observation made by Penha (2011). As shown in Table 21, Bangchak which has the 
most shares owned by private investors is the most active renewable energy investor among 
these five companies; while PERTAMINA and PETRONAS are 100% owned by the states 
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and have relatively less green investment activities. However, it should be noted that 
ownership structure is not always applicable. There is an exception such as ExxonMobil 
which is 100% private-owned company but is against renewable energy investment.  
 
Table 21 Ownership structure and years of establishment of PTT, Thai Oil, Bangchak, 
PERTAMINA and PETRONAS 
Rank of companies in term of 
activeness in Renewable energy 
investment activities 
Year of establishment Ownership structure 
Bangchak 
 
1984 
• PTT owned 27.22% of shares until 
2016 
• The rest is owned by private investors 
in the Stock Exchange of Thailand 
PTT 
1978(in the period of second 
world oil crisis) 
• Since 2001 the company was listed in 
Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) 
• Ministry of Finance (51.1%) 
Krung Thai Bank (7.4%); the rest is 
owned by private investors 
Thai Oil 1961 
• PTT owns majority shares as 49.1% 
PERTAMINA 
1968 (as a result of merging 
between PN PERMINA and PN 
PERTAMIN) 
• 100% stated owned 
PETRONAS 1974 
• 100% stated owned 
 
 
6.2.1.2 The role of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) 
The role of CEOs is recognized as one of key factors that influence corporate 
strategies to climate change mitigation of O&G companies. A well-known example of 
CEOs which literature usually referred to is a former CEO of BP, Lord John Browne 
(Rowlands, 2000; Kolk and Levy, 2001; van den Hove at al., 2002; Macalister, 2007; 
Skjærseth and Skodvin, 2009). BP under his leadership from 1995-2007 changed from 
being a climate change denier to become a proactive actor in mitigating climate change. 
Starting with withdrawing from Global Climate Coalition (GCC) in 1996, a lobby group of 
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heavy industries against climate change agreement, the company had set a new slogan as 
‘beyond petroleum’ conducting GHG reduction activities such as emission trading and 
renewable energy investment. Although environmentalist NGOs criticized his attempt for 
being a greenwash, it was found after he left that the company turned back to conventional 
fossil fuel business (Kolk, 2008; Pearce, 2008; Macalister, 2009). Shell’s former CEO 
Mark Moody Stuart was also another important figure. He was reported to have a vision 
toward the low-carbon energy: “we want to meet our customers’ need for energy, even if 
that means leaving hydrocarbon behind” (The slumbering giants awake, 2001). However, 
similar to BP, after CEO Mark Moody Stuart moved out, “the hydrocarbon supremacists 
rapidly regained the ground they had lost” (Porritt, 2015).                                   
 Four O&G companies, except PERTAMINA, mentioned the role of CEOs in their 
interviews. The most obvious expression is from Bangchak interviewee who highlighted 
the fact that former CEOs established a culture of Bangchak to run business with social and 
environmental responsibility. Outstanding role of CEOs of Bangchak was confirmed by an 
academic interviewee: 
“From an external glance, CEOs of Bangchak are the most outstanding. 
They present green image and show concerns on community development, 
especially former CEO Mr. Sopol who helped Bangchak survive financial 
crisis in 1997 and former CEO Dr. Anusorn who set the GHG reduction 
targets of Bangchak well before Thailand had a national reduction 
commitment” (Scholar, male) 
Former CEO and President Dr. Anusorn Sangnimnuan, in position from 2004-2012, 
was the one who initiated various green energy investment starting with biofuel production 
and solar farms “Sunny Bangchak”. Company interviewee referred to his educational 
background in environmental engineering as one of main reasons why he gave special 
focus on business operation which was align with environmental concerns. As an associate 
of PTT, some of Bangchak’s Board of Directors were PTT executives. However, the 
President position was given to Bangchak’s own personnel. In this regard, Dr.Anusorn 
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Sangnimnuan had employed his authority to commence many green investment projects. 
Serving as the President for two full terms (eight years), he successfully put his green 
energy investment ideas into practice. However, the company interviewee recalled tension 
between PTT and Bangchak: 
“PTT appointed their personnel to serve as Directors. Dr. Anusorn was 
then selected to be CEO. He started renewable energy projects. He was 
determined to do anything, which would be beneficial to Bangchak. PTT at 
that time focused more on natural gas business and less on environmental 
problems. PTT did not let Bancghak run gas business, so we turned to 
renewable energy. But that caused PTT view Bangchak as a stubborn 
child” (Bangchak interviewee, female). 
The case of PTT and Bangchak shows that although being an associate of PTT, 
Bangchak can run its own business strategies thanks to the key role of CEOs. Yet the 
situation is different in the relation between PTT and Thai Oil because PTT holds higher 
shares in ThaiOil than it does in Bangchak. Thai Oil seems to comply more with the PTT’s 
business strategies: 
“PTT appointed Top1 and 2 of ThaiOil executives. We are a listed 
company and 50% of our shares are owned by other investors. Although we 
do not have to always follow PTT, but we consult with PTT about 
investment projects and align our direction with PTT Group (meaning PTT 
and its all subsidiary and associates)” (Thai Oil interviewee, female).   
As for PTT itself, the interviewee did not mention the role of CEOs in the interview. 
However, the review in annual reports showed that PTT’s former president and CEO from 
2012-2015, Dr. Pailin Chuchottaworn, had played a key role in increasing the green 
investment. As presented in PTT annual reports (2011-2014), he initiated the new strategic 
direction of PTT as to become a Technologically Advanced and Green National Oil 
Company or TAGNOC. The green investment was officially recognized as one of three 
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main company strategic plans. The statement in PTT annual report (2012) was read as “TA 
(Technologically Advanced) means business on the basis of knowledge application or 
development of PTT’s own technology instead of mere consumption of natural resources, 
G (Green) means environmentally friendly investment in energy and petrochemical 
businesses and NOC (National Oil Company) means establishment of energy security and 
prosperity for the nation”.          
 In the case of PETRONAS, the company and NGOs interviewee stated identically 
that CEOs of PETRONAS reported directly to Prime Minister (PM) according to the 
Petroleum Act 1974, meaning that Malaysian PM has absolute authority in PETRONAS. 
“If PM did not tell PETRONAS to go green, then it will not do”, said NGOs interviewee. 
To give a clear example, NGOs respondent cited what happened to Mr.Mohd Hassan bin 
Marican, a former CEO and president of PETRONAS since February 1995 until February 4, 
2010. According to NGOs, Prime Minister Najib Razak who took power in 2009 ended 
CEO contract of Mr. Hassan because of his disagreement with the government. The former 
CEO was reported to have conflict with PM Najib over issues ranging from who should be 
appointed as PETRONAS board to which Formula One car to sponsor (Koswanage and 
Kaiser, 2012). The fundamental conflict however seems to be rooted in his refuse to let the 
governments use PETRONAS as a cash trough. 
6.2.1.3 The role of shareholders 
Shareholder pressure, specifically referred to private shareholder, is considered as 
an important factor on O&G companies’ responses to environmental issues; in particular, 
IOCs whose shares are owned by individual and institutional investors. Many have reported 
various occasions where shareholders and investors met the O&G companies’ executives in 
the Annual General Meeting (AGM) and raised their concerns on the impact of companies 
on climate change (Logan,2014; Associated Press ,2015; Gunther, 2015; Macalister and 
Carrington, 2015; Neate, 2016b). Shareholders can pressure the companies through limiting 
the funds they provide for O&G exploration and production operations or rewarding the 
CEOs who worked to achieve the climate change mitigation targets (Davis, 2006; Fight the 
power, 2015; Farrell, 2016). However, the companies responded to shareholders’ pressure 
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differently. Shell and BP accepted shareholder demands to increase transparency about how 
their operations affected climate change; while CEO Rex Tillerson of ExxonMobil (now 
appointed as a secretary of state of the US) rejected shareholder resolution and insisted on 
his view that “cutting oil production was not acceptable for humanity” and that “the world 
is going to have continue using fossil fuels, whether they like it or not” (Neate, 2016b). 
 The role of shareholders to some degree have impact on O&G corporate strategies 
in particular European-based companies; however, this factor appears to play trivial role on 
five O&G companies studied. Interviewees from Bangchak and Thai Oil did not mention 
they have received shareholder pressures although they are listed companies in the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand (SET). However, PTT interviewee mentioned the dilemma that PTT 
faced when making decisions, which was caused by the fact that the government owns 51% 
of its shares while the rest of 49% is owned by private investors: 
“Whether PTT will invest in renewable energy or not depends on two 
factors. First of all, we are a listed company, so we have to think about the 
return of profits to shareholders. However, we are half-blood as majority of 
shares, around 50%, owned by the state. Thus, we need to balance these 
two factors. Nevertheless, in reality we cannot find the balance. 
Government policy is more dominant. We comply with the government 
policy in the end” (PTT interviewee, male). 
Interviewees from Malaysia and Indonesia also did not mention private shareholder 
pressure as the governments of Indonesia and Malaysia are sole shareholders. Whether or 
not the two companies take proactive strategies in green energy business is thus depending 
on the government policy. However, both Indonesian and Malaysian governments are 
viewed as having contradiction between an urge to generate electricity from 
cheap/abundant fuels like coals and an aim to achieve GHG emissions reduction target. 
This issue will be discussed in the section of National factors. 
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6.2.2 Short-term economic advantages 
In this factor, the study examined sub-factors which affected the short-term 
economic advantages of O&G companies; namely shortage of capital, maturity of 
company’s operation, and carbon intensity of company. During economic downturn in 
2008-2009, companies like BP and Shell pulled back their investment in renewable energy 
due to the shortage of capital in the clean energy business. It was reported that banks which 
suffered in the crisis i.e. RBS, Lehman Brothers, Washington Mutual and Fortis, were 
among the biggest finance sources for green energy business (The green slump, 2009). 
Apart from the aforementioned shortage of capital, Davis (2006) in his study to find out 
why oil companies did not commit in renewable energy investment stated that oil industry 
had reached its maturity and thus pursuing lean business approaches. The R&D budget, a 
crucial driver of renewable energy, was cut as it was not profitable as other activities.   
The carbon intensity of companies, which is referred to core business areas, fossil 
fuel reserves and production volume, has an important influence for short-term economic 
advantage of O&G companies (Skjærseth and Skodvin, 2009). The companies with high 
carbon intensity (producing coal and oil more than gas) are likely to be a target of 
regulations and to have reactive climate change strategies (Rowlands, 2000). Many 
companies were reported to clean their portfolios by switching to gas as well as pursuing 
GHG reduction activities such as installing Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technology, 
energy efficiency and flaring-venting reduction. Gas production has been promoted by 
major O&G companies as a response to Paris agreement in 2015. The new articles by the 
Economist and the Guardian have reported a wide collection of O&G companies’ efforts in 
promoting natural gas as the cleanest fossil fuel. To give some examples: 
 Total, Iberdrola, E.On and Enel influenced trade bodies such as the European Wind 
Energy Association (EWEA) and European Photovoltaic Industry Association 
(EPIA) to advocate for a renewable-gas alliance as to achieve Europe’s energy 
security targets (Neslen, 2015a) 
 The Oil and Gas Climate Initiative (OGCI) comprising of 10 companies (BP, 
CNPC, Eni, Pemex, Shell, Total, Statoil, Repsol, Saudi Aramco, Reliance 
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Industries) set up one US$ billion fund for 10 years which will be used in 
implementing technology to monitor and reduce fugitive gas emissions in gas 
production process (Carrington, 2016a) 
 Shell did a US$ 54billion acquisition of BG, a British producer of natural gas as its 
strategic planning in cleaning up its energy portfolio and addressing the decrease of 
oil demand (Katakey, 2016; Nodding donkeys, 2015; On the oil wagon; 2016) 
 Statoil argued that fossil fuels are not carbon equal; thus switching to use gas in 
electricity generation instead of coal is cost effective and reasonable measure for 
governments (Sverdrup, 2015). 
  Five O&G companies studied in this research raised issues concerning two sub-
factors; the shortage of capital and the carbon intensity. For the first sub-factor, PTT and 
PETRONAS interviewees referred to the lower budgets caused by the lower income in the 
period of low crude oil prices. The study will explain this issue in the investigation of 
global factors as the decrease in capital was caused by world crude oil prices.   
 Carbon intensity is taken into consideration on short-term economic advantages by 
three companies studied; namely PETRONAS, PERTAMINA and PTT. For Bangchak and 
Thai Oil, company interviewees did not mention about switching to gas as a way to cope 
with GHG emissions. This is due to these two companies do not run upstream industry 
(exploration and production), but rather in midstream (refinery) and downstream (end-
products distribution and petrochemical). 
 Interviewees from PETRONAS, PERTAMINA and PTT raised issue on switching 
to gas production to reduce carbon intensity of the companies, but with different 
perception.  PETRONAS interviewee claimed that the company promotes gas production as 
one of ways to mitigate climate change. The 2015 Sustainability Report of PETRONAS 
showed that the company viewed natural gas as a cleaner energy: 
“Natural gas will play a key role towards achieving a low-carbon economy 
and PETRONAS aspires to strengthen its position as a global Liquefied 
Natural Gas (LNG) player. In supporting this pursuit, the Company 
embarked on its first PETRONAS Floating LNG (PFLNG) Satu Project, a 
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versatile facility comprising LNG production, processing, liquefaction and 
offloading facilities. The structure, which limits the need for extensive 
pipelines or heavy infrastructure, will further unlock value from Malaysia’s 
remote and stranded gas fields. PFLNG is PETRONAS’ new game-changer 
that will transform the landscape of energy production” (PETRONAS, 
2015).  
In addition, the company reported to implement energy efficiency, venting-flaring 
reduction process and investments in the area of carbon capture and storage as its carbon 
commitments. 
As for PERTAMINA, the company started gas business in 1970s in the form of 
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG). In 2006 PERTAMINA developed Coal Bed Methane 
(CBM), an unconventional gas, in an attempt to increase its national gas reserve 
(PERTAMINA, 2006). The company has been since then active in gas business but later 
realized that only gas seemed insufficient to meet rising energy demand of the country. In 
2014 a new sector was set up to manage gas, new and renewable energy business, called 
“Directorate of Gas, New and Renewable Energy (PERTAMINA, 2014).  The new and 
renewable energy included a wide range of energy i.e. nuclear, wind, solar, ocean and tidal. 
PERTAMINA interviewees concluded firmly that even for the short-term economic 
consideration the company needs to move further than switching to gas production: 
“The reserves are not balancing. Finding new reserves and exploiting 
reserves is not balance. We already become a net importer of oil. Soon we 
will be a net importer of gas. We want to increase sustainability of energy 
in Indonesia. Renewable energy is part of our obligation for our next 
generation” (PERTAMINA interviewee, male).    
In the case of PTT, the company through its subsidiary- PTTEP has explored and 
produced crude oil and gas onshore and offshore in both Thailand and abroad. During 
2000-2010 PTT spent huge investment to develop gas business in two main areas, 
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) for cooking and natural gas for vehicles. In addition, to 
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promote the use of NGV fuel, a then unconventional fuel in transportation sector, PTT 
initiated a number of campaigns. They are for instance installing NGV kits for thousands of 
taxis for free of charge, sponsoring 10,000 baht (US$ 330) for installing NGV in 5,000 
private cars, and cooperating with Ministry of Energy and Ministry of Transport in a 
project “Bangkok Clear Sky with NGV” in which PTT’s NGV Fund worth 5 billion baht 
(approximately US$145 million) was given to Bangkok bus operators to install NGV kits 
and buy new NGV buses. (PTT, 2001, 2002, 2005, 2007). The demand of gas for NGVs 
increased substantially from 23 MMcf/d in 2007 to 74 MMcf/d in 2008 and then to 134 
MMcf/d in 2009 (PTT, 2009). Despite this success, the company reported enormous loss in 
profits since it was assigned by the government to sell gas with a retail price lower than 
production cost. Particularly during the time of high crude oil and gas prices in 2008, PTT 
was ordered to fix the retail price of NGV fuel at 8.50 baht (US$ 0.3) per kilogram against 
the cost of production of 14 – 15 (US$ 0.5) baht per kilogram in order to help alleviate 
burdens of Thai people (PTT, 2008). PTT interviewee sharply stated how the company 
prioritized compliance with government policy over business profits: 
“The government ordered PTT to sell NGV fuel with much lower prices 
than production costs. PTT’s accumulated loss in NGV business was over 
120,000 million baht (approximately $US 3,484 millions). Former CEO 
Mr.Prasert Boonsampun once commented that CEOs of PTT have easy 
work because they can run business without concerning on making profits” 
(PTT interviewee, male).  
It is not until 2015, the company can successfully negotiate with the government 
authority to push for gradual and continual adjustment in the retail price of gas for NGV 
vehicles to reflect its real production costs (PTT, 2015). Gas business for PTT appeared to 
be a burden and the company is unlikely to switch to gas production to gain short-term 
economic advantage.                                                                 
 To conclude, the companies with still high gas reserve like PETRONAS switched to 
gas production as well as implementing CCS technology as a way to gain its short-term 
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economic advantage. Due to low gas reserves and experience in negative business profits, 
PTT appears to pursue a different path by moving toward renewable energy sources to full 
fil their short-term economic advantages. Similar to PTT, PERTAMINA has been in an 
urgent urge to find more energy sources as only oil and gas cannot meet the country’s high-
energy demand. Lastly, Bangchak and Thai Oil do not possess gas reserve; thus having no 
choices but to find other lines of energy business.   
6.2.3 Long-term economic advantages  
Two sub-factors, views on profitability of renewable energy and views on future 
energy mix, are considered for the long-term economic advantages of O&G companies. 
Literature review on renewable energy investment done by major O&G companies 
suggested that the difference in views on long-term economic advantage cause different 
corporate strategies in diversifying business portfolio from fossil fuels to renewable energy. 
However, it is noted that companies changed their views throughout years resulting in an 
on-off relation with renewable energy (See the history of renewable energy investment of 
major O&G companies in Appendix F). Back in 1970s and early 2000s, O&G companies 
were active in entering into green business (When virtue pays a premium, 1998); mostly 
European-based companies like BP and Shell who held positive view on the future of the 
growth in renewable energy and believed that the first movers will get more advantages 
(Wee, 2002; Miler, 2013; Johnson, 2015). In early 2000s BP envisaged renewable energy 
will account for 5% of revenue by 2020 and 50% by 2060 and Shell had a long-term 
planning scenario suggesting that RE will account for 30-40% of global energy by 2060 
(Levy and Kolk, 2002).         
 However, late 2000s the world had seen ‘back to petroleum’ of major O&G 
companies. To name a few, in 2007 Shell then CEO, Jeroen van der Veer, commented that 
“contrary to public perceptions, renewables is no the silver bullet that will solve all our 
problems” (Macalister, 2007). Later in 2009 Shell exited all solar business and all types of 
renewables i.e. wind, hydropower saying that they were not economic. Rather, Shell was 
going to invest only in biofuels (Pearce, 2009; Wedd, 2009). BP shut down its alternative 
headquarter in London in 2009 before leaving solar PV in 2011 after 40 years in this 
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business, saying that it could not make money from solar and pointed to low-cost solar 
panel produced in China as a main competitor of its products (Macalister, 2009, 2011b).  
ExxonMobil, the US-based major O&G company, has been expressing its long-held view 
that renewable energy is not economic and that oil and gas will maintain dominant in 
energy mixes especially those of developing countries in the next 40-50 years (Levy and 
Kolk 2002; The unrepentant oilman, 2003; Perry, 2012; AP, 2014; Elgin, 2014; Logan, 
2014; Katakey, 2016; Neate 2016b). However, this view is in the line with BP, a major 
European-based company who once had gone ‘Beyond Petroleum’. BP Energy outlook 
(2016) forecasted that fossil fuels remain the dominant and will be accounting for almost 
80% of total energy supplies in 2035; while the shares of renewables (including biofuels) in 
primary energy will rise from around 3% today to 9% by 2035.     
 The study on five O&G companies from Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia shows 
diverse views on profitability of renewable energy and on what the future energy will look 
like. Before going into details, it is noted that the present study captures companies’ 
perceptions at the time of conducting fieldwork in August to December 2016. The changes 
of their views in late 20
th
 century are important but beyond the scope of study which focus 
on the changing world of 21
st
 century.   
6.2.3.1 Views on profitability of renewable energy 
Views on profitability of renewable energy is separated between views on biofuels 
for transportation and on renewable energy i.e. solar PV for electricity generation. Starting 
with biofuels, PTT, Bangchak and Thai Oil interviewees perceived that biofuels business is 
not economic at the moment due to low crude oil price. PTT interviewee claimed that 
biofuel production cost is lower than normal fuel because of subsidy from government’s oil 
fund not because it has cheaper price. Moreover, the interviewee raised that many R&D on 
biofuel projects were shut down or paused as a result of low crude oil price. According to 
the interviewee, those projects are for instance R&D on algae-based biofuel which PTT had 
invested for 6-7 years and spent around 700-800 million baht (US$30 million), R&D on 
B20 biodiesel, and 2
nd
 generation of biofuels: 
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“The R&D on algae-based biofuels was shut down everywhere in the world. 
Shell did so before PTT did. The reason to shut down is that it cannot reach 
commercialization point. I was the one who ordered to shut down the 
project in early of 2016. … The celluloid-based ethanol was suspended. We 
started it when the time of high crude oil price. Now that the oil price is 
very cheap, using celluloid as a raw material for ethanol is like burning a 
teak tree to make a firewood” (PTT interviewee, male).  
Thai Oil interviewee has similar view with PTT on biofuels: 
“At the moment, ethanol business is quite challenging. Although it has 
benefits for national energy security, help farmer, reduce oil imports, but 
actually Thai Oil found it is difficult to run business. First of all, we do not 
have upstream and downstream industry of biofuel
8
.  In addition, we face 
limitations to export ethanol due to a law. The ethanol production of 
Thailand cannot compete with that of Brazil. They have larger sugar yields 
and better economic of scale. Thus they can sell ethanol cheaper price than 
Thailand” (Thai Oil interviewee, female). 
Association of ethanol producers of Thailand confirmed difficulty of biofuels business. 
According to the president of association, biofuels is helpful in the period of high crude oil 
price: 
“Biofuel can help a lot when crude oil price was high. But when the price 
decreases to US$ 30 per barrel, ethanol is much more expensive than crude 
oil. Ethanol is food-based fuel, so its production cost is always expensive 
than that of crude oil or shale gas. At this moment, biofuels is a burden 
than a solution” (President of association, male). 
It appears that biofuel business of Thailand O&G companies are affected by 
volatility of world crude oil price. However, the companies continue producing biofuel for 
                                                          
8 Upstream industry of biofuel means energy crop plantation; while downstream refers to retailing of end products. 
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domestic consumption due to biofuel blending mandate. PERTAMINA and PETRONAS 
are also required to produce biofuels in a blending rate, which their national governments 
implemented. These two national oil companies also had trouble in running biofuel 
business during the period of low crude oil price and viewed that biofuel at the present was 
a burden. As PETRONAS interviewee explained: 
“B10 mandate if implemented is going to be a burden. No matter we don’t 
like or not, we have to do it. Our retail oil price is not flexible like price in 
Thailand. We have to set prices to meet market price if we would move 
towards biodiesel business” (PETRONAS interviewee, female).   
The next issue examined is views on profitability of renewable energy for electricity 
generation. Starting with a company which appears to have a positive view; namely 
Bangchak. The company received benefits from high adder rates (8 baht per kWh) for solar 
PV-electricity generation projects (see details on financial incentives in the section of 
‘National factors’). As a low-risk & low-return business, Bangchak’s solar farms with a 
power purchase agreement for 130 MW with Electricity Generation Authority of Thailand 
provided substantial income for the company especially during the time of high crude oil 
price. As Bangchak interviewee recalled: 
“Two years ago when the crude oil price was very high, many oil 
companies experienced income deficit, except Bangchak. This is because 
we have supplementary revenues from solar PV business. If we only run oil 
business, our future is not sustainable. Solar PV business depends on solar 
radiation, but the oil business depends on crude oil price. Solar PV helps 
enhance business sustainability. We view that oil will be run out, so we find 
alternative energy. We aim to be a 100-years old company” (Bangchak 
interviewee, female). 
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Bangchak clearly sees renewable energy profitable and pursues green energy 
business as a way to enhance its business sustainability. However, this was viewed with 
suspicion by both PTT and Thai Oil:   
“Strategies are choices. We choose different choice from Bangchak. At the 
moment no one knows who is right, who is wrong. There are supporters of 
choices of Bangchak, and of Thai Oil. We chose to do what we are good at. 
Whether or not the choice is sustainable, we have to see which organization 
can last in the next 50 years. Now Bangchak chose to go green. We have to 
consider if their business has competitiveness advantage or not. We have 
our own competitiveness advantage. We have learned that we cannot do 
everything, but only things that we are good at” (Thai Oil interviewee, 
female). 
“Bangchak’s advantage is from the merit of high adder rate. Bangchak has 
received this financial incentive for 5-6 years already. Only 2-3 years left 
before the contract would finish. So after the adder scheme is finished, we 
can then see if Bangchak will maintain its business or not. We should see 
how sustainable of its business is under the FiT scheme” (GPSC 
interviewee, male). 
Both PTT and Thai Oil interviewees suspicious Bangchak’s long-term commitment 
to solar PV business. The in-depth investigation in Thailand companies reveal the new 
finding that although companies are associated with each other, they may pursue different 
business strategies. More importantly, it highlights the importance of having a first mover 
especially in a conventional O&G business which has been operating since late 19
th
 century 
(PBS, 2004). Bangchak appears to be the first mover among O&G companies in Thailand; 
while Total from France was perceived to be the first major O&G company who breaks 
from the pack and this time it will stick to renewable energy business (Macalister, 2015a). 
The study will discuss further on the influence of first mover and peer pressure among 
O&G companies in the section of Global Factors.  
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Despite the skeptical perception on Bangchak’s solar PV business, PTT itself 
considers solar PV as profitable but is not yet sustainable without the state’s financial 
subsidy. The clear example that PTT sees profitability in solar PV is an establishment of a 
new subsidiary, Global Power Synergy Co., Ltd (GPSC), in 2013 to run power business 
using natural gas and solar PV as well as to invest in energy storage technology (GPSC, 
2016). Nevertheless, The GPSC interviewee explained that the company faces limitations 
which mostly caused by limited quota from the government to buy electricity from 
renewable energy: 
“We set target to use 10% of renewable energy to generate electricity by 
2019. However, because the government did not increase quota, we have to 
seek business opportunity abroad such as Japan and Myanmar in order to 
achieve the target. We recently won the lottery to install 5MW-capacity 
solar farm cooperative although we can install much more capacity” 
(PTT’s subsidiary interviewee, GPSC, male) 
Thai Oil has 24% of shares in GPSC. The company interviewee viewed that 
renewable energy is a new trend in 21
st
 century and a direct substitute of O&G products. So 
the company has closely inspected the development of low-carbon energy business. 
However, due to insufficient competitiveness advantage in renewable energy and smaller 
capital capacity than PTT, the company decided to do joint venture with PTT in GPSC 
rather than taking on the investment itself. Besides, Thai Oil interviewee provided an 
interesting view on future energy. This will be discussed in the section of views on future 
energy mix.         
 PERTAMINA also has positive views on profitability of renewable energy for 
electricity generation. Moreover, the company has faced similar limitations, as the national 
electricity company, PLN, does not yet agree with the FiT rate and prices of electricity 
from renewable energy.  Rather than seeking business opportunity abroad as Thailand 
O&G companies did, PERTAMINA made a business-to-business contracts with local 
authorities or private companies located in small islands far away from the national grid to 
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sell electricity from renewable energy sources. Because of this business strategy, the future 
renewable energy projects of PERTAMINA is thus to install as small as 1 MW-capacity of 
renewable energy in various sites nationwide (see the figure 2). The conflict between PLN 
and PERTAMINA is elaborated in the section of National Factors. 
“We want to make good commercial business from renewable energy. We 
explore solar, wind, biomass and produce power and sell to either PLN or 
private sector. One regular approach is through selling to the grid and get 
FiT.  But we do not rely on this FiT only, we are also seeking other 
opportunities between PERTAMINA and other state owned company.  In 
some areas, there is no grid and no electricity supply yet, so we want to 
cooperate with local government offices in remote areas. We can do 
business to supply power for them… PERTAMINA tries to sell power inside 
country because we have many islands.” (PERTAMINA interviewee, male) 
Among five companies studied, PETRONAS is only one who viewed that 
renewable energy is not profitable, or to be more specific, renewable energy is not as 
profitable as oil and gas both in domestic and international market:  
“Renewable energy business grows very fast but does not make good profits 
as O&G. O&G is dirty but make profits. For solar, people don’t think that it 
needs a large area to install, where can we find such land?...If you have 
money, will you buy condominium in Kuala Lumpur and get profits or buy a 
house outside the city? Of course, you have to put money into the thing that 
will give you more profits”(Anonymous interviewee, Malaysian, male9).  
How the companies view on profitability of renewable energy is one of key factor 
influencing business strategies. On the spectrum, there is Bangchak at the far right having 
positive views on profitability of renewable energy business, PETRONAS at the far left 
viewing renewable energy as not as profitable as O&G; while PTT, Thai Oil and 
                                                          
9
 This interviewee required both his name and affiliate to be kept anonymous.  
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PERTAMINA are somewhere in between. Additionally, views on future energy mix plays 
important role in decision making for the long-term economic advantages of O&G 
companies.  
6.2.3.2 Views on future energy mix 
Among the five companies studied, PETRONAS appears to have a strongest view 
regarding the future dominance of fossil fuels, which they believe will still represent 80% 
of world energy mix in 2050, according to an anonymous interviewee in Malaysia. Such a 
view resembles that of ExxonMobil, which continuously presents its own future energy mix 
projection to favor fossil fuels (Associated Press, 2014; Neate, 2016b). As for Thai Oil, the 
company interviewee agreed that renewable energy is currently fashionable, though it is 
unlikely that oil industry will disappear completely from the world energy mix: 
“Our oil business is a heavy industry. It is not like the technology of Nokia 
or battery that would be out of date easily. Rather, we have infrastructures 
that cannot be abolished easily. Also, we are improving our oil refinery so 
that it will be listed in first quartile
10
. In so doing, our oil business will not 
be replaced easily” (Thai Oil interviewee, female). 
From this point of view, Thai Oil’s focus is to strengthen its core business in oil 
refinery; whereas PETRONAS continues with the exploration and production of oil and gas, 
especially LNG business, as explained earlier in the section on short-term economic 
advantages.   
6.2.4 Compatibility of renewable energy to core expertise 
O&G companies in general are engaging in biofuel production as a renewable 
energy source, as it aligns well with their core expertise and business as usual models. In 
this regard, oil companies can easily be influenced to undertake biofuel development and 
commercialization. Literature has recorded on-off investment in most other types of 
                                                          
10 First quartile in Solomon index which is a benchmarking for energy industries (exploration & production, refining, 
petrochemicals, pipeline & terminals, gas processing, power generation, etc (author). See more detail in 
https://www.solomononline.com/about 
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renewable energy i.e. solar PV or wind, though almost all major O&G companies have 
maintained their investment in biofuels (Ferris and Gronewold;2014). In particular, this is 
the case of Shell, which started a joint venture in 2010 with Cosan, the world's third largest 
sugar producer and fifth largest ethanol producer, with $12 billion investment (D'Altorio, 
2010). At present Shell advertises in its website that it is one of the largest blenders of 
biofuels in the world.            
 The incompatibility of other types of renewable energy, such as solar PV and wind, 
with the core expertise of O&G companies has been used as one of the main rationales for 
divestment (Juhasz, 2013; Elgin, 2014; Johnson, 2015). Ferris and Gronewold (2014) 
interviewed a former head of Chevron's clean energy subsidiary, Chevron Energy Solutions, 
that was the second largest solar integrator in California, on his views regarding the 
compatibility of solar PV with the core expertise of oil companies. The former Chevron 
executive pointed that “the oil companies know molecules, and solar isn't about molecules. 
It's about electrons”.           
 The argument that solar PV does not match oil companies’ core expertise seems 
convincing; however, scholars presented that this issue can be addressed. Miller (2013) 
investigated the business strategies of BP, Shell and Total in Solar PV using an innovation 
theory. The author showed that although solar PV does not represent the core expertise of 
oil companies, they can still run solar PV business through the acquisition of shares in solar 
PV companies. This was allegedly a better strategy than establishing an in-house solar PV 
section in oil companies. French oil Major-Total was the good example of this business 
strategy as it acquired a 60% shares of SunPower Corporation, the U.S.-based solar-panel 
maker, for US$ 1.37 billion in 2011 (Gold, 2011). Total chose to keep SunPower’s 
executive team, who were specialists in solar PV. Doing so helped Total continued its solar 
PV business until present; whereas Shell and BP left the industry since 2009 and 2011, 
respectively (Miller, 2013; Macalister, 2015a). In addition, Johnson (2015) argued that 
O&G companies used the incompatibility of solar PV with core expertise as an excuse not 
to invest in renewable energy. This is especially surprising considering the fact that 
companies have actually invested in non-energy business, which were certainly not part of 
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their core expertise. For example, ExxonMobil has invested in real estate and electric 
motors.  
6.2.4.1 Compatibility of biofuels to core expertise  
For the case of five O&G companies analyzed in the present study, all of them have 
invested in to different degrees in biofuels. Thailand O&G companies are relatively more 
enthusiastic to make biofuel investment than PERTAMINA and PETRONAS, mainly 
because Thailand needs to enhance national energy security by reducing oil imports. A 
thorough review on biofuel investment of all five O&G companies was presented in 
Chapter 4. PTT and Bangchak started the commercialization of biofuels earlier than 
PETRONAS and PERTAMINA. PTT and Bangchak started the sale of E10 since 2003, and 
later in 2008 E20, E85 and B2-B5 were all available in their gas stations while 
PERTAMINA started the sale of B5 and E3 in 2006 and PETRONAS started supplying B5 
to the Ministry of Defense in 2009. PTT and Bangchak have spent substantial amounts of 
their budget for R&D of 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 generation of biofuels (both bioethanol and biodiesel). 
This is especially the case of PTT, which has its own Research and Technology Institute 
established since 1993, while PERTAMINA was reported to recently plan to establish one: 
“We are setting up a Research and technology center which will have four 
focus areas: O&G (biodiesel development), Geothermal, Petrochemical, 
new energy and renewable energy. The center will help our company set up 
new business in renewable energy. At the moment R&D is now running, but 
in different businesses like in upstream or downstream. But all of them will 
be integrated into one next week, (December 2016) and report to the CEO” 
(PERTAMINA interviewee, male) 
PETRONAS’s annual report also mentioned that the company signed a strategic 
alliance with Battelle, Battelle-Japan and Mitsubishi in 2007 to develop and operate a 
renewable energy lab in Malaysia. One of its first attempts was R&D on bio-fuels and 
biomass from palm oil waste (PETRONAS, 2008). However, there is no further 
explanation on the R&D activities of biofuels of PETRONAS in its other annual reports. 
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Deputy President of Malaysian Biodiesel Association (MBA) elaborated that R&D on 
biodiesel was mostly done by Malaysian Palm Oil Board (MPOB), which started research 
on the use of palm oil for car engines in 1984. As for bioethanol, “there is no organization 
working on bioethanol in Malaysia. No development, no research in Malaysia” (MBA 
Deputy President, male). Last but not least, PTT and Bangchak invested in palm oil 
plantation, whereas Bangchak and Thai Oil set up ethanol and biodiesel production plants. 
These are investment in an upstream industry that is part of the biofuel supply chain, which 
conventionally involves stakeholders like farmers, palm oil mill and plantation companies 
or sugar companies (Lim and Ouyang, 2012). Both PERTAMINA and PETRONAS did 
not have such upstream business. President of Asosiasi Produsen Biofuel Indonesia 
(APROBI) commended on the business strategy in biofuel of PERTAMINA and PTT:   
“I think it is smart thing for PTT to secure supply through investing in palm 
oil plantation. Why PERTAMINA does not join us?  PERTAMINA has plan 
and intention, but has never taken action. Their situation is like they think it 
is enough for them already.  But they are at risk of having problem in 
supply, at least if they join they could have control. If not, they are at risk. 
From national point of view, it will be good if they join. But from a private 
company’s viewpoint, it is good for us if they don’t join” (APROBI 
President, male).  
Biodiesel supply could be a problem for PERTAMINA, according to an interview 
with the president of APROBI. However, for PETRONAS supply is guaranteed by the 
Malaysian Biodiesel Association (MBA). One possible explanation why PETRONAS does 
not take part in upstream industry of biofuel is because of the huge volumes of supply in 
palm oil:  
“MBA assures that supply will not be an issue in Malaysia. So we have more 
than enough supply of CPO. So maybe that’s why PTT has to be active in 
investing in supply too” (MBA Deputy President, male). 
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6.2.4.2 Compatibility of renewable energy (i.e. solar PV) with core 
expertise 
 Among the five companies studied, only PETRONAS appears to view that 
renewable energy is not part of their business. One of the staff members interviewed at 
PETRONAS stated that nobody in the company perceived renewable energy as being 
disruptive to their business operation. However, according to an anonymous interviewee, 
PETRONAS’s renewable energy business will lead to a conflict with the electricity 
company, TNB: 
 “PETRONAS is O&G company. If we do power business then we compete 
with TNB
11
 which is the state-owned too, how could that happen? There is 
no government strategy to let two state-owned companies competing with 
each other” (Anonymous interviewee, Malaysian, male).  
The role of the state-owned O&G company and state-owned electricity company is 
viewed differently by PERTAMINA interviewees. For them, PERTAMINA is supplying 
electricity to PLN as IPPs (Independent Power Producers), thus not competing with PLN’s 
business:  
“PLN runs transmission grid, but we are injecting supply to the grid. We 
are complementing just as IPPs. We are not going into transmission 
business. We are competing in the open market (PERTAMINA 
interviewee, male). 
For Thailand’s case, there is no conflict between national O&G companies and the 
electricity generational authority, EGAT. It is clearly that O&G companies sell electricity 
to the grid, which is owned solely by EGAT. Moreover, the compatibility of renewable 
energy in general, and solar PV specifically, to core expertise is not a problem at all for 
PTT and Bangchak. GPSC interviewee explained: 
“Renewable energy is the simplest business. The coal-fired plants need a 
lot more human resources to run and monitor operations. But for 
                                                          
11 TNB or Tenaga Nasional Berhad is a state-owned electric utility company in Peninsular Malaysia and also the largest 
power company in Southeast Asia. See more detail in www.tnb.com.my 
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renewable energy, the operation is very simple because we do not store the 
power. All electricity generated will be send to the grid immediately. So the 
operation and monitoring is not complicated at all. Anyone can invest in 
solar PV business. We did not do R&D by ourselves. There are many 
organizations and companies doing R&D and solar PV technology has 
been a lot advance. We just bought such technology and hire a consulting 
company to help us” (GPSC interviewee, male). 
An interviewee who is a Director of UniTrio Technology Limited, a solar PV 
installation company in Thailand, confirmed that O&G companies are not required to have 
expertise in solar PV to be able to run this business: 
“Bangchak is only an investor. They have money and use it to hire a   
construction company to install solar panels. Bangchak Solar company has 
only a small group of engineers, no labor for construction. One of our 
customers is Bangchak too. They hired us to install solar panels in the roof 
of their gas stations. It is like real estate companies. They have money and 
hire construction companies or architecting companies to build houses or 
condominium for them” (Interviewee, Thai, male).  
Lastly, Thai Oil considers that its core expertise is in oil the refinery business, 
though it can see the possibility of making profits from the renewable energy business. 
Thus, it decided to invest together with PTT in taking a 24% stake in GPSC. This strategy 
helps Thai Oil enhance its economies of scale in the renewable energy business and save 
budget when hiring new human resources. Moreover, the interviewee stated that Thai Oil 
would not mind to increase its investment in GPSC in the future.    
6.2.5 Corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
After the 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico caused by BP, the British O&G company -
and the oil industry in general- faced extreme public criticism. BP was forced to sell all its 
less profitable business (including renewable energy businesses i.e. wind farm) in order to 
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obtain money to pay for the damage, which was considered the worst environmental 
disaster in American history (Ferris and Gronewold, 2014). After years of lawsuits, BP 
received a finalized court order to pay an estimated US$ 20 billion in settlement for the 
damages it caused to the environment and economy of five Gulf States (Kasperkevic, 2016). 
Moreover, regaining legitimacy for O&G industry’s operation after such disaster was found 
very challenging (Breeze, 2012; Du and Vieira, 2012; Summerhays and de Villiers, 2012). 
 The 2010 oil spill caused BP to divest from renewable energy. However, it drove 
other oil companies to take proactive efforts in social and environmental responsibility. 
Chevron launched a global campaign titled “We agree” in October 2010, as a response to 
public concerns on the environmental impacts of oil industry. The theme of the campaign 
can be seen through the speech of Rhonda Zygocki, vice president of Policy, Government 
and Public Affairs of Chevron, “we hear what people say about oil companies – that they 
should develop renewables, support communities, create jobs and protect the environment – 
and the fact is, we agree”, (Chevron, 2010). Whether Chevron takes their campaign 
seriously or not is one issue to be examined (Sneirson and Cherry, 2011). However, it 
shows that corporate social responsibility (CSR) can influence O&G companies to invest in 
renewable energy.           
 Among the five companies studied in the present work, Thai Oil has carried out a 
wide range of CSR activities. The company’s annual reports, and especially its 
sustainability reports, presented the community development projects which Thai Oil has 
conducted alone or in cooperation with other stakeholders i.e. government authorities, 
NGOs and international governmental organizations. A Thai Oil interviewee also said that 
Thai Oil has conducted CSR activities, which are related to renewable energy development 
projects at the community level:   
“Thai Oil can be green by various approaches. It is not necessary that we 
have to run renewable energy business. Rather, we can be green through 
CSR activities or enhance energy efficiency in oil refinery plants. We are 
taking responsibility for society and environment as CSR, not business 
investment” (Thai Oil interviewee, female). 
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One good example of its CSR activities related to renewable energy development is 
Umphang Energy Town Project in Tak province, which the company launched as a tribute 
to HM the King on the occasion of his 84
th
 Birthday Anniversary. The project aimed to 
enhance the living standard of villagers who lived far away from the power grid by setting 
up renewable energy development projects such as a Pico-Hydro Power plant, cooking 
biogas production, and biomass energy production. It is noted that Thai Oil has cooperated 
with various organizations, such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
Ministry of Energy of Thailand, and Energy for Environment Foundation (E for E), in 
launching renewable energy development projects in rural areas of Thailand. 
6.2.6 Lesson learned from past experiences in renewable energy business 
Prior losses in renewable energy business can discourage O&G companies from 
investing in renewable energy (Kolk and Levy, 2002; Davis, 2006; Penha, 2011). 
ExxonMobil referred to their huge loss in the 1970s as a reason why they do not invest in 
low-carbon energy. Scholars then pointed to changes in the US policy as a main cause for 
the company’s losses in the renewable energy business. To address the first oil shock in 
1973, President Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter’s administration in 1974-1980 period 
gave strong financial support on R&D for energy research, but those funds were cut off by 
President Reagan’s Administration in 1981 (Johnson, 2015). Shell is another company that 
experienced losses in the solar PV business. Shell CEO recently expressed that the 
company “had learned a painful lesson with a previous foray in photovoltaics that taught 
the company that petroleum geologists did not make the best electrical engineers” 
(Macalister, 2016c).  However, such losses may not be only due to the company lacking 
expertise in solar cells, but could be also because of the poor management strategies Shell 
used to run such a novel innovative technology, as Miller (2013) indicates.   
 Among the five companies, only PTT was reported to have experienced a loss in the 
biofuel business. In 2007 PTT established a subsidiary called PTTGE to oversee the palm 
oil business in Kalimantan, Indonesia. However, PTT’s annual report in 2014 stated that 
PTTGE had experienced losses from impairment of operating assets, amounting to 2,816 
million baht. The palm oil plantation project was considered ‘costly and unprofitable’ and 
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finally the company decided to sell 95% of its shares of Mitra Aneka Rezeki (MAR), the 
subsidiary of PTTGE established to operate PTT's palm plantation and palm-oil refinery 
business in Indonesia, to Prasada Jaya Mulia (The Nation, 2014). Despite the previous 
losses and current low crude oil prices, PTT maintains its biofuel production due to a 
government biofuel mandate. This also applies to Bangchak, ThaiOil, PETRONAS and 
PERTAMINA.         
 As for the solar PV business, none of the five companies have reported making a 
loss yet. Rather PTT and Bangchak are expanding their solar PV business abroad to address 
limited power purchase quotas from the government of Thailand. PERTAMINA perceives 
the potential economic profits that could arise from selling electricity that is generated by 
renewable energy to private sectors and local governments in small islands far away from 
the national grid. Lastly, PETRONAS runs a solar farm with a relatively small capacity 
(10MW). The company interviewee did not mention whether the project makes a profit or 
not, or whether they plan to make other future investment plan in solar PV.   
 To conclude, in the biofuel business a previous experience of making monetary 
losses does not seem to have an impact on the five companies’ biofuel production, as they 
have to comply with their national government blending mandates. However, in the solar 
PV business no companies have experienced losses yet. Thus, more time is required to see 
what will happen to these developments.  
6.2.7 View on global climate change 
Views on global climate change of O&G companies have been evolving from solely 
hostile to more accepting and willing to take part in mitigation efforts. In 1989 major O&G 
companies in the USA formed the ‘Global Climate Coalition’, a lobbyist organiation aimed 
at lobbying US Congress not to pass the regulation on greenhouse gas emissions reduction 
(Kolk and Levy, 2001). The Global Climate Coalition (GCC), together with American 
Petroleum Institute (API) acted against mandatory climaet change policy at the US and 
international community by applying two attacking stargeties: “raising questions about and 
undercutting the prevailling scientific wisdom on climate change in order to cast doubts in 
the mind of the public and policy-makers on the existence of a problem, and attacking the 
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policy proposals on economic grounds”  (van den Hove et al., 2002, p.5). The GCC started 
to lose its lobbying power when some of its members decided to leave the group. British 
Petroleum (BP) was the first company who withdrew from the GCC in 1996, followed by 
Royal Dutch Shell in 1998; while US-based major oil companies such as ExxonMobil 
continued to participate until the end of GCC in 2002 (Kolk and Levy, 2001).  After the 
adoption of Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the world has witnessed an increasing divergence of 
corporate responses to climate change of European and American multinational oil 
corporations, forming the ‘Trans-Atlantic divide’, as Rowlands pointed out in his article 
titled “Beauty and the Beast? BP’ and Exxon’s position on global climate change” 
(Rowlands, 2000).           
 The situation in the 2010s seems to be the same with early 2000s. Harvey (2016) 
reported that a study of the Carbon Disclosure Project examined eleven O&G companies 
and concluded that North American companies are less green than European ones. 
ExxonMobil has maintained its opposing position to climate change (The unrepentant 
oilman, 2003), as can be seen from the speech of Former CEO Rex Tillerson, who 
commented that “models predicting effects of global warming aren’t very good and that it 
would be very hard for the world to meet aggressive emission reduction targets. 
Technologies can help deal with rising sea levels or changing weather patterns that may or 
may not be induced by climate change. Mankind has this enormous capacity to deal with 
adversity” (Associated Press, 2015). On the contrary, European-based companies tend to be 
more accepting of the notions of global climate change. One example is an interview of a 
head of sustainability at Statoil, “Statoil doesn’t debate climate science, we act on it. We 
recognize that coal, oil and gas are major contributors to the world’s total GHG emissions” 
(Sverdrup, 2015).         
 The different views on global climate change leads to a difference in business 
strategies. The hostile view on global climate change leads to reactive corporate responses 
and vice versa. All five companies studied in the present research were found to agree with 
climate science and to internalize climate change mitigation activities into their operations, 
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according to their annual reports and sustainability reports. PTT’s annual reports explicit 
stated that the oil consumption is a cause of global warming: 
“Investment in this area (oil palm plantation) was made through PTT 
Green Energy Co., Ltd. (PTTGE), (…) in the production of biodiesel as an 
alternative energy in line with the government policy on alternative energy 
and reduction of global warming caused by oil consumption” (PTT, 2010). 
It would be unlikely that ExxonMobil would agree with such a statement, as its CEO Rex 
Tillerson kept downplaying the threat by global warming:  
“It’s an engineering problem, and it has engineering solutions. The fear 
factor that people want to throw out there to say we just have to stop this, I 
do not accept” (McKibben, 2017).  
It is noted that although the companies agree that global climate change is real, their 
actions are not necessary in line with renewable energy investment. As the IPCC’s fifth 
assessment report 2014 illustrates, there are a wide range of climate change mitigation 
activities that the energy sector i.e. O&G industry, can pursue. These vary from basic ones 
such as GHG measuring and reporting, GHG emission reduction targets, energy efficiency, 
switching to using gas, flaring-venting reduction, as well as reforestation to increase carbon 
sink. The diversification from fossil fuels to low-carbon energy is more ambitious, and not 
many O&G companies choose to follow (Chaiyapa et al., 2017). An anonymous 
interviewee from Malaysia elaborated the complexity of this issue by saying that we have 
to balance geopolitics, climate change, and poverty reduction. Thus, only agreeing on 
global climate change is not influential enough for O&G companies to diversify their 
energy portfolios. In addition, some of the five companies studied viewed that global 
climate change mitigation agreement will not be as serious as expected. This is going to be 
discussed in the section of Global Factors.  
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6.3 National factors 
6.3.1 National policies on climate change and renewable energy development  
The majority of O&G companies are multinational as they have business operation 
in many countries. However, as Skjærseth and Skodvin (2009) proposed, multinational oil 
corporates can be affected by the politics of the host countries, but the most influential 
factors are to be found in the companies’ home countries where they have their historical 
roots and headquarters, as well as most of their business activities. The national 
government policies in home countries of O&G companies are thus a key factor in shaping 
corporate responses to climate change mitigation. A number of scholars studied what 
caused the divergent climate change strategies of US and EU-based O&G companies and 
concluded that it was mainly because the European governments implemented more 
stringent regulations and policies than the US government did (Sethi and Elango,1999; 
Levy and Newell, 2000; Rondinelli and Berry, 2000; Kolk and Levy, 2001; McCright and 
Dunlap, 2003; Kolk et al., 2008). James Watson, CEO of SolarPower Europe, commented 
that it could have been that it was the strong push from the French government what made 
Total – a French O&G company- engage itself in solar PV business (Macalister, 2016d).  
 On the other hand, climate change scholars and environmentalists are concerned 
that American companies will be even more opposing to the climate change mitigation 
efforts in the future, as the new US President Donald Trump clearly expressed his 
skepticism in global climate change issues and said he wanted to pull the US out of the 
Paris agreement (Harvey, 2016). Apart from major western O&G companies, Penha (2011) 
studied a wider variety of O&G companies, including NOCs from China, Russia and Saudi 
Arabia. The author concluded that companies whose national governments implemented 
climate change policy and set renewable energy targets are likely to be more active in 
renewable energy investment than those whose governments do not have such policies. As 
for the five O&G companies analyzed in the present thesis, their national governments have 
both implemented climate change policies and renewable energy development policies. The 
present study discusses each how each particular policy affects the corporate strategies of 
those five companies.  
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6.3.1.1 National climate change policy 
The government of Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia have been active in climate 
change mitigation efforts both at international and regional organizations. They have 
recently submitted their Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) declaring their 
GHG reduction targets and already existing policies to promote clean and renewable energy 
in their energy mix. Thailand intends to reduce GHG emissions by 20% from the projected 
business-as-usual (BAU) level by 2030, Indonesia will reduce 26% of its GHG emissions 
against BAU scenario by 2020 and Malaysia aims to cut down its GHG emissions intensity 
of GDP by 45% by 2030, relative to the emissions intensity of GDP in 2005 (INDC, 2015, 
2016). At the regional level, the three countries are member states of Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which initiated various regional climate change efforts 
i.e.  ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) Blueprint 2009-2015 and ASEAN Action 
Plan on Joint Response to Climate Change (ASEAN cooperation on environment, 2015). 
 However, what was said at the international level can actually be different to what is 
actually done. The interviewees from Malaysia and Indonesia argued that their 
governments are not so serious as they seem with their commitment in GHG emissions 
reduction. 
“Look at our climate change policy, PM said commitment, but then started 
coal-fired plants and it will increase the energy mix of coal power plants. 
So you can see how serious of government is about climate change. The 
main constraint is at government policy” (anonymous interviewee, 
Malaysian, male).  
Similarly, PERTAMINA interviewees voiced their opinions: 
“The Indonesian people need more energy and we need to find the supply. 
The government is pushing to explore more reserves; they do not look at the 
climate mitigation. The more oil and gas is the better. Because the demand 
is high” (PERTAMINA interviewee, male). 
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PERTAMINA and PETRONAS perceived that their national governments are 
concerned more about how to achieve national energy security from cheap and available 
energy sources. Unclear messages from the governments regarding climate change 
mitigation appears to be a signal for O&G companies to maintain their business as usual 
behavior relating to fossil fuels production. Interviewees from Thailand O&G companies 
did not raise any comments regarding national climate change policy, and their main 
concerns appear to relate to renewable energy development policy and incentives from the 
government.  
6.3.1.2 National renewable energy development policy  
Just like climate change policy, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia have 
implemented renewable energy policies and set the targets to increase the uptake of low-
carbon energy in their national energy mix. The present study separately discusses the 
biofuel mandate and policy on renewable energy for electricity generation in order to 
illustrate the complexity of O&G corporate responses to government policies. 
o Biofuel mandate  
Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia have biofuel mandates, which were introduced in 
different years and include different blending rates. Further information on biofuel 
mandates for each country are presented in Appendix G.  Due to this biofuel mandate, all 
oil companies (national and foreign) have to comply and commercialize biofuel products at 
their service stations. However, implementation is not as smooth as could be expected, and 
interviewees from each of the three countries expressed difficulty in various matters related 
to policy implementation.          
 PTT interviewee provided an opinion regarding how biofuel mandates from the 
government promotion of biofuels became a burden of the company. Regardless of this, the 
company was forced to comply because this is a government mandate:  
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“The government prohibits the import of palm oil and ethanol. They want 
us to use domestic supply to help farmers, although imports are cheaper 
than domestic products” (PTT interviewee, male).  
Thai Oil interviewee explained that the company started biofuel production because 
of government policy. Also PTT, a main shareholder, assigned Thai Oil to carry out the 
project. However, at present the company is experiencing limitations in its biofuel business, 
as explained earlier in the section on the profitability of renewable energy. 
 Bangchak was the only one company that explained that the company did not invest 
in biofuels because of government policy. Rather, the company acted ahead of the 
government’s policy and started its biofuel projects voluntarily: 
“Other oil companies compulsorily produce biofuels. Bangchak is the 
opposite. We were the ones who convinced and encouraged the government 
to promote biofuel. We helped in pilot projects. Once the result was 
satisfying, the government then implement a mandate. Thai Oil and PTT 
have to comply with policy. But Bangchak invests in biofuel voluntarily” 
(Bangchak interviewee, female). 
An interviewee who is a former Director General of Department of Alternative 
Energy Development and Efficiency in Ministry of Energy confirmed the statement of the 
Bangchak interviewee. In his opinion, Bangchak conducted its business taking into account 
social and environmental responsibility, and that its renewable energy investment was more 
advanced than that of other oil companies, as it was conducted on voluntary basis while 
other companies were forced to do so.        
 PETRONAS was reported to be reluctant to comply with the biofuel mandate of 
Malaysia. At the beginning, PETRONAS, together with other oil companies operating in 
Malaysia, argued that they did not have facilities for blending biodiesel. The government 
provided funds to construct those facilities, as the Deputy President of Malaysian Biodiesel 
Association (MBA) explained:  
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“We have 5 petroleum companies in Malaysia. All oil companies did not 
want do the biofuels, claiming that they didn’t have facilities, so the 
government have to pay some. Then the oil companies did not have choices, 
but to follow the mandate. Palm oil companies pay tax to MPOB
12
 which 
use the money to build the facilities”(Deputy President of MBA, male). 
The difficulty in making PETRONAS comply with biofuel mandate was confirmed 
by President of APROBI, an association of biofuel producers of Indonesia. In addition, he 
compared PERTAMINA with the other two NOCs in term of compliance with the biofuel 
mandate: 
“It is really difficult to control PETRONAS. To convince them, Ministry of 
Plantation brought PETRONAS to see the biodiesel operation in Indonesia, 
like blending facilities, etc.  PERTAMINA is easier to join biodiesel. But 
PTT is the easiest; I think it is because PTT realized they have to do” 
(President of ARPOBI, male). 
Lastly, the government authority in Biofuel Division, Ministry of Plantation 
Industries and Commodities Malaysia revealed some insight about PETRONAS’s reaction 
towards the B10 mandate. Apart from low-crude oil price and high palm oil price, 
PETRONAS’s reluctance to comply with the mandate was another reason of the delay in 
introducing the B10 mandate, which was originally scheduled to start in 2016. However, at 
the time of writing this thesis (May 2017), Malaysia still cannot put the B10 mandate into 
practice. 
“PETRONAS and other O&G companies signed the letter together telling 
the government that they needed more time and needed a new facility in 
order to blend B10. This seems not correct, because the government 
                                                          
12 Malaysian Palm Oil Board (MPOB) 
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thought the current blending facilities can use with B10 too. No need to 
build new plants” (Government authority interviewee, male). 
o Policy on renewable energy for electricity generation    
 The government of Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia are aware of their high 
dependence on fossil fuels. To address this, they launched a renewable energy master plan 
with targets to increase the uptake of renewable energy in their national energy mix. Table 
22 presents the main information on renewable energy policy of the three countries 
(APERC, 2016; interview data from Malaysia and Indonesia). 
 
Table 22 Renewable energy policy of Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia 
Country Policy name Targets of RE Financial scheme Government office in 
charge of RE policy 
Thailand  Alternative Energy 
D    Development Plan 
(     (2015-2036) 
 Power Development    
plan (2015-2036) 
 
 30% of over all RE in final 
energy consumption 
 15-20% of RE in 
electricity generation 
 Adder rates 
      (2007-2014) 
 FiT(started in 2014) 
Department of  
Alternative Energy 
Development and 
Efficiency (DEDE), 
Ministry of Energy 
Malaysia  Renewable Energy Act 
2011 
 11th Malaysia 
Plan (2016-2020) 
 
 3% RE for electricity 
generation 
 Target RE (FiT) capacity 
of 2,080 MW 
 1st Dec 2011 collected 
1% levy from electricity 
bills, changed to 1.6% 
levy since Jan 2014 
 will not affect 75% of 
electricity consumers 
(≤ 300 kWh/month will  not 
pay levy) 
Sustainable Energy 
Development Authority 
of Malaysia (SEDA) 
Indonesia  National Energy Policy 
(2014) 
 New and renewable 
Energy at least 23% in 2025 
and at least 31% in 2050  
 Target for RE in power 
generation is unclear. 
 
 FiT  (2016 still in 
revision to adjust FiT 
prices) 
 May use other schemes 
i.e. reduce tax for IPPs 
Directorate General of 
New, Renewable 
Energy and Energy 
Conservation 
(DGNREEC),Minster 
of Energy 
 
Table 22 shows that Thailand and Malaysia have set the targets of renewable energy 
for power generation, though Indonesia does not yet have a clear target. However, company 
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interviewees and government interviewee in these three countries expressed the limitation 
of government incentives and quotas to buy power from renewable energy.   
 An interviewee from GPSC, a subsidiary of PTT running power business, 
mentioned that the company cannot participate in the Competitive Bidding Method which 
the government used to select a winner for the power purchase agreement (PPA). This is 
because the status of company as being a state-owned company. As a result, PTT through 
GPSC had to conduct a joint venture with another solar PV company, who won the bidding.  
In addition, the government changed to promote solar rooftop instead of solar farms, due to 
insufficient transmission line and limited renewable energy funding. GPSC had to cancel 
the solar farm project in the southern province.  Moreover, GPSC set a business target to 
have 10% of power generation from renewable energy by 2019, yet they may have to revise 
the target or otherwise start seeking business opportunities abroad to meet the target.  
GPSC already participated in a joint venture in the 20.8-MW Ichinoseki Power 1 in Japan. 
Asked why choosing Japan, GPSC interviewee referred to the Japanese energy policy, 
which promotes renewable power generation after the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake tsunami. 
The Ichinoseki Power project is enjoying the former Japanese government FiT rate at 42 
yen/kWh, which is higher than the current FiT tariff of 26 yen/kWh.    
 Similarly, Bangchak, even though it has a power purchase agreement for 130 MW 
under adder rates through its subsidiary-BGPC, is expanding its solar PV business in Japan.  
According to the company website, a 30MW capacity solar PV project is already in 
commercial operation and another 164 MW capacity project is under development (BCPG, 
2016). Both PTT and Bangchak were encouraged to enter the solar PV business by 
Thailand national renewable energy policy. However, the two companies have gone beyond 
the national policy in their home country and utilized the national renewable energy policy 
of a host country, in this case, Japan.      
 PERTAMINA interviewees explained the current problem with the FiT scheme and 
their business strategy to conduct renewable power generation with other partners without 
relying on FiT. Government authorities from the Directorate General of Gas and 
Directorate General of New, Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation (DGNREEC), 
138 
 
Minstry of Energy provided explanation on the problems related to the FiT scheme. 
According to them, PLN, a state-owned utility company, does not agree with current prices 
in FiT (which was designed by DGNREEC), saying that the price of the electricity 
generated through it is too expensive. Power generated by coal and gas is cheaper than 
renewable power generation. The DGNREEC government authority said that the office is 
considering revising the 2016 FiT rates, which are likely to become lower in the future. 
However, DGNREEC interviewee herself disagreed with such idea as it will not attract 
investors. In addition, because the budget to subsidize renewable power generation would 
come from the Ministry of Finance, DGNREEC is trying to cooperate with Ministry of 
Finance to find better finance incentives, such as tax reduction for IPPs.    
 The root cause of this problem, as pointed out by Indonesian government 
interviewees, appears to lie in an insufficient level cooperation and communication between 
ministries. Only in the case of FiT for renewable power generation, there are at least three 
ministries involved:  Ministry of State-owned Enterprises in charge of policy of 
PERTAMINA and PLN, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources in charge of national 
energy policy and FiT scheme, and Ministry of Finance in charge of financial budget for 
FiT. In addition, geothermal energy development of Indonesia has faced similar difficulties. 
Despite the country having started upstream geothermal industry since the 1970s, Indonesia 
is not yet utilizing its huge geothermal potential, which could be as high as 29 GW (see 
Table 23). A government official from the Directorate General of Geothermal, Ministry of 
Energy and Mineral Resources, explained the difficulties involved in geothermal 
development in Indonesia. In his opinion, the lack of good cooperation among ministries 
has caused a delay in utilizing the huge geothermal potential of the country:  
“Challenges of renewable energy development in Indonesia, in particular 
geothermal energy, is that many ministries do not communicate well. Such 
as the price, the tender and the upstream regulation. We have to talk with 
Ministry of State owned Enterprises (SOE), so that they will push PLN to 
buy power from renewable energy, and we have to talk with Ministry of 
Finance about the price, but so far do not coordinate well, Ministry of 
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Forestry and Environment will design the guideline regulation for upstream 
sector of Geothermal, and we are waiting for this guideline. All these 
problem are the same with last ten years” (Government interviewee, male). 
The situation of the FiT scheme in Malaysia is also challenging. The government 
official from the Sustainable Energy Development Authority of Malaysia (SEDA) 
explained that the renewable power generation depends on the renewable energy fund, 
which comes from a levy in electricity bills. Each month households that consume more 
than 300 kWh will pay a levy at 1.6% of their electricity bills. This amount is very small 
because over 75% of household use less than 300 kWh of electricity. SEDA official 
explained that because of limited funds, the renewable energy targets cannot be increased. 
Also, the government does not want to raise levy rates in electricity bills for fear of 
increasing the burden on the public. The FiT scheme for other renewable energy sources is 
still available until 2018, but for solar PV the quota is finished. SEDA has changed to use 
net metering mechanism since November 1, 2016 to subsidize solar PV.    
 PETRONAS installed a 10MW solar farm in Gebeng, receiving FiT from SEDA. 
However, there are complaints over big companies getting too large shares of the solar PV 
quota. SEDA allocated 65 MW quota for solar PV power generation; however, if it granted 
a 5MW or 10MW power purchase agreement to a few big companies, then small and 
medium companies cannot enter the business (The Green Mechanic, 2014). Currently, the 
limited quota and funds for renewable energy generation do not seem to be ideal for 
PETRONAS. However, PETRONAS interviewees omitted giving an opinion on current 
and future plans in solar PV, and their annual reports also do not provide any other 
information. 
  6.3.2 Countries’ O&G reserves and renewable energy resources 
Existing literature recorded that around 1960s-1970s IOCs started experienced 
decreasing or shortage of O&G reserves because of a rise of nationalism in oil producing 
nations (Csomos, 2014; Johnson, 2015). O&G reserves in countries where IOCs operated 
were taken back by the host countries’ governments. NOCs were established to manage 
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their own national O&G reserves. Such shortages drove IOCs such as ExxonMobil and 
Shell to diversify their business into the non-oil sector. Since over 90% world O&G 
reserves are occupied by NOCs, in particular those from OPEC countries, some IOCs from 
western countries started to explore and produce O&G in highly risky and environmentally 
fragile areas i.e. Shell’s plan to drill for oil in the Arctic (Barrett and Elgin, 2015; Critchlow, 
2015).  Having bigger O&G reserves can be one factor discouraging NOCs to invest in 
renewable energy. Penha (2011) observed that NOCs with huge reserves such as Saudi 
Aramco (Saudi Arabia), NIOC (Iran), PDVSA (Venezuela) and CNPC (China) did not 
invest or made less investments in renewable energy. However, the low crude oil price in 
2015-2016 caused oil producing countries to suffer budget deficits and turn in the direction 
to low-carbon energy i.e. solar PV and wind (Goldenberg, 2016). In particular, those in 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA), which has plentiful sunshine and enormous 
amount of white sand, have a great potential to start up solar PV businesses (Renewable 
energy, 2015). Having national renewable energy resources is thus another important factor 
for O&G companies to turn to green energy investment.     
 Table 23 presents O&G reserves, status in O&G trading and renewable energy 
potential of Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. Among these three countries, Thailand has 
the least O&G reserves; whereas Malaysia and Indonesia have richer reserves, especially in 
gas sector, as both of them are world leading Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) exporters. 
Lower O&G reserves appears to be a factor that influences O&G companies in Thailand to 
be more active in searching for alternative and renewable energy than Malaysian and 
Indonesian companies. PTT and Bangchak started the sale of biofuels at their service 
stations since 2003, followed by PERTAMINA in 2006 and lastly PETRONAS in 2011. 
The same story applies to solar PV, PTT installed solar rooftops since 2007; whereas 
PETRONAS -with funding from Mitsubishi corporation- only installed a solar rooftop of 
Suria KLCC shopping mall in 2011.         
 Depleting O&G reserves changed the status of Indonesia, which went from being an 
oil producing nation to a net importer in 2005. The country used to be only one Southeast 
Asian country which was a member of OPEC. This held true until 2008, when Indonesia 
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decided to leave OPEC because it could not meet production quota. Such a change caused 
the Indonesian government to seriously consider developing alternative and renewable 
energy in the country. The president of Asosiasi Produsen Biofuel Indonesia (APROBI) 
recalled that biofuel development started to be considered more seriously since the country 
became a net oil importer: 
“Bioenergy was started in 1980s but only in the labs and research centre. 
In 2005 we started again, because at that time we became a net oil 
importer. This fact shocked us, because we thought that we were rich in oil 
reserve. After independence and we got national revenue from oil 
production, especially get high income during oil shock in 1970s. We used 
that money to develop schools and clinics.  Every village has the clinic 
using money from the oil revenue. So when 2005, we were so shocked to 
find that we need to import oil. The government started the idea of using 
biofuel.  And we formed the association” (President of APROBI, male). 
PERTAMINA interviewee affirmed the company’s mission to supply 
energy for the country. The mission is vital as the country experiences decreasing 
O&G reserves.  
“The first rationale is our reserves are depleting. The reserves are not 
balancing: finding new reserve and exploiting reserve is not balance. We 
already become net importer for oil, soon we will be net importer of gas. 
We want to increase sustainability of energy in Indonesia. Renewable 
energy is part of our obligation for our next generation” (PERTAMINA 
interviewee, male) 
Malaysia’s national context appears to be opposite to Thailand and Indonesia. With 
relatively greater O&G reserves, in particular gas, PETRONAS has the least active 
investment in renewable energy amongst the five O&G companies studied. PETRONAS 
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interviewee provided the relation between O&G reserve and renewable energy 
development. 
“If your backyard still has a lot of reserves, what will you do? You want to 
invest RE?” (PETRONAS interviewee, female). 
However, the blessing that Malaysia possesses regarding its O&G reserves can be a 
double-edged sword. A Malaysian researcher on energy policy at the Asia Pacific Energy 
Research Centre (APERC) commented that having rich reserves delays the country in 
searching for alternative energy and that Malaysia people needed to change their mindset 
about O&G reserves for sustainability of the country. 
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 Table 23 Oil and gas reserves and years of production (from 2014), national status of O&G trading, and renewable energy 
potential of Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand 
 
Countries 
Gas proven 
reserves 
(tcm) 
Years 
of 
production 
Oil proven 
reserves 
(billion bbl) 
Years 
of 
production 
Status in O&G trading Renewable energy resources 
Malaysia 1.1 16 3.8 15  Net gas exporter 
World second-largest LNG 
exporter in 2013 
 Net oil importer since 2013 
(APERC, 2016) 
 39% of world palm oil production (MPC, 
2014) 
 Solar potential radiation 4.5 kWh/m2 
(Bakhtyar et al., 2013) 
Indonesia 2.9 39 3.7 12  Net oil importer since 2005 
 Net gas exporter 
World seventh-largest LNG 
exporter 
 (IEA, 2013) 
 Geothermal 29 GW 
 Hydro 75 GW 
 Wind 62 GE of commercial potential 
 Biomass for electricity 33 GW 
 Solar potential irradiation between 2.6-5.8 
kWh/m2 
Theoretical potential 
 Ocean wave 142 GW 
 Ocean thermal 4.2 GW (APERC, 2016) 
Thailand 0.46 2.8 0.24 5.7  Net oil importer 
 Import 20% of gas, 80% 
domestic production 
(EPPO,2015). 
 Biomass potential 7000 MW 
 Biogas potential 278 MW 
 Solar potential irradiation 5.1 kWh/m2/day 
 Wind potential 
(7–8 m/s): 3000 MW 
(8–9 m/s): 52 MW 
 Geothermal potential 5.3 MW 
(Bakhtyar et al., 2013) 
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6.3.3 Social demand for environmental conservation 
Scholars that studied the causes of the difference in corporate responses to climate 
change mitigation between EU and the US-based O&G companies proposed that the 
perception of the public is another key factor that can influence O&G companies to take 
proactive response (Skjærseth & Skodvin, 2009). European people showed great concerns 
on environmental issues, whereas American are more individualist and concerned on their 
lifestyle (Levy and Kolk, 2002). It is also expected that pressure on O&G companies to 
take environmental responsibility would become less under the presidency of Donald 
Trump and a Republican-dominated Congress.  (Harvey, 2016).  Although president Trump 
has –at the time of writing this thesis- not fulfilled his election promise of withdrawing 
from the Paris agreement, his selection of former ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson to be a 
secretary of States worried many about his policy toward global climate change agreement 
(McKibben, 2017) The public perception and social demand for environmental 
conservation is an important factor for influencing the behavior of corporations. However, 
in the present study only a few interviewees mentioned about NGOs and public perception. 
The first one was PTT interviewee. In his opinion, Thai NGOs actively opposed many 
energy-related projects such as coal-fired plants and dam construction, but they have never 
criticized the biofuel production: 
“Usually NGOs will protest when energy prices increase. At present, the 
government employ oil fund to pay for the gap between high biofuel 
production costs and retail prices. As long as the retail prices are not 
expensive and the price-intervention policy is working, NGOs will not do 
protests” (PTT interviewee, male). 
Similarly, a Malaysian interviewee pointed that the civil society is not a key player 
in pressuring the government to change policies. This means further that the public cannot 
have an impact on corporate strategies of PETRONAS since the government, and 
especially the Prime Minister, has a direct say in PETRONAS’s decision and strategies.  
145 
 
“Civil society in Malaysia is not yet established. The awareness on climate 
change is not so widely.  We need to educate people. Environmental 
concern is growing such as the public disagreement on nuclear. We have 
some NGOs like CETDEM doing work to raise public awareness” 
(Anonymous interviewee, male).  
The Executive Director, Centre for Environment, Technology & Development 
Malaysia or CETDEM was also interviewed. According to him, his organization is not 
supporting the use of palm oil-based biodiesel. This is because when palm oil prices go up, 
the food prices would increase, affecting consumers’ living cost. In addition, the palm oil 
industry is influential and his organization is concerned on environmental issues caused by 
the industry.           
 The viewpoint that the CETDEM interviewee shares with the PTT interviewee is 
that the price of commodities and food are important for people in Malaysia and Thailand. 
This reflects the primary social concern of developing countries in Southeast Asia relates to 
the economic sides of the problem. However, environmental concerns, which are an 
important factor in steering corporate strategies of O&G companies toward green energy 
investment, is not yet well- established in the three countries studied.   
6.3.4 Business-government relation 
The O&G companies examined in existing literature are mostly western IOCs. As a 
result, the literature investigates business-state relationships as if each of them is a separate 
entity. Theory on business-state relation proposes two scenarios: either the state actively 
serves business interests (business can influence government policy) or the state maintains 
neutrality and independence from business interests (Skjærseth and Skodvin, 2009).  
However, the case studies in this research are National Oil Companies (NOCs) and 
associates of NOCs. Thus, O&G companies studied and their respective national 
governments cannot be viewed as a separate entity. As would be seen in the following 
section, the governments of Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia have involved in these five 
O&G companies’ decision-making and strategies to a various degree. 
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For PTT, Thai Oil and Bangchak, some of the companies’ board of directors are 
high-ranked government officials. However, interviewees currently working at Department 
of Alternative Energy Development and Efficiency were reluctant to conclude that their 
affiliation represented a conflict of interest, as such practices are common in Thailand. 
Rather, they proposed that it could increase companies’ compliance with the government’s 
renewable energy development policies. An interviewee who is a former Director General 
of Department of Alternative Energy Development and Efficiency in Ministry of Energy, 
recalled the time when he served as a Director in the Board of Bangchak and PTT. 
According to his interview, he encouraged Bangchak to expand its business in biofuels by 
increasing the number of service stations offering E85, though he failed to convince PTT as 
there were many directors in the Board.       
 An interviewee from PTT raised different concerns, saying that having the regulator 
be part of the regulated entities could be viewed as unfair by foreign investors, “it is just 
like you play soccer but the referee is the owner of your competitor”. Nevertheless, the PTT 
interviewee concluded that for Thailand’s specific context it seemed good to have Board of 
Directors from government authority i.e. Ministry of Energy and Ministry of Finance, as 
they know well PTT’s business and provide good governance.     
 PETRONAS is clearly tied with the government. First of all, it is owned 100% by 
the government through the Ministry of Finance. Secondly, PETRONAS’s CEO and Board 
of Directors report directly to the Prime Minister of Malaysia according to Petroleum Act 
1974 (PETRONAS interviewee, 2016). Although the government officials do not serve as a 
director of PETRONAS, every board member is appointed by Prime Minister, who has the 
absolute right to appoint or remove every member of PETRONAS’s executive management 
(Goldstein, 2009). The government, or specifically the Prime Minister, is thus one of the 
sources of PETRONAS’s decisions and strategies. Unfortunately, the government of 
Malaysia has not yet prioritized environmental issues. An anonymous interviewee from 
Malaysia highlighted this fact: 
“IOCs face pressure from shareholders, but NOCs like PETRONAS face 
government. What government orders, we follow that.  Main driver of 
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government is economic and politic not environment yet” (Anonymous 
interviewee, male).  
PERTAMINA is also 100% owned by the government. However, the company is 
not so closely connected to the government as PETRONAS is. A PERTAMINA 
interviewee explained that they also have Board of Directors, a Board of Commission and 
shareholder meetings. The Board of Directors decide what the company strategy will be. 
Unlike PETRONAS, PERTAMINA does not report to the President but to Ministry of State 
Owned Enterprises (MSOE). While the Malaysian Prime Minister may be viewed as having 
too much control on PETRONAS, the President of Indonesia is expected to employ more of 
his power. The high-ranked government official working in the Directorate General of Gas 
gave an opinion on how to solve the lack of cooperation among ministries, which many 
have perceived as one of the main causes of why renewable energy is under-development in 
Indonesia: 
“The lacking of clear concreate government policy is the main obstacle, too 
many bureaucracy, too many licenses, common issues is the communication 
problem among ministries. For example, Ministry of Finance has different 
view, they want to make profits, generate money, so they want to put tax on 
renewable energy too, but to promote the new technology is to provide tax 
exemption etc.  There are two options to solve this problem, either the 
President himself or coordinating Ministry. If the President has clear view 
on renewable energy, it will be helpful for renewable energy development, 
only he can tell the minsters to work together. Under the current President 
is good, if he is informed well, he will address the problems” (Government 
interviewee, male). 
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6.4   Global factors  
6.4.1 Volatility of world crude oil prices  
World crude oil prices is a major factor influencing O&G corporate business 
strategies regarding renewable energy investment. However, the relationship between crude 
oil price and renewable energy investments of O&G companies is very complex. During 
the oil shocks in 1973 and 1979, oil prices increasingly drove the governments of OECD 
countries to provide a strong support for R&D in alternative energy in order to lessen their 
dependence on oil imports from the Middle East (Johnson, 2015). As a result, major 
western O&G companies invested in renewable energy. However, once the crude oil prices 
became very low in 1986, O&G companies lost their interest in alternatives to oil and shut 
down their low-carbon energy projects (Davis, 2006). The recent low crude prices during 
2015-2016 provided a different picture. Oil producing countries, such as Middle East 
countries, Russia, and Jordan, suffered from the low crude oil prices and encouraged a shift 
to green energy i.e. solar PV and wind (Walker et al., 2015; Renewable energy, 2015; 
Black and Macalister, 2016; Goldenberg, 2016). Thus, it is argued that the oil prices in 21
st
 
century did not affect the renewable energy investment of O&G companies in the same way 
they did in the past, and that oil prices are not linked with renewable energy investment, 
especially in the power generation sector (Hering, 2014; Goldenberg, 2016). In addition, 
the crude oil price is not the sole factor that influence corporate business strategies. 
ExxonMobil has held a long-term vision that future energy mix composition will be 
dominated by fossil fuels, and perceived that renewable energy was not economic; thus, the 
company continues their core business in O&G despite the recent sharp slump in crude oil 
prices (Associated Press, 2014).       
 The volatility of world crude oil prices affected the five O&G companies analyzed 
in the present research in a different way. Other factors such as views on short-term and 
long-term economic advantages, national context i.e. O&G reserves of the country, have to 
be taken into account to see how low or high crude oil prices changed O&G corporate 
strategies. In addition, the study found that the biofuels business was affected by the world 
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crude oil prices (see Figure 10
13
), while investment in other renewable energy sources such 
as solar PV appears to be linked with costs and developments in that technology. This 
section will discuss the relation between crude oil prices and the biofuel investments of five 
O&G companies from Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia.      
 Firstly, based on the review on biofuel investment projects of PTT, Bangchak, Thai 
Oil, PERTAMINA and PETRONAS (as presented in Chapter 4), the study found that 
changes in world crude oil price affected the degree of action on biofuels. As Figure 11  
shows, during the high crude oil prices in 2007-2008 (the peak was in June 2008, at 
US$ 156.34 per barrel) there were many biofuel development activities taking place 
(Macrotrends, 2017). On the other hand, during the crash in crude oil price during 2015-
2016 (the lowest point was in January 2016, at US$ 29.38 per barrel), the number of biofuel 
development decreased, and PTT even experienced losses in their palm oil plantation 
business, which was shut down (with its R&D on algae-based biodiesel also being shut 
down). 
 
Figure 10  Dubai crude oil prices from 2001-2016 (raw data was obtained from 
Macrotrends, 2017) 
                                                          
13
 The research applied Dubai crude oil price as Southeast Asian countries import oil from 
Middle East the most.  
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         Legend 
                  PTT                           Bangchak                 Thai Oil                     PERTAMINA    PETRONAS 
 
Figure 11 Landmark biofuels investments of PTT, Thai Oil, Bangchak, PERTAMINA and 
PETRONAS in the first 15 years of 21st century (based on the findings in Chapter 4) 
When looking into the details, PTT, Thai Oil and Bancghak are more actively 
producing and developing biofuels than PERTAMINA and PETRONAS. This is a result of 
the fact that Thailand typically has to import over 80% of the crude oil it consumes. Thus, 
the country was suffering from high crude oil prices and government policy prioritized 
ways to reduce oil imports to enhance national energy security (see discourse analysis of 
biofuel projects of PTT, Thai Oil and Bangchak in Chapter 5). Indonesia has also 
experienced depleting in O&G reserves, but much later than Thailand. Finally, Malaysia’s 
PETRONAS was the last one who commercialized biodiesel, due to its relatively higher 
amount of O&G reserves. However, the most important reason why PETRONAS was the 
last among the five companies to invest in biofuel is the fact that high crude oil price 
favored PETRONAS as an oil exporter. As a government authority in Malaysia stated: 
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“When crude oil was high PETRONAS got profits and did not think about 
renewable energy. They just wanted to dig more oil. Now they suffered from 
the low crude oil prices” (Government interviewee, male). 
As a result, high oil crude oil affected oil exporters and importers differently. When 
asked about the current low crude oil prices, PETRONAS interviewee accepted that the 
company was being affected from lower oil revenue. However, they are still able to manage 
through cutting down unnecessary costs, attempting energy efficiency strategies and 
running on prudent budgets. More interestingly, the interviewee explained that the 
company has pursued a strategic business plan to still make profits, although not as big as 
during the period of high crude oil prices:  
“We still export oil and gas. We export crude oil and we import refined 
products. Our crude oil is sweet, has good quality because of low Sulphur.  
Then we buy refined products which have lower grade and are cheaper, so 
we get profits” (PETRONAS interviewee, female). 
In conclusion, the volatility of crude oil price appears to affect corporate strategies 
of five O&G companies differently. A given country’s O&G reserves and some other 
factors also play a role and need to be taken into consideration. The case of PETRONAS 
revealed that the oil company is capable to come up with a strategic business plan to cope 
with low crude oil prices.  Thus, only taking into account low crude oil prices does not 
necessarily lead to a diversification of energy portfolio of O&G companies, as claimed by 
existing literature regarding companies from Middle East or Europe (Goldenberg, 2016; 
Renewable energy, 2015; Breaking the habit, 2016; On the oil wagon, 2016;). This is an 
important finding of the present research.  
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6.4.2 Discovery of shale oil/gas       
 The discovery of shale oil and gas, which is possible thanks to the horizontal 
drilling and hydraulic fracturing or fracking technology, has changed the world’s energy 
mix dramatically. Since the late 2000s the shale revolution in the US caused O&G 
companies to abandon renewable energy and focus on their core business (Perry, 2012; 
Ferris and Gronewold, 2014; Johnson, 2015). Hersher (2016) reported a study by the U.S. 
Geological Survey, which announced that a deposit in West Texas was the largest 
continuous oil and gas deposit ever discovered in the US. The area known as the Wolfcamp 
shale has proved to have huge reserves, estimated at 20 billion barrels of oil and 16 trillion 
cubic feet of natural gas. The amount of petroleum discovered is nearly three times more 
than what was found in North Dakota's Bakken shale in 2013, and is nearly three times the 
amount of petroleum products used by the US in a year. The discovery of shale gas/oil 
challenged the idea of peak oil, which predicted the collapse in the supply of oil. Rather, 
the world experienced the opposite type of crisis, and Monbiot (2016) pointed out that “we 
are drowning in the stuff”. Moreover, as the OPEC increased oil production with the 
purpose to crash the oil crude price and destroy the shale oil/gas businesses in the US, the 
world has seen dramatic reduction in world crude oil price, which went below US$ 30 per 
barrel (the lowest price was US$ 29.38 per barrel in January 2016).    
 The impact of discovery of shale oil and gas on the five O&G companies analyzed 
in this study manifested itself as a crash of world crude oil price, which was discussed in 
section 6.4.1. In addition, the Indonesian government authority from the Directorate 
General of Gas and Oil provided information that PERTAMINA has invested in the shale 
gas business in the US, but said that PETRONAS is more aggressive in such business. 
PETRONAS interviewee thought that shale oil and shale gas affect the climate policy of the 
US, and that Thailand will change its renewable energy policy if it were to find such 
reserves: 
“The US used to be an oil import, but now they have shale gas, so it 
changes the status on climate change. The US position is changed. If 
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Thailand finds shale gas, then I can guarantee that Thailand’s renewable 
energy development will be reduced” (PETRONAS interviewee, female).   
Nevertheless, whether Thailand O&G companies would change their renewable 
energy to focus on their core business of fossil fuels or not requires further investigation. 
However, so far the study found that PTT, Thai Oil (through a joint venture with PTT) and 
Bangchak are seeking business opportunity in solar PV abroad, as explained in section 
6.2.3. Moreover, PTT is acquiring shares in 24-M Company to produce Lithium Ion battery 
as a new energy storage technology. Thus, the discovery of shale oil and gas in the US at 
the present seems not directly change the renewable energy business strategies of PTT, 
Thai Oil and Bangchak. 
6.4.3 Development and costs of renewable energy technology 
This factor mainly refers to low-carbon energy sources, aside from biofuels. Penha 
(2011) highlighted that development and costs of renewable energy influence renewable 
energy investments, since it leads to economic viability and competitiveness with fossil 
fuels. This section discusses only PV technology since all of five companies studied have 
invested in this form of clean energy. The study found that solar PV investment of O&G 
companies in Thailand and Malaysia are correlated to the costs of silicon PV cells, which 
have dramatically reduced in recent years thanks to advancement in technology.   
 In 1954, researchers from Bell Laboratories successfully installed silicon solar cells 
powering a miniature Ferris wheel. The event was considered the beginning of solar PV 
development. However, its cost was estimated to be as high as US$ 286 per watt (Baker, 
2014). Due to development in technology and the role of Chinese government in strongly 
promoting its solar PV manufacturing industry, the costs of silicon solar cells have 
continuously decreased, until they reached a level of less than US$ 1 per watt at the present 
(Sun et al., 2014; Baker, 2014).  Figure 12 shows a list of the landmark solar PV projects of 
PTT, Thai Oil (through joint venture in GPSC), Bangchak and PETRONAS. Although PTT 
started installing solar PV on the roof of its service stations for self-consumption since 
2007, the commercialization of solar PV of Bangchak (which was then an associated 
company of PTT) took place in 2011. In the same year, PETRONAS (with cooperation 
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with Mitsubishi Corp) installed solar panels on the roof of Suria KLCC shopping mall. The 
project was for experiment purposes, though it can supply some electricity to the shopping 
mall.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legend 
                  PTT                           Bangchak                 Thai Oil                     PERTAMINA    PETRONAS 
 
The timeline of solar PV investment of Thailand and Malaysian O&G companies 
reflects the correlation with costs of solar cells, which has dramatically decreased in the last 
4-5 years. The government of Thailand implemented an adder scheme for solar farm since 
2007, but the companies did not take action until 2011, when the costs of PV lowered 
substantially. GPSC interviewee further elaborated on the issue of the cost of solar cells:  
Figure 12 Landmark solar PV investments of PTT, Bangchak, Thai Oil and PETRONAS (based 
on the findings in Chapter 4) 
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“In the past 5 year, technology has been advanced and cost was very low. 
The government promoted solar farm since 2007, but no one wanted to do 
business. When the solar panel costs reduced, together with generous adder 
rates of 8 baht per kWh from the government, many investors become 
active” (GPSC interviewee, male). 
As for PERTAMINA, the company has a plan to install solar PV for generating 
electricity and selling to private partners (see Figure 3). The government authority from 
Directorate General of New, Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation (DGNREEC) 
gave opinions on the reasons why solar PV development in Indonesia was slower than in 
other countries. Firstly, it is because Indonesia does not have any PV manufacturing 
capabilities, and needed to import solar panels. The price is higher than having it produced 
locally. She also cited India as a model that Indonesia should follow, because it set up a 
local manufacturing industry. Secondly, the government official pointed to the limited 
government budget as an obstacle to renewable energy development.  
6.4.4 Global movement to divest from fossil fuels companies 
This global phenomenon is novel in the study of O&G corporate strategies to 
climate change mitigation. The movement started in 2012 by NGO called 350.org, 
attempting to raise public engagement from individuals and institutional investors and join 
forces to withdraw their money from fossil fuels companies (Howard, 2015). Major pension 
funds, churches, universities, even Rockefeller Family Fund and the world’s biggest 
sovereign wealth fund owned by Norway are committed to divest from coal, oil and gas 
companies (Carrington and Howard, 2015; Neate, 2016a). This has provided pressure for 
O&G companies to keep O&G reserve on the ground as stranded assets in order to prevent 
the world temperature increase to below 2℃, which is the target of the Paris Climate 
Change Agreement. The latest progress reported in May 2017 on the Global Divestment 
Mobilisation (GDM) indicates that thousands of people have participated in over 260 
events in 45 countries on six continents. In addition, the volume of divestment is said to 
amount to over US$5.5 trillion, from 710 institutions across 76 countries.    
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 Despite of this impressive achievement, questions have been posed as whether the 
divestment will really make changes to fossil fuel companies’ behavior. Some analysists 
point out that the engagement approach could be more effective to induce the firms to 
undertake climate change mitigation (Fight the power, 2015). In addition, major O&G 
companies like Shell and Saudi Aramco have expressed their disagreement in the 
divestment efforts. Shell CEO said that “the divestment was a simplistic solution to a wider 
problem that could delay adopting more meaningful policy options, I fundamentally do not 
believe that holds a business rationale” (Macalister and Carrington, 2015). The former 
chairman of Saudi Aramco argued against the premise of the global divestment movement, 
indicating that fossil fuels are not the problem, but their harmful emissions. Thus, instead of 
stopping producing O&G he proposed that technologies are needed to be developed to 
capture carbon dioxide (Pashley, 2016).       
 While it has been claimed that this global movement is active in 45 countries, the 
present study found that such movements does not have impacts on any of the five O&G 
companies studied. First of all, interviewee from Thai Oil and Bangchak, PTT which have 
some shares owned by private investors in the Stock Exchange of Thailand, acknowledged 
the existence of the global divestment movement, but said that the companies are not 
currently affected. The Thai Oil interviewee said that she found some funding institutions 
canceled their investments, but the volume was small and did not have impact on Thai Oil. 
Such global movement has not yet affected Thailand, or maybe it would affect Thailand 
later than other countries. An anonymous interviewee from Malaysia critically argued about 
this global movement and the idea of stranded assets. In his view, stranded assets is an idea 
that NGOs constructed to attack O&G companies. More importantly, he cited the fact that 
the Malaysian government depends very much on revenue from the O&G business of 
PETRONAS. Thus, it is out of question that the government would cut down O&G 
business, as it is the main source of government income: 
“Government needs money to develop country, to enhance well-beings of 
people. Will you make your major source of incomes into stranded assets? 
We need the last drop of oil” (Anonymous interviewee, male). 
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6.4.5 Global climate change agreement 
At the very beginning, climate change mitigation, which represents efforts to reduce 
man-made greenhouse gases, was considered as a threat to the oil and gas industry, since its 
products were one of the direct causes of climate change. Some of major O&G companies 
formed in 1989 the ‘Global Climate Coalition’ (GCC), a lobbyist organiation aimed at 
lobbying US Congress not to pass regulation on greenhouse gas emissions reduction (Kolk 
and Levy, 2001). The GCC was viewed as a one major reason why the USA did not ratify 
Kyoto Protocol (McCright and Dunlap, 2003). However, once the idea of climate change 
gained enough momentum and the parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) made efforts for more stringent mechanisms to address the 
global challenges, some O&G companies were influence to change their busienss as usual 
and to take part in global climate change mitigation efforts. The Kyoto Protocol, 
implemented in 1997, caused the so-called second wave of renewable energy investment by 
O&G companies (Switzer, 2014).        
 The Paris Agreement in 2015, the latest global climate change agreement, also 
resulted in a push by the O&G industry. On the day the global Paris agreement came into 
force, the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative (OGCI) -comprising of ten major O&G 
companies; namely BP, CNPC, Eni, Pemex, Shell, Total, Statoil, Repsol, Saudi Aramco, 
Reliance Industries- declared that they would create a 1 US$ billon fund for 10 years to 
mitigate GHG emissions released during their operation (Carrington, 2016a). On the other 
hand, ExxonMobil has long been opposing the climate change problem. It has been recently 
revealed that the company’s scientists had known since 1981 that fossil fuels combustion 
caused the global warming and climate change; yet the company allegedly provided about 
$30million of funds to climate change denial researchers and activists in order to mislead 
the public about the causes and the dangers of climate change (Goldenberg, 2015; 
Nuccitelli, 2015; Barrett and Philips, 2016). In the present study, the global climate change 
agreement appears to affect the five O&G companies through the national climate change 
commitment. The national governments of Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia have 
submitted INDC to UNFCCC and committed to reduce a certain amount of GHG emissions 
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(see section 6.3.1). The perception of O&G companies themselves toward the global 
climate change agreement, especially the Paris Agreement, is not as obvious, as most 
company interviewees did not refer to it during the interview. The exception was 
PETRONAS, where the interviewee thought that global climate change commitment will 
not be serious because the US has a new President, who appears to be climate change 
denier: 
“Climate change is gonna be changed when Trump is rejecting it. He has stronger 
voice” (PETRONAS interviewee, female). 
The opinion of PETRONAS interviewee appears to be legitimate considering the 
appointment of former CEO of ExxonMobil Rex Tillerson to be a Secretary of State under 
administration of President Donald Trump. Although at the time of writing President 
Trump has not yet withdrawn from the Paris Agreement, as he promised during the 
presidency campaign, his selection worries many regarding the future direction of the US 
regarding global climate change agreement.    
6.4.6 Peer influence among companies in the O&G industry 
Industrial peers and industrial leaders are considered as influential factor for 
shaping O&G corporate responses to climate change mitigation (Pulver, 2007). 
Participating in international O&G industrial associations or other climate change 
conferences, CEOs and executives have arenas for meeting and talking. The interactions 
lead to osmosis of ideas and converging strategies among the leaders of O&G companies 
(Levy and Kolk, 2002; Penha, 2011). In addition, firms are likely to follow the leading 
company in the industry. For example, Pemex, a national oil company of Mexico, chose to 
follow BP and Shell’s climate strategies in order to become world class companies like 
them (Pulver, 2007). Regarding renewable energy investment, some commented that Total 
from France would be the first major O&G company which breaks from the pack and 
becomes a frontrunner, considering its persistent investment in solar energy (Macalister, 
2015a).      
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The five companies studied provided a rather different picture about peer influence 
on renewable energy investment. In Thailand’s case, PTT, Bangchak and Thai Oil are 
associate companies. However, their corporate strategies in green energy business are not 
exactly the same. Bangchak has obviously taken renewable energy investment as a way to 
build business sustainability. Thai Oil chose to strengthen its core business in oil refinery, 
while undertaking a joint venture in power business with PTT. This reveals that peer 
influence on renewable energy investment, even among associate companies, is not so 
strong.           
 When comparing the three NOCs, the present study found that PTT, PERTAMINA 
and PETRONAS, are aware of the business strategies and characteristics of each other. 
However, they did not choose to follow each other’s choices. For PETRONAS, the 
interviewee made a point that the company chose to follow ExxonMobil regarding 
renewable energy investments: 
“We are monitoring everything that are happening, we know what Total, 
Statoil are doing. They have different strategies; IOCs have different 
strategies. NOCs are also like IOCs, some are more aggressive like PTT. 
We are not going very strong in renewable energy; we are like ExxonMobil. 
And PTT is like Shell” (PETRONAS interviewee, female). 
In addition, the PETRONAS interviewee claimed that renewable energy investment 
seemed to be the strategy of companies or countries with less O&G reserves, and that 
PETRONAS would become like PTT in the future once O&G reserves started to deplete.  
 In the view of PERTAMINA, interviewees seem to relate PERTAMINA with 
PETRONAS more than with PTT. The interviewees’ comments implied that the company 
looked up to PETRONAS, in the sense that PETRONAS has exclusive rights and powers 
over Malaysian O&G reserves. This fact enables PETRONAS to maintain its focus on 
upstream O&G business.  
“PETRONAS has a strong link to the government. It acts as both regulator 
in upstream industry and a business company. PERTAMINA is strong too 
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but private company put pressure to join the business. Because of free trade 
law, Indonesia opens up for foreign private investors. PERTAMINA used to 
act as a regulator, but now SKK Migas serves as a regulator. The large 
portion of O&G reserves are still awarded to PERTAMINA, but some small 
portion need to be open to foreign / private companies” (PERTAMINA 
interviewee, male). 
It is allegedly noted that PERTAMINA did not view PTT as a model. President of 
APROBI, who has worked in the palm oil business for decades and was familiar with the 
business of PTT, PETRONAS and PERTAMINA, commented that PTT was smart to 
secure biofuel supply. He criticized PERTAMINA for being reluctant to get involved in the 
upstream palm oil business. Similarly, PTT itself did not view PERTAMINA as a model. 
Rather, PTT interviewee perceived PETRONAS as a successful business case.  
“R&D of Petronas is better than PTT because PETRONAS is richer and 
gives more importance to R&D more than PTT does” (PTT interviewee, 
male). 
Although PTT looks up to PETRONAS for its financial performance, PTT has been 
active in renewable energy because of its own company specific features (i.e. CEO’s vision, 
view on profitability of renewable energy) and national factors (i.e. limited country’s O&G 
reserves, government policy and target in renewable energy development). Similar to PTT, 
PERTAMINA has become active in finding alternative and renewable energy due to 
Indonesia’s decreasing O&G reserves.      
 PETRONAS has always been ranked higher than PTT and PERTAMINA in the list 
of Global Fortune 500
14
. Because of its status as the top of the O&G companies in 
Southeast Asian region, PETRONAS appears to look at world major O&G companies as a 
model instead of industrial peers in the same region. However, because ExxonMobil is their 
                                                          
14
 See ranking in previous years in http://fortune.com/global500/ 
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choice of industrial leader, PETRONAS appears to be less enthusiastic to invest in 
renewable energy. 
6.5    Conclusions  
The study summarized the main findings in tables to illustrate the differences and 
similarities of the responses to each factor of the five O&G companies analyzed. Table 24, 
25 and 26 present the findings regarding factors relating to company specific features, 
national factors and global factors, respectively. The present study answers the three 
research questions in sub-objective 3 below the tables.  
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Table 24 Company specific features of PTT, Bangchak, Thai Oil, PERTAMINA and PETRONAS 
Country Thailand Indonesia Malaysia 
            Company 
Factors 
PTT Bangchak Thai Oil PERTAMINA PETRONAS 
Ownership structure 
and role of CEOs 
and shareholders 
• 51.1% of shares 
owned by government 
• CEO takes a green 
vision 
• Government is a 
dominant shareholder 
• 27.22% of shares 
owned by PTT 
• CEOs initiate green 
business 
• Not mention private 
shareholder pressure 
• 49.1 % of shares 
owned by PTT 
• CEOs follow PTT 
• Not mention private 
shareholder pressure 
• 100% state owned 
• No private 
shareholder pressure 
• 100% state 
owned 
• CEOs report to PM 
• No private shareholder 
pressure 
Short-term 
economic 
advantages 
• Switch to gas • Not mention switch to 
gas (do not have 
upstream business ) 
• Not mention switch gas 
(do not have upstream 
business ) 
• Switch to Coal Bed 
Methane (CBM) 
• Switch to gas 
• Apply CCS technology 
Long-term economic 
advantages 
• Biofuel is not 
economic during low 
crude oil price -RE is 
profitable but limited 
opportunity in 
Thailand 
 
• Biofuel is not economic 
during low crude oil 
price 
• View that RE is 
profitable and help 
business sustainability 
• Biofuel is not 
economic during low 
crude oil price 
• Strategically choose to 
maintain oil business, 
oil industry will not 
disappear easily 
• Biofuel is difficult to 
run during low crude 
oil price 
• RE can be profitable 
and seek business 
with private 
companies 
• Biofuel is a burden now 
• RE is not profitable as 
O&G business. 
• Oil and gas will 
maintain dominance in 
energy mix 
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Table 23 Company specific features of PTT, Bangchak, Thai Oil, PERTAMINA and PETRONAS (continued) 
 
 
 
 
Table 24 Company specific features of PTT, Bangchak, Thai Oil, PERTAMINA and PETRONAS (continued) 
 
 
 
 
Country Thailand Indonesia Malaysia 
Company 
Factors 
PTT 
Bangchak Thai Oil PERTAMINA PETRONAS 
Compatibility of RE 
to core expertise 
• Biofuel is compatible 
with core expertise  
• Set up GPSC to run 
RE generation power 
business 
• Biofuel is compatible with 
core expertise 
• Set up BCPG to run RE 
power generation business 
• Hire consulting company 
on RE 
• Biofuel is compatible 
with core expertise  
• Do not have 
competitiveness 
advantage in RE so  
decided to joint 
venture in GPSC 
• Biofuel is compatible 
with core expertise but 
not involve in upstream 
palm oil business 
• Set up RE department 
in 2014 
• Reluctant to do 
biofuels  
• PERTONAS should 
not do RE business 
because of conflict 
with an electricity 
company 
Corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) 
 
Not mentioned  Not mentioned Run CSR projects to install 
RE for rural communities  
Not mentioned Not mentioned 
Lesson learned from 
past experiences 
• Loss in palm oil 
plantation in Indonesia 
• Shut down R&D on 
algae-based biodiesel 
 No loss experience mentioned  No loss experience 
mentioned 
 No loss experience 
mentioned 
No loss experience 
mentioned 
View on global 
climate change 
Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree but do not think it 
is going serious as 
President Trump would 
deny the problem 
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Table 25 National factors of PTT, Bangchak, Thai Oil, PERTAMINA and PETRONAS 
 
             Country Thailand Indonesia Malaysia 
            Company 
Factors 
PTT Bangchak Thai Oil PERTAMINA PETRONAS 
National policy and 
incentive on RE and 
climate mitigation 
policy 
• INDCs to reduce 20 % by 2030.  
• Target to have 30% of overall RE in final energy 
consumption by 2036 
• 15-20% of RE in power generation 
• Biofuel mandate  
• INDCs to cut 26& by 2020 
• Increase to 23% share of RE by    
2025and 31% in 2050 
• Unclear target of RE in power 
generation 
• Biofuel mandate 
• INDCs to cut GHG emission 
intensity of GDP by 45% by 
2030 
• Achieve 17% of RE in 2030 
• 3% of RE in power generation  
• Biofuel mandate 
Country O&G 
reserves and RE 
resources 
• Oil net importer 
• Import 20% of gas, 80% domestic production 
• Biomass potential 7000 MW 
• Biogas potential 278 MW 
• Solar potential irradiation 5.1 kWh/m2/day 
• Wind potential 
 (7–8 m/s): 3000 MW 
 (8–9 m/s): 52 MW 
• Geothermal potential 5.3 MW 
• Net gas exporter (world 7th largest 
LNG exporter) 
• Net oil importer since 2005 
• Geothermal 29 GW 
• Hydro 75 GW 
• Wind 62 GE of commercial potential 
• Biomass for electricity 33 GW 
• Solar potential irradiation between 
2.6-5.8 kWh/m2 
Theoretical potential 
• Ocean wave 142 GW 
• Ocean thermal 4.2 GW 
 
• Net gas exporter (world 2nd 
largest of LNG exporter) 
• Net oil importer since 2013 
• 39% of world palm oil 
production 
• Solar potential radiation 4.5 
kWh/m2 
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Table 25 National factors of PTT, Bangchak, Thai Oil, PERTAMINA and PETRONAS (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             Country Thailand Indonesia Malaysia 
                       Company 
Factors 
PTT Bangchak Thai Oil PERTAMINA PETRONAS 
Social demand for 
environmental 
conservation 
NGOs will not protest as long as the energy price is not 
high. 
 Not mentioned Low public awareness on environmental 
issues and climate change. 
Business-government 
relationship 
 Some boards of directors are government officials 
  
Reports to various ministers   CEOs reports directly to Prime 
Minister 
 Governments do not prioritize  
environmental issues  
166 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 26 Global factors of PTT, Bangchak, Thai Oil, PERTAMINA and PETRONAS 
 
             Country Thailand Indonesia Malaysia 
            Company 
Factors 
PTT Bangchak Thai Oil PERTAMINA PETRONAS 
World crude oil 
prices 
• Biofuel investment is 
correlated with changes 
in crude oil prices 
• Encouraged to invest in 
RE when high crude oil 
prices 
• Biofuel investment 
is correlated with 
changes in crude oil 
prices 
• Encouraged to 
invest in RE when 
high crude oil prices 
• Biofuel investment is 
correlated with 
changes in crude oil 
prices 
• Encouraged to invest 
in RE when high 
crude oil prices 
• Biofuel investment is 
correlated with 
changes in crude oil 
prices 
 
• Biofuel investment is 
correlated with 
changes in crude oil 
prices 
• Got big revenue 
when high crude oil 
price and do not want 
to invest in RE 
Discovery of shale 
oil/gas 
Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned Invest in shale gas in 
the US 
Invest in shale gas in 
the US but more 
aggressively than 
PERTAMINA 
Development and 
cost of RE 
technology 
Invested in solar PV 
when silicon solar cell 
cost is decreased 
Invested in solar PV 
when silicon solar 
cell cost is 
decreased 
Joint venture with 
PTT 
• RE projects are still in 
R&D and development 
plan 
• Except Geothermal 
which started since 
1970s 
Invested in solar PV 
when silicon solar 
cell cost is decreased 
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Table 26 Global factors of PTT, Bangchak, Thai Oil, PERTAMINA and PETRONAS (continued)  
 
             Country Thailand Indonesia Malaysia 
                   
Company 
Factors 
PTT Bangchak Thai Oil PERTAMINA PETRONAS 
Global movement 
to divest from fossil 
fuels companies 
No impact No impact • Observed that some 
institutional investors 
cancel investment but the 
volume as small 
• The movement can affect 
Thailand in the future but 
quite later than other 
countries 
No impact • No impact 
• The government will 
unlikely put O&G 
reserves into stranded 
assets because they rely 
on the O&G revenues 
Global climate 
change agreement 
 
 
 
Not mentioned on Paris 
agreement 
Not mentioned on Paris 
agreement 
Not mentioned on Paris 
agreement) 
Not mentioned on Paris 
agreement 
Not as serious since President 
Trump will reject it 
Peer influence 
among companies 
in industry 
 
 
 
Look up at PETRONAS 
in term of financial 
performance  
Aim to be a leader in 
RE itself 
Strategically choose to 
maintain oil business 
Look up at PETRONAS 
for being  a regulator in 
upstream  O&G  business  
Choose to follow ExxonMobil 
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6.5.1 Factors which influence O&G companies in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia to 
invest in renewable energy 
Firstly, global factors are less influential to O&G corporate strategies to conduct 
renewable energy investment than company specific features and national factors. This can 
be seen from the fact that company interviewees from PTT, Thai Oil, Bangchak, 
PERTAMINA and PETRONAS did not raise concerns on some global factors i.e. global 
movements to divest from fossil fuels companies, the discovery of shale gas/oil or Paris 
agreement- the latest global climate change agreement. As for the volatility of world crude 
oil price, PETRONAS was only one company that gained benefits from the high crude oil 
prices; while the other four companies were driven to find alternative and renewable energy. 
The national factors i.e. countries’ O&G reserves are needed to be taken into account to 
understand why PETRONAS enjoyed the time when world crude oil prices were high while 
the four companies suffered and got encouraged to develop renewable energy. Moreover, 
the peer influence appears to be of little importance, as each company has its own specific 
features and operates in a different national context. PETRONAS, which is the top O&G 
company in Southeast Asia, chose to follow ExxonMobil. On the other end of the spectrum, 
Thai Oil and Bangchak which are associate companies of PTT, seem to have pursued their 
own business strategies to some degree. Thus, PTT as the mother company, does not much 
influence Thai Oil and Bangchak as much as could be expected.    
 Secondly, company specific features were seen to be the most influential to drive 
O&G companies in Thailand to invest in renewable energy. This can be seen from the fact 
that PTT, Thai Oil and Bangchak are operating under the same national factors; namely 
government policy on climate change and renewable energy development, country’s O&G 
reserves and renewable energy resources, social demand for environmental conservation 
and business-government relations. However, each of them has pursued different business 
strategies. Bangchak is the most active in both biofuel and solar PV, considering the fact 
that the company started investment earlier than PTT and Thai Oil. Additionally, Bangchak 
has more installed capacity in solar PV than PTT and Thai Oil. The present study 
concluded that the company specific features are the key factors driving O&G companies in 
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Thailand to enter renewable energy businesses.       
  Thirdly, national factors, especially country’s O&G reserves, were the most 
influential factors that drive O&G companies in Thailand and Indonesia, which were more 
active in developing renewable energy sources than O&G company in Malaysia.  Because 
Thailand has the lowest O&G reserves among the three countries, PTT, the NOC of 
Thailand and its two associate companies, were pushed to look for alternative and 
renewable energy sources to secure the energy supply of the country. PERTAMINA, an 
Indonesian NOC, has become increasingly enthusiastic to find more new renewable energy 
sources due to depleting O&G reserves. This can be clearly seen from the fact that the 
country changed its status from a net oil exporter to a net oil importer in 2005. On the other 
hand, PETRONAS controlling all Malaysian hydrocarbon reserves due to the Petroleum 
Act 1974, still enjoys relatively high O&G reserves especially natural gas. Due to this 
simple but fundamental fact, O&G companies in three countries have different business 
strategies in terms of renewable energy investment.  
6.5.2 Differences and similarities between factors influencing NOCs and those 
influencing O&G companies in existing literature (western IOCs and major NOCs) 
Given the fact that only world major IOCs from developed countries and NOCs 
from Middle East, China, and Russia have typically been investigated in literature, the 
present study tested whether or not and to what extent factors found in the existing 
literature can be applied with the NOCs and their associate companies from developing 
countries in Southeast Asia-Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia.     
 First of all, it was found that most of factors can be applied to the five O&G 
companies in the study, and some findings correspond to what happened with major IOCs 
and NOCs in the literature. In the first group of factors (company specific features), the five 
O&G companies have been influenced similarly to world IOCs and NOCs by the factors 
related to 1) ownership structure and the role of CEOs, 2) short-term economic advantages, 
3) long-term economic advantages, 4) compatibility of renewable energy to core expertise, 
5) Corporate social responsibility, and 6) views on global climate change. The rest of the 
factors; namely the role of private shareholders and the lesson learned from past experience 
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in renewable energy business are found to have little influence or no impact on the 
corporate strategies of the five O&G companies. The reason why the former factor appears 
to have little of importance is because three of the studied companies are majority or 100% 
owned by the government- PTT, PERTAMINA and PETRONAS. The private shareholders 
thus have little or no impact at all on the decision making process of the companies. Given 
that the majority of Thai Oil’s shares are owned by PTT, Thai Oil’s business strategy to 
some degrees aligns with that of PTT. Lastly, 27.22% shares of Bangchak were owned by 
PTT, while the rest was owned by private investors. However, a Bangchak interviewee did 
not perceive private shareholders as an influential factor for its decision to enter the 
renewable energy business. As for the lessons learned from the financial losses in 
renewable energy business, which was one of many reasons why ExxonMobil does not put 
money in the green energy business, the study found that only PTT experienced losses in 
biofuel investment (palm oil plantation in Indonesia). However, PTT continues its sales in 
biofuel products in Thailand, and what appears to matter for PTT’s biofuel investment are 
rather the changes in world crude oil prices and government biofuel mandate.    
 In the second group of factors (national factors), the factors which influence five 
O&G companies are similar to those influencing major IOCs and NOCs except 1) social 
demand for environmental conservation and 2) business-government relation. In developing 
countries like Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, it is found that the public as well as NGOs 
are concerned with prices of energy and living costs. The interviewees from Malaysia 
stated that public awareness on environmental issues and particularly global climate change 
is not high. In addition, Malaysian Prime Ministers are given absolute power on the 
decision and strategy of PETRONAS. Hence, civil society in Malaysia appears to have no 
impact on PETRONAS. In addition, an interviewee from Thailand pointed that local NGOs 
would not protest against PTT as long as the energy prices are cheap. As for the business-
government relation, the five O&G companies seem to behave differently from what the 
existing literature proposed. This is because the five companies have strong ties with the 
governments, or act as a regulator in upstream business itself in the case of PETRONAS. 
Thus, business actors and governments cannot be viewed as a separate entity, as seen in the 
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existing literature. The cause of such difference is due to existing literature having 
examined mostly IOCs, which are private owned companies, while the five O&G 
companies in this study are NOCs or their associates.     
 Last but not least, only one factor in the third group (global factors) seems 
applicable to the five O&G companies. The development and costs of technology in solar 
PV is a key driving factor for PTT, Thai Oil, Bangchak and PETRONAS to start solar farm 
and solar rooftop projects. The rest of the factors were found to have unclear or different 
impacts from what the existing literature proposed about world IOCs and NOCs. Details of 
each factor are provided below.        
 The volatility of world crude oil prices: High crude oil prices were perceived to 
encourage O&G companies to invest in renewable energy, as seen in the aftermath of first and 
second oil shocks in 1973 and 1979. The study found that this factor is true for O&G companies 
from Thailand and Indonesia, as they have to import crude oil. However, the story was different for 
a company with rich O&G reserves like PETRONAS. During high crude oil price in 2008-2009, 
PETRONAS obtained huge profits from O&G business, thus feeling uninterested to invest in any 
low-carbon energy business. However, during the low crude oil price in 2015-2016 PETRONAS 
still managed to cope with lower revenue and continue with its core business by cutting unnecessary 
costs and trading its high-quality crude oil in an exchange with low-quality final oil products.   
 Discovery of shale oil/ gas:  This factor affected five O&G companies indirectly. 
The discovery of shale oil/gas caused the world crude oil prices to decrease, and change the 
view on the future energy mix of the planet. However, O&G companies in Thailand and 
Indonesia’s business strategies with regards to renewable energy investment appear 
unchanged due to the discovery of shale oil/gas. Only PETRONAS seems to be encouraged 
by the factor, as it is likely to be able to maintain its core business in O&G.   
 Global movement to divest from fossil fuels companies:  This factor has the least 
impact on all five O&G companies. Although the existing literature, especially news 
articles in well-known business magazines, would highlight the increasing momentum of 
the movement, company interviewees in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia said they were 
not affected, mostly because their national governments are the main shareholders. 
Moreover, in the case of PETRONAS, the government of Malaysia heavily depends on the 
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O&G revenue from PETRONAS. A Malaysian anonymous interviewee stated clearly that it 
is impossible that the government would turn their main source of income into stranded 
assets.            
 Global climate change agreement, especially Paris Agreement:  This factor 
actually affects the five O&G companies indirectly through the implementation of national 
climate change policy. However, as PERTAMINA and PETRONAS company interviewees 
mentioned, the governments seem not to be so serious with regards to their GHG emission 
reduction commitment. Moreover, the PETRONAS interviewee predicted that compliance 
with the global climate change agreement would not be serious, because President Trump 
will refuse to comply with the agreement.      
 Peer influence among companies in the O&G industry:  Existing literature 
proposed that O&G companies interacted and shared ideas with each other in various 
arenas, such as the associations of O&G industry or climate change conferences. Thus, 
converging business and climate change mitigation strategies among them are to be 
expected. However, the study found that peer influence has little impact on three Thailand 
O&G companies. Although they are associated, PTT, Thai Oil and Bangchak have 
maintained some degree of independence in terms of renewable energy investment. 
Bangchak is the most active in moving towards green energy businesses, but such action 
was viewed with suspicion by PTT and Thai Oil. Among PTT, PERTAMINA and 
PETRONAS, there is no evidence that the three NOCs are being influenced by the 
renewable energy investment strategies of each other. Rather, PETRONAS as the top O&G 
company in Southeast Asia in term of its financial performance according to Global 
Fortune 500, chose to follow ExxonMobil’s view on the future energy mix, which claims 
that fossil fuels will maintain a dominant position for the next 40-50 years.   
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6.5.3 Characteristics of O&G companies which influence the likelihood of 
renewable energy investment  
The findings from Chapter 6 were cross-checked with those from Chapter 4 
(regarding actual renewable energy investment projects that the five O&G companies have 
carried out in the first 15 years of the 21
st
 century). The present study then identified which 
O&G companies are the most and the least active in diversifying their energy mix and 
embarking on renewable energy investment as a corporate strategy to climate change 
mitigation. Bangchak from Thailand appears to be the most active in green energy 
investment, whereas PETRONAS from Malaysia is the least active company and appears 
determined to remain within its core O&G business.  
The differences between Bangchak and PETRONAS in terms of company specific 
features, national factors and global factors are illustrated in Table 27. The present study 
proposes that the following characteristic could be used in predicting whether other O&G 
companies, both NOCs and private owned companies, are likely to invest in renewable 
energy or not.  
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Table 27 Characteristics of Bangchak and PETRONAS 
Group Factors Bangchak 
(Most active) 
PETRONAS 
(least active) 
Company 
specific features 
 Ownership structure 
and role of CEOs and 
shareholders 
 27.22% of shares owned by PTT 
 CEOs initiate green business 
  Not mention private shareholder 
pressure 
 
 100% state owned 
 CEOs report to PM 
 No private shareholder pressure 
 Short-term economic 
advantages 
 Not mention switch to gas  
(Bangchak does not have 
upstream business) 
 
 Switch to gas 
 Apply CCS technology  
 Long-term economic 
advantages 
 Biofuel is not economic during 
low crude oil price 
 View that RE is profitable and 
help business sustainability 
 Biofuel is a burden now 
 RE is not profitable as O&G 
business. 
 Oil and gas will maintain 
dominance in energy mix 
 
 Compatibility of 
renewable energy to 
core expertise 
 Biofuel is compatible with core 
expertise 
 Set up BCPG to run RE power 
generation business 
 Hire consulting company on RE 
 
 Reluctant to do biofuels  
 PERTONAS should not do RE 
business because of conflict with 
an electricity company 
 Corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) 
 Not mentioned 
 
 
 
 Not mentioned 
 Lesson learned from 
past experiences in 
renewable energy 
business 
 No loss experience mentioned 
 
 
 No loss experience mentioned 
 View on global climate 
change 
 Agree  Agree but do not think it is going 
serious as President Trump 
would deny the problem 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
175 
 
Table 27 Characteristics of Bangchak and PETRONAS (continued) 
 
Group Factors Bangchak 
(Most active) 
PETRONAS 
(least active) 
National 
factors 
 National policy and 
incentive on renewable 
energy and climate 
mitigation policy 
 INDCs to reduce 20 % by 2030.  
 Target to have 30% of overall 
RE in final energy consumption 
by 2036 
 15-20% of RE in power 
generation 
 Comply with biofuel mandate  
 INDCs to cut GHG emission 
intensity of GDP by 45% by 
2030 
 Achieve 17% of RE in 2030 
 3% of RE in power generation  
  Comply with biofuel mandate 
 Country O&G reserves and 
renewable energy resources 
 Oil net importer 
 Import 20% of gas, 80% 
domestic production 
 Biomass potential 7000 MW 
 Biogas potential 278 MW 
 Solar potential irradiation 5.1 
kWh/m2/day 
 Wind potential 
o (7–8 m/s): 3000 MW 
o (8–9 m/s): 52 MW 
 Geothermal potential 5.3 MW 
  Net gas exporter (world 2nd 
largest of LNG exporter) 
 Net oil importer since 2013 
 39% of world palm oil 
production 
 Solar potential radiation 4.5 
kWh/m2 
 Social demand for 
environmental conservation 
 
 
 
 NGOs will not protest as long as 
the energy price is not high. 
 Low public awareness on 
environmental issues and 
climate change. 
 Business-government 
relations 
 
 
 
 Some boards of directors are 
government officials 
 Government officials 
encouraged the company to 
invest in renewable energy 
 
 CEOs reports directly to 
Prime Minister 
 Governments do not prioritize  
environmental issues  
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Table 27 Characteristics of Bangchak and PETRONAS (continued) 
Group Factors Bangchak 
(Most active) 
PETRONAS 
(least active) 
Global 
factors 
 Volatility of world crude oil 
prices 
 
 
 
 
 
  Biofuel investment is correlated 
with changes in crude oil prices 
 Encouraged to invest in RE 
when high crude oil prices 
   Biofuel investment is correlated 
with changes in crude oil prices 
 Got big revenue when high crude 
oil price and do not want to invest 
in RE 
 Discovery of shale oil and gas 
 
 
 
 Not mentioned  Invest in shale gas in the US but 
more aggressively than 
PERTAMINA 
 Development and cost of 
renewable energy technology  
 
 Invested in solar PV when 
silicon solar cell cost is 
decreased 
 Invested in solar PV when silicon 
solar cell cost is decreased 
 Global movement to divest 
from fossil fuels companies 
 No impact 
 
 No impact 
 The government will unlikely put 
O&G reserves into stranded assets 
because they rely on the O&G 
revenues 
 
 Global climate change 
agreement 
 
 
 Not mentioned on Paris 
agreement 
 Not as serious since President 
Trump will reject it 
 Peer influence among 
companies in industry 
 
 
 Aim to be a leader in RE itself  Choose to follow ExxonMobil 
 
From the characteristics listed in Table 27, the present study highlights the main 
distinguishing elements between Bangchak and PETRONAS in blue color frames. What 
appears to be the characteristic of O&G companies that are enthusiastic to transform 
themselves to become an energy company are: 
 The company is majority owned by private investors. 
 CEOs are concerned with the issue of sustainability, and have a vision and see the 
importance of the green energy business  
 The company has little or no O&G reserves especially gas reserve. As a result, the 
company cannot simply switch to produce gas as the short-term strategy, and 
instead chooses to move to renewable energy investment. 
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 The company views renewable energy as being profitable, which can serve to 
enhance its own business sustainability. 
 The company considers biofuels as part of its core expertise. As for renewable 
power generation, the company sets up a subsidiary to run the business. To address 
the lack of expertise in renewable energy technology, the company hires a 
consulting company or outsources. 
 The company’s home country has less O&G reserves and/or has become a net oil 
or gas exporter. Moreover, there should be sufficient and diverse renewable energy 
sources in the country, and the company should be able to utilize these local 
resources.   
 The company has strong link with the government, and government officials are 
promoting the company to move toward renewable energy investment. 
 The company gets affected by the volatility of world crude oil prices, in particular 
during periods of high prices. The expensive crude oil prices encouraged the 
company to seek out alternative and renewable energy. 
 The company does not invest in shale oil/gas. 
 The company takes a leading role in renewable energy investment or follows 
industrial peers who are frontrunners in green energy business.  
On the other hand, the O&G companies that are likely to maintain their business as 
usual model in O&G industry have the following characteristics. 
 The company is 100% owned by the government. 
 CEOs of the company have to report directly to the government, or a head of 
government who is concerned more on economic aspect rather than environmental 
issues.  
 The company has ample O&G reserves, and can switch to gas production as well as 
install CCS (Carbon Capture and Storage) technology to reduce emissions.  
 The company views biofuel production as a burden and is reluctant to comply with 
the government biofuel mandate. In addition, the company views renewable energy 
178 
 
as being less profitable than O&G business, and projects that O&G sources will 
remain dominant in future energy mix. 
 The company holds the view that renewable energy is not its core expertise, and 
that it is not the role of O&G companies to carry out investment in them. 
 The home country has rich in O&G reserves and is still a net energy exporter.  
 The company has strong link to the government, which prioritizes economic 
development over environmental issues.  
 The company obtains big profits when crude oil prices are high. It is thus 
discouraged to diversify its business portfolio into renewable energy. In addition, 
the company is capable of finding strategies to cope with lower revenues due to 
cheap crude oil prices  
 The company invests in shale oil/gas. 
 The company aligns its business strategy with leading industrial peers who are not 
keen to invest in renewable energy. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusions and policy 
recommendation  
 
The present research examines the corporate responses of the O&G industry to 
climate change mitigation, placing a special focus on business diversification from fossil 
fuels to renewable energy. Considering the severe impacts of global climate change and the 
Paris climate agreement, which put forward a strong global commitment to preventing a 
2℃ increase in global temperature above pre-industrial levels and to limit further 
temperature rise to 1.5℃, the long term phase-out of fossil fuels and the substitution by 
low-GHG alternative energy resources appears imperative.  However, existing literature 
appears to have limitations in capturing the complexity of O&G corporate strategies to 
climate change mitigation. Thus, the present study addressed some important gaps in 
existing literature. Firstly, the majority of existing literature investigated a small group of 
the world’s major O&G companies, mostly on International Oil Companies (IOCs) from 
the US or the EU and a few National Oil Companies (NOCs) from the Middle East, China 
and Russia. The present study thus targeted three NOCs from emerging economies in 
Southeast Asia -PTT from Thailand, PERTAMINA from Indonesia and PETRONAS from 
Malaysia- as case studies. These three NOCs can serve as a starting point for the study of 
the wider picture on NOCs, which are typically the main energy suppliers of any given 
countries. The study also included two associates of PTT- Bangchak and Thai Oil-, in order 
to provide a more in-depth picture of the specific case of Thailand.  
Secondly, the socio-economic phenomenon which are taking place in the 21
st
 
century i.e. volatility of crude oil prices, the discovery of shale oil and gas, new global 
climate change agreements, not to mention the global movement to divest from fossil fuels, 
have not been well-examined in the existing literature. The present study designed an 
analytical framework to investigate those aforementioned factors to see how they affect 
O&G corporate strategies in the development of renewable energy.  The last gap which the 
study addressed is that little analysis was carried out on the discourses that O&G 
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companies have used to legitimize their business diversification from fossil fuels to 
renewable energy sources, given the fact that such renewable energy technology is not their 
core business. The understanding of such discourses is important, as it showcases the 
communication strategies that O&G companies have used to gain public acceptance on new 
types of energy sources. To investigate O&G corporate strategies on climate change 
mitigation and address the aforementioned gaps in the existing literature, the research 
conducted three studies, each of which attempted to answer one of three sub-objectives of 
this thesis. The main purpose and findings of each sub-objective are presented below. 
7.1   Summary of findings for Sub-objective 1 
Sub-objective 1: To examine renewable energy development projects of state-owned 
oil and gas companies and their associates in Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, in the 
first 15 years of 21
st
 century        
 Sub-objective 1 was discussed in Chapter 4. The questions asked in this sub-
objective are 1) whether major O&G companies in Southeast Asia have conducted 
renewable energy investment or not, and 2) which energy sources they are putting 
investment efforts to. These seem to be simple questions; however, the literature suggested 
that world major O&G companies have an on-off relation with renewable energy. Some 
major IOCs (such as ExxonMobil) are even opposing renewable energy developments, by 
stating that they are not profitable and outside the role of O&G companies. Understanding 
the renewable energy investment activities and changes throughout years of five O&G 
companies from Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia is thus important in order to compare the 
investing behaviors of major world O&G companies.        
 The study conducted a thorough review on the actual renewable energy investment 
projects of PTT, Thai Oil, Bangchak, PERTAMINA and PETRONAS during the first 15 
years of the 21
st
 century. The results showed that all five companies have invested in 
renewable energy, but to various degrees and on a range of different technologies. 
Investment activities can be carried out in the forms of R&D, commercialization, and even 
CSR activities, as shown in Table 12 in section 4.4. All five companies have produced and 
commercialized biofuels. Bangchak and PTT appear to be more active in biofuels business 
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than the other three companies. They entered the upstream biofuel industry through palm 
oil plantation, whereas Thai Oil, PERTAMINA and PETRONAS did not make any such 
investments. Moreover, Bangchak and PTT carried out R&D on 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 generation of 
biofuel, an activity in which PERTAMINA and PETRONAS have less or no investment in. 
The study also found that biofuel investments appeared to be correlated with the 
oscillations in global crude oil prices. Nevertheless, the five companies maintain biofuel 
production and sales even though world crude oil price were cheap, due to existence of 
government mandates in each of the three countries.      
 Solar PV only became the focus of the attention of PTT, Bangchak and 
PETRONAS in recent years, when the cost of solar cells dramatically dropped and their 
respective governments initiated attractive Feed-in-Tariff policies. The solar PV installation 
capacity which Bangchak and PTT have attained is much higher than that of PETRONAS, 
whereas PERTAMINA has not yet installed any solar PV panels at the time of writing this 
thesis.  However, PERTAMINA is the only company involved in the development and 
exploitation of geothermal energy, thanks to the high geothermal potential of Indonesia. 
7.2   Summary of findings for Sub-objective 2 
Sub-objective 2:  To examine discourses or language-in-use of state-owned oil and gas 
companies and their associates in justifying renewable energy investment 
 Chapter 5 examined sub-objective 2. The focus of this chapter was to examine the 
discourses that O&G companies used to justify their investment in any given renewable 
energy source. The present study analyzed the discourses written in the annual reports of 
PTT, Thai Oil, Bangchak, PETRONAS and PERTAMINA, which are all available in the 
companies’ websites until the 2015 annual reports, the latest published at the time of 
writing. Details of annual reports of five O&G companies were presented in Table 5 in 
section 3.4.  Three questions were asked in the sub-objective, 1) what are discourses each 
oil and gas company applies to justify a given source of renewable energy?, 2) what sort of 
discursive legitimation strategies are used to justify a given renewable energy by oil and 
gas companies in Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia?, and 3) what are the implications of a 
discourse study for the diffusion of renewable energy?     
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 To answer the first question, the study identified and recorded discourses in each 
year for which annual reports were available in order to see the long-term dynamics and 
changes within the reports. The study presented all discourses that five O&G companies 
used to explain their reasons for investing in each type of renewable energy shown in Table 
13-20 in Chapter 5 and Appendix A, B,C, D and E. Special attention was given to 1) the 
discourses that the O&G companies used in the first year that they started investing in a 
given renewable energy source, 2) the discourses which were used the most repeatedly and 
3) the discourses which are specific to the socio-economic context of the home countries 
where the companies are located in.          
 The results showed that for biofuel investment all five companies referred to 
discourses on responding to government policy, and four companies except PETRONAS 
applied discourses on enhancing national energy security and biofuels are good for 
environment and health. At the time when PTT and Bangchak started the sale of biofuels 
products, the discourse on following the King’s initiate and helping farmer were also found. 
These are interesting findings because the companies chose to cite these two discourses 
rather than the discourses on complying with government policy or discourse on 
environment protection. Not only these two discourses are specific to the socio-economic 
context of Thailand, the use of such discourses highlights the role of socio-political 
discourses on renewable energy development and diffusion, in particular at the early stages 
in their development and commercialisation. The study thus concluded that to promote new 
energy products in a society, socio-economic discourses could be a key driving factor that 
would complement technology development, economic incentives or government policy. 
The discourse study reveals the importance of language factors for renewable energy 
diffusion. Solar PV discourses were found only in the annual reports of PTT, Bangchak and 
PETRONAS. Three of them similarly applied discourses on making profits or business 
sustainability and protecting the environment to explain why they carried out solar PV 
investment. Since the beginning of solar PV projects, the three companies referred to the 
discourse of making profits or enhancing business sustainability. The study found that for 
the case of solar PV investment, the companies did not apply socio-economic rationales 
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which are specific to their home countries’ contexts. The reason of this absence is 
explained in the second question.        
 The study answered the second question by categorizing the discourses found in the 
first question into four different types, based on an analytical framework on discursive 
legitimacy strategies, namely Authorization, Rationalization, Moral evaluation and 
Mythopoesis. The results showed that companies manipulated various discourses to 
legitimize their low-carbon energy projects. Figure 7, 8 and 9 in Chapter 5 showed the 
discursive legitimation strategies on biofuel, solar PV and geothermal investments, 
respectively. It should be noted that the companies have invested in other renewable energy 
sources, such as PTT carrying out investment in wind, biogas and hydropower. However, 
biofuel, solar PV and geothermal constitute the top three energy sources in which these 
companies have invested. Thus, the study focused on discourses of these three energy 
sources.          
 For solar PV, it is found that the four companies used authorization, rationalization 
and mythopesis, but not the moral evaluation, as discursive legitimacy strategies. This is 
because the companies sell power generated from solar PV to the grid, without directly 
being in touch with end-consumers, in contrast with what happens in their biofuel business. 
Thus, they do not have to apply moral rationales to gain public acceptance.  Lastly, only 
PERTAMINA invests in geothermal at the moment. The study found that the company 
mostly applied rationalization and authorization as discursive legitimacy strategies for 
geothermal investment. However, with findings from only one case, the study cannot make 
a comparison on geothermal discourses. Thus, further research on discourses used by other 
O&G companies which invest in geothermal would be required to arrive at a conclusion on 
this regard.          
 The third question is on the implications of the discourse study for renewable 
energy diffusion. The findings from a discourse analysis on the investments in renewable 
energy of O&G companies provide a potential solution to address ‘behavioral challenges’, 
one of three sets of socio-technical barriers for renewable energy diffusion or penetration 
(Dulal et al., 2013; Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006; Painuly, 2001; Reddy and Painuly, 2004; 
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Sovacool, 2009; Sovacool et al., 2011). Based on socio-technical approach, there are three 
sets of intertwined and socio-technical barriers for renewable energy diffusion; namely 
economic, political and behavioural.  According to Sovacool (2009), each type of barrier is 
understood as “economic barriers include financial impediments, market barriers, and 
market failures. Political barriers reflect regulatory challenges including weak and 
inconsistent political incentives, varying standards, competition among utilities, and 
underfunding of research and development. Behavioral barriers encompass the cultural and 
social dimensions of power technologies, and include public apathy and misunderstanding, 
psychological resistance, and the interpretive flexibility surrounding what consumers 
believe electricity should be”  (p.4502).        
 The discourse analysis and discursive legitimation strategies conducted in this 
present study revealed how the O&G companies promoted and justified new renewable 
energy sources to the public given the fact that they are not conventional energy like fossil 
fuels. The most obvious contribution of the discourse study regards the public awareness 
and acceptance on biofuels products, as they are directly involved with a large group of 
consumers. Among the five companies studied, Thai O&G companies (PTT and Bangchak) 
applied a wide range of discourses and legitimation strategies for biofuel investment. 
Considering that Thailand’s biofuels is the most successful case in Southeast Asia 
(Chanthawong and Dhakal, 2016), the discourses that the O&G companies in Thailand used 
can serve as a good example for other O&G companies in other countries to promote their 
biofuel products. However, further research is needed to see to what extent the discourses 
of O&G companies can influence public acceptance.  
 
 
 
185 
 
7.3   Summary of findings for Sub-objective 3 
Sub-objective 3: To investigate factors that influence state-owned oil and gas 
companies and their associates to invest in or divest from renewable energy   
 Chapter 6 discussed sub-objective 3.  Developing on the results of sub-objective 1, 
which pointed out that some companies (in particular those in Thailand) have been 
relatively active in investing in renewable energy, the study investigated the factors that 
influence companies to invest in or divest from low-carbon energy. In addition, in the study 
of discourses in sub-objective 2, the study acknowledged limitations in the methodology on 
critical discourse analysis. Discourse analysis helps revealing communication strategies, 
which O&G companies used to promote or justify their new green energy products. 
However, what the companies said as a reason of their green investment cannot necessarily 
be claimed to be the actual rationale for them to take action. This limitation is common in 
existing literature regarding applied discourse analysis on secondary data, such as the 
sustainability reports of the mining industry (Han Onn and Woodley, 2014).   
  As a result, the study applied a novel analytical framework to comparatively 
analyze all five companies from the three countries studied. The framework comprised 
three sets of factors obtained from a literature review on both academic journals and news 
articles from well-known business magazines. The three sets of factors were 1) company’s 
specific features i.e. ownership structure and role of the CEOs and shareholders, 
expectation on short-term and long-term economic advantages, view on global climate 
change, 2) national factors i.e. home country’s renewable energy and climate change policy, 
country’s O&G reserves and renewable energy resources, social demand for  environmental 
conservation and business-government relation, and 3) global factors i.e. volatility of world 
crude oil prices, discovery of shale oil and gas, development and cost of technology, and 
peer influences among O&G industry.        
 Three research questions in sub-objective 3 were addressed. The first question is to 
investigate the factors which influence O&G companies in Thailand, Malaysia and 
Indonesia to invest in renewable energy. The study summarized its main findings in Table 
24, 25 and 26 in section 6.5 of Chapter 6. Among the three sets of factors, global factors are 
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less influential for O&G corporate strategies to conduct renewable energy investment than 
company specific features and national factors. This can be seen from the fact that company 
interviewees from PTT, Thai Oil, Bangchak, PERTAMINA and PETRONAS did not raise 
any concerns on some global factors i.e. global movements to divest from fossil fuels 
companies, the discovery of shale gas/oil or the Paris agreement- the latest global climate 
change agreement.          
 Secondly, company specific features were seen to be the most influential to drive 
O&G companies in Thailand to invest in renewable energy. This can be seen from the fact 
that PTT, Thai Oil and Bangchak are operating under the same national factors; namely a 
government policy on climate change and renewable energy development, country’s O&G 
reserves and renewable energy resources, social demand for environmental conservation 
and business-government relations. However, each of them has pursued different business 
strategies. Bangchak is the most active in both biofuel and solar PV, considering the fact 
that the company started investment earlier than PTT and Thai Oil. Additionally, Bangchak 
has more installed capacity in solar PV than PTT does. The present study concluded that 
company specific features are the key factors driving O&G companies in Thailand to enter 
renewable energy businesses.        
 Thirdly, national factors, such as the country’s O&G reserves, were the most 
influential factors that drive O&G companies in Thailand and Indonesia, which were more 
active in developing renewable energy sources than the O&G company in Malaysia.  
Because Thailand has the lowest O&G reserves among the three countries, PTT, the NOC 
of Thailand and its two associate companies, were pushed to look for alternative and 
renewable energy sources to secure the energy supply of the country. PERTAMINA, an 
Indonesian NOC, has become increasingly enthusiastic to find more new renewable energy 
sources due to depleting O&G reserves. Due to this simple but fundamental fact, O&G 
companies in each of the three countries have different business strategies in terms of 
renewable energy investment.         
 The second question is to examine differences and similarities between factors 
influencing NOCs and those influencing O&G companies in existing literature (western 
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IOCs and major NOCs). This is given the fact that only world major IOCs from developed 
countries and NOCs from Middle East, China, and Russia have been investigated in most 
of existing literature.  The present study tested whether or not and to what extent factors 
found in the existing literature can be applied with the NOCs and their associate companies 
from developing countries in Southeast Asia-Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia.   
 It was found that most of factors can be applied to the five O&G companies in the 
study, and some findings correspond to what happened with major IOCs and NOCs in the 
literature. Factors which appeared to have less influence or different influence on five O&G 
companies are 1) the role of private shareholders and the lesson learned from past 
experience in renewable energy business. The reason why the former factor appears to be 
of little important is because three of the companies studied are majority or 100% owned by 
the government- PTT, PERTAMINA and PETRONAS. The private shareholders thus have 
little or no impact at all on the decision making process of the companies. As for the 
lessons learned from the financial losses in renewable energy businesses, which was one of 
many reasons why ExxonMobil does not invest in green energy projects, the study found 
that only PTT experienced losses in biofuel investments (palm oil plantation in Indonesia). 
However, PTT continues its sales of biofuel products in Thailand, and what appears to 
matter for PTT’s biofuel investments are changes in world crude oil prices and the 
government’s biofuel mandate.         
 In the second group of factors (national factors), the factors which influence the five 
O&G companies are similar to major IOCs and NOCs except 1) social demand for 
environmental conservation and 2) business-government relations. In developing countries 
like Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, it is found that the public as well as NGOs are 
concerned with the prices of energy and living costs. As for the business-government 
relation, the five O&G companies seem to behave differently from what the existing 
literature proposed. This is because the five companies have strong links to their 
governments, or act as a regulator itself in the case of PETRONAS, which has been granted 
absolute authority to regulate and give license to upstream O&G business in Malaysia. 
Thus, business actors and governments cannot be viewed as separate entities, as seen in the 
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existing literature. The cause of such difference is due to existing literature having 
examined mostly IOCs, which are private owned companies, while the five O&G 
companies in this study are NOCs or their associates.     
 The third question is to highlight characteristics of O&G companies which are the 
most and the least likely to invest in renewable energy. Based on findings from sub-
objective 1 in Chapter 4 and interview data with stakeholders in Thailand, Malaysia and 
Indonesia, the study concluded that Bangchak from Thailand appears to be the most active 
in green energy investment; whereas PETRONAS from Malaysia is the least active 
company and projects to remain in the core O&G business. The different condition between 
Bangchak and PETRONAS in terms of company specific features, national factors and 
global factors was illustrated in Table 27 in section 6.5.3. The present study proposes that 
the characteristics showed in Table 28 could be used in predicting whether O&G 
companies -both NOCs and private owned companies- are likely to invest in renewable 
energy. 
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Table 28 Characteristic of O&G companies which are more and less likely to invest in 
renewable energy  
Factors MORE likely to invest in renewable energy LESS  likely to invest in renewable energy 
Ownership structure  
 
Majority owned by private investors. 100% owned by the government. 
 
 
CEOS’ role CEOs are concerned about sustainability 
issues, have a vision and see the 
importance of the green energy business  
 
CEOs are not concerned about 
environmental issues, or have to report 
directly to the government or the head of 
government, who is concerned more on 
economic aspects rather than environmental 
issues.  
Short-term economic 
advantages 
The company does not have upstream 
business. So the company cannot switch to 
produce more gas to gain short-term 
advantages.  
The company has abundant O&G reserves 
and has operated in upstream O&G industry. 
The company can switch to gas production 
as well as install CCS (Carbon Capture and 
Storage) technology to reduce emissions 
Long-term economic 
advantages 
Hold the view that renewable energy is 
profitable and can enhance its own business 
sustainability. 
 
Hold the view that renewable energy is less 
profitable than O&G business, and projects 
that O&G will remain dominant in future 
energy mix. 
 
View on compatibility 
of renewable energy to 
core expertise 
Considers biofuels as part of its core 
expertise. As for renewable power 
generation, the company sets up a 
subsidiary to run the business. To address 
the lack of expertise in renewable energy 
technology, the company hires a consulting 
company or outsources. 
Views that production as a burden and is 
reluctant to comply with the government 
biofuel mandate 
View that renewable energy is not its core 
expertise, and even that it is not the role of 
O&G companies to perform such investment 
Country’s O&G 
reserves and 
renewable energy 
resources  
The company’s home country has less 
O&G reserves and become a net oil or gas 
exporter. Moreover, there should be 
sufficient and diverse renewable energy 
sources 
 
The home country has rich in O&G reserves 
and is still a net energy exporter.  
 
 
190 
 
Table 28 Characteristic of O&G companies which make it more and the less likely that 
they will invest in renewable energy (continued) 
 
Factors 
MORE likely to invest in renewable 
energy 
LESS  likely to invest in renewable 
energy 
Business-government 
relation  
The company has strong links with the 
government, and government officials are 
promoting the company to move towards 
investing in renewable energy. 
The company has strong link with the 
government but the government prioritizes 
economic development more than 
environmental issues.  
 
Volatility of world 
crude oil prices 
The company was affected by the 
volatility of world crude oil prices, in 
particular during a period of high prices. 
The expensive crude oil prices encouraged 
the company to seek out alternatives and 
renewable energy. 
The company made big profits when the 
crude oil prices were high and was 
discouraged to diversify their business 
portfolio into renewable energy. In addition, 
the company is capable of finding strategies 
to cope with lower revenues due to cheap 
crude oil prices  
Discovery of shale 
oil/gas 
The company does not invest in shale 
oil/gas 
 
The company invests in shale oil/gas. 
Peer influence among 
O&G industry 
The company takes a leading role in 
renewable energy investment or follows 
the industrial peers, who are frontrunners 
in the green energy business.  
 
The company align its business strategy with 
the leading industrial peers, who are not 
keen to invest in renewable energy 
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7.4  Policy recommendation  
   Whether O&G companies will move towards renewable energy or not depends 
upon a wide range of factors, be them company specific features, the national context of its 
home country, global socio-economic issues, as well as technology developments in any 
given renewable energy source. All factors intertwine and play a certain role in encouraging 
or discouraging O&G corporate strategies to climate change mitigation, especially 
renewable energy investment. Penha (2009), studying the world major oil companies’ 
approaches to green energy investment, states that understanding the business strategies of 
oil companies is like playing a live puzzle, as each element is changing over time.  The 
present study agrees with this statement and acknowledges that there is no single factor 
which can influence O&G companies’ climate change strategy, nor one policy can solve all 
limitations and induce incumbents to steer their resources away from fossil fuels and 
toward renewable energy. However, the study draws some policy recommendation for the 
governments of Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia to address pressing challenges, which 
were repeatedly raised by interviewees in order to clear a path for the low-carbon energy 
development of their O&G companies.      
7.4.1 Policy recommendation for Thailand 
Three of the O&G companies studied have already been quite active in conducting 
investments in renewable energy. The interviewees from PTT, Thai Oil and Bangchak, 
government authority and scholars shared the perception that Thailand is ahead of other 
Southeast Asian countries in renewable energy development. Some Malaysian and 
Indonesian stakeholders acknowledge that Thai O&G companies are more enthusiastic in 
developing low-carbon energy than their NOCs, and that their NOCs should follow Thai 
O&G companies’ business strategies. Nevertheless, there are some issues hindering 
renewable energy development and need government action. Firstly, not only O&G 
companies but also renewable energy companies are facing the problem of having limited 
transmission lines, which has resulted in a limited quota to buy the electricity generated 
from renewable energy i.e. solar PV. PTT and Bangchak have addressed this problem by 
seeking out business opportunity abroad, such as in Japan and Myanmar. This is helping 
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the companies to expand their business and achieve investment targets. However, it is 
unlikely to be beneficial to Thailand in the long run. This is firstly because a large amount 
of capital is flowing out the country, and secondly the government’s targets towards climate 
change mitigation and diversification of energy mix will be undermined. The present study 
thus suggests that the government encourages the establishment of partnership between 
O&G companies and electricity-generating company for these two entities to conduct joint 
investment in building more transmission lines. This will help lessen the government’s 
burden in finding enough budget to stimulate O&G companies to engage more in 
renewable energy power generation.         
 The second policy recommendation regards biofuel development. Thailand has a 
surplus of bioethanol, while experiencing low productivity of palm oil. Bioethanol in 
Thailand is the most advance in the region as it has mixed 85% of bioethanol with gasoline. 
However, biodiesel production is limited due to a scarcity of palm oil. In the short-term, the 
government of Thailand should encourage or help establish trading between ethanol 
producers in Thailand and palm oil producers in Malaysia and Indonesia. This would help 
Thai O&G companies to commercialize a higher rate of biodiesel, and at the same time 
enable Malaysian and Indonesian companies to produce bioethanol. It is noted that at the 
present there is no bioethanol sales at service stations in either Malaysia or Indonesia. 
Nevertheless, biofuels can serve as a transition fuel. For the long-term solution, the 
government should move gradually move toward electric vehicles as a more sustainable 
solution for reducing GHG emissions in the transportation sector. O&G companies could 
contribute to this by transforming their gas stations into power-charging centers.  
 
 
 
193 
 
7.4.2 Policy recommendation for Indonesia  
Indonesia is blessed with O&G reserves and diverse renewable energy resources i.e. 
geothermal and ocean energy. However, as many Indonesian interviewees mentioned, an 
unclear policy and lack of good cooperation among government offices are the main 
obstacles for utilizing its great renewable energy resource potential. At the present, 
PERTAMINA interviewees provided an insight that the company is seeking B2B 
(business-to-business) partnership with private companies and local government offices 
located in small islands far away from the grid to sell electricity generated from renewable 
energy. PERTAMINA initiated this business model to address the problem that PLN 
(Perusahaan Listrik Negara), a national electricity company, does not want to buy 
electricity from renewable energy, as it is more expensive than that generated from coal. 
Although the present study agrees with PERTAMINA’s coping strategy, the government 
should still take action to pave a way for renewable energy development, not only for 
PERTAMINA, but also for other emerging renewable energy enterprises. As a result, the 
study suggests that the government establishes an independent organization which has the 
authority to implement policy and possesses financial resources to provide incentives to 
renewable energy developers. This new organization would be an all-in-one center, 
enabling unification of renewable energy development of the country.   
 Another potential solution to increase the uptake of renewable energy investment in 
Indonesia could be that the government promotes the investment in the upstream sector of 
renewable energy technology development. As one Indonesian government official pointed 
out in the interview, it could have been beneficial to Indonesia if the country had its own 
solar panels manufacturing industry. This would encourage domestic consumers to turn to 
solar PV energy for their alternative energy, since the prices of local products would be 
cheaper and more available than imported ones.  
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7.4.3 Policy recommendation for Malaysia  
The present study found that PETRONAS is the least active in renewable energy 
investment among the five O&G companies. Many factors account for such a lack of 
activity, as explained in Chapter 6. However, what appears to be most influential factors are 
national factors, especially Malaysia’s abundant O&G reserves and the government’s 
relative lack of concern on environmental issues. Thus, it is difficult to elaborate a policy 
recommendation for the Malaysian government, as the government itself seems reluctant to 
change its dependence on O&G revenues and diversify the energy mix. The study perceives 
that the public and civil society of Malaysia could put pressure on the government and 
bring about policy changes. The media, academic institutions and NGOs could raise public 
awareness on environmental issues and the importance of transitioning towards a low-
carbon energy future. Only in this way the government would be induced to change its 
policy direction, which could eventually affect PETRONAS’s business strategies.  
 In addition, the fact that Malaysia has rich O&G reserves has created the mindset 
that the country can endlessly utilize the fossil fuels. However, such mentality would also 
put the country at risk of having to increase GHG emissions and being left alone in the 
global community, when other countries have been consistently moving forward to the 
transition to a low-carbon energy future. In this regard, the campaigns by both international 
and local NGOs could be crucial to raise public awareness on the risk of a high dependence 
on fossil fuels. The idea of keeping fossil fuel reserves in the ground as stranded assets, 
which the global movement for fossil fuel divestment is now advocating, should be 
imbedded into people’s mindset, in particular those of the younger generations.  
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7.5   Rooms for future research  
Understanding corporate strategies to climate change mitigation, especially focusing 
on diversification from fossil fuels to renewable energy, is crucial for policy makers to steer 
the powerful and resourceful O&G industry towards sustainable energy development. 
Either a discourse study on companies’ annual reports or an empirical study on factors 
which could influence O&G companies to invest in renewable energy can enhance 
understanding on the behaviors and business strategies of firms. The present study 
produced a comprehensive picture regarding the three NOCs of Thailand, Malaysia and 
Indonesia; while also obtaining insights on two of the associates of Thailand’s NOC. 
However, such research findings represent only the starting point for a study that provides a 
wider picture on NOCs. The present study hopes that students or scholars would continue 
work to clarify and produce a more comprehensive and in-depth knowledge on O&G 
corporate strategies to climate change mitigation.      
 7.5.1 Further research to cover more case studies   
 Apart from the three NOCs in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia, future research 
could include NOCs from other developing countries, either in Southeast Asia or other 
regions. NOCs of Vietnam, Brunei and the Philippines could provide further insights. In 
addition, Myanmar is another potential interesting case to study, given the fact that the 
country has very rich gas reserves and recently opened up for foreign investment.  
7.5.2 Expanding time period 
 In the rapid changing world of the 21st century it will be important to continue 
investigating O&G corporate strategies for many years to come. At present the long-term 
impacts of the discovery of shale gas/oil, the new US administration under President 
Donald Trump, low crude oil price, the Paris Agreement and the global movement to divest 
from fossil fuels companies can still not be clearly seen. As a result, the study recommends 
continuing examining how these five O&G companies from Thailand, Malaysia and 
Indonesia will respond to such global phenomena over the next 5 or 10 years.  
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7.5.3 Discourse analysis on government energy policy 
Only company’s annual reports were analyzed in the study. However, future 
research could also run discourse analysis on government energy policy or the statements 
of Presidents, Prime Ministers or Energy Ministers and compare them with discourses 
found in companies’ documents. This could show how O&G companies, and in particular 
NOCs, internalizes government discourses into their own languages.  
7.5.4 Research on impact of O&G companies’ discourses on renewable energy 
on public acceptance 
As explained in the section 7.2, to gain a better understanding on how public 
acceptance can be influenced by the discourses that O&G companies used, there should be 
a further study on the relation between these two variables. The future research can start 
with public acceptance of Thai consumers towards biofuels products, as there is sufficient 
data on the discourses that PTT, Thai Oil and Bangchak have used in their annual reports. 
After obtaining the results for the case of Thailand, expanding the study areas to other 
countries could be very interesting. Vietnam appears to be a good candidate, given the fact 
that its government and national oil company, PetroVietnam, have tried but failed to 
stimulate the usage of biofuels. Many biofuels production plants were closed down because 
of low demand (Sapp, 2016a, 2016b).    
7.5.5 Improvement on research methodology 
To investigate the factors that influence O&G companies to invest in renewable 
energy, the study applied a qualitative methodology through semi-structured interviews. 
Future research can improve the research methodology in at least three directions. Firstly, 
the factors studied should be regularly updated. The study formed a comprehensive 
analytical framework that includes a wide range of factors that matter for O&G companies 
in late 20
th
 century and first 15 years of the 21
st
 century. In the next decades, there may be 
novel factors that start to influence O&G corporate strategies toward climate change 
mitigation. Secondly, the future study may apply quantitative approach investigating the 
relation of one or two important factors with corporate strategies. For example, changes 
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over year of O&G production volumes of O&G companies can be used to determine 
whether or not the companies are likely to invest in renewable energy business. Thirdly, the 
questionnaire survey with Likert scales can be applied to weight importance of each factor 
on decision making of O&G companies toward renewable energy investment. Having 
quantitative results from the survey can be useful for triangulating the interview data.   
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Table 1 Discourses on biofuel investment of PTT  
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      -May 30, 2008: PTT 
and Toyota Group 
joined hands in the 
research and 
development of a new  
diesel technology called 
Bio-Hydrogenated 
Diesel or BHD, The 
innovation could 
respond to the 
government policy. 
-Investment here was 
made through PTTGE, 
which  
consisted in producing 
crude palm oil for 
vegetable   
oil consumption and 
for biodiesel 
production as an   
alternative energy 
form and 
petrochemical   
feedstock, in line with 
the government policy 
on   
alternative energy and 
global warming caused 
by oil   
consumption 
 
-Investment in this area 
was made through PTT   
Green Energy Co., Ltd. 
(PTTGE), and included 
production   
of crude palm oil for 
vegetable oil for 
consumption,   
as oleochemical 
feedstock, and in the 
production of   
biodiesel as an 
alternative energy in line 
with the   
government policy on 
alternative energy and 
reduction of   
global warming caused 
by oil consumption 
  
 
    -Responded to the policy 
of the Ministry  of Energy 
in aiding suffering oil 
palm planters who  
suffered from plunge in 
prices of palm oil by 
buying 10 million liters, 
given its storage capacity, 
of 100%  biodiesel or 
B100. 
Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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Table 1   Discourses on biofuel investment of PTT  (continued) 
Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual reports 
Color legend 
 
     
                  
Year 
Discourse 
strands 
2
0
0
1 
2
0
0
2 
2
0
0
3 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
2
0
0
9 
2010 2011 
2
0
1
2 
2
0
1
3 
2
0
1
4 
2
0
1
5 
Environmental 
reasons 
   -PTT has 
continued the 
research and 
development 
of 
environmental
ly friendly  
products and 
services; In 
2004, various 
environmental 
programs 
were 
implemented 
such as the 
research and  
development 
of alternative 
fuels e.g. 
Natural Gas 
for Vehicles 
(NGV) and 
gasohol 
-The 
company 
developed 
and 
expanded 
the markets 
for 
alternative 
fuels to 
reduce  air 
pollution 
including 
NGV, 
Gasohol and 
biodiesel 
-As a leader 
in the supply 
of alternative 
energy forms 
for a better 
environment 
and an active 
promoter of  
research and 
development 
of products 
and 
technologies 
for the 
environment, 
in 2006 PTT 
expanded its 
market of  
alternative 
energy to 
lower 
petroleum 
imports and 
air pollution 
-PTT Gasohol 
91 Plus, a new 
product, made 
its debut  
in response to 
His Majesty the 
King’s initiative. 
This product  
contains an 
excellent engine 
cleaning agent 
of the US Top 
Tier  
Gasoline 
standard as well 
as a friction 
modifier for 
cleaner  
engines for 
improved 
combustion, 
higher driving 
efficiency,  
full power, fuel 
saving, reduced 
polluted 
emission 
-PTT and 
Toyota Group 
joined hands in 
the research 
and 
development of 
a new  
diesel 
technology 
called Bio-
Hydrogenated 
Diesel or 
BHD.. The 
innovation 
could respond 
to the 
government 
policy and, 
more 
importantly, is 
environment  
friendly 
through 
reduction of 
global 
warming 
  
 
 - PTT will invest 
more in the 
power   
business as well 
as other eco-
friendly energy 
operations to   
counter global 
warming impacts, 
such as bio-fuels, 
both   
gasohol and 
biodiesel, and 
oleochemical 
products made   
from natural raw 
materials 
 
-…the palm oil 
business, which 
is an 
environmentally   
friendly energy 
source 
-A notable 
example is bio-
jet   
fuels, which 
lower aviation 
emissions under 
the Emission   
Trading Scheme 
(ETS) enacted in 
European 
countries 
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Table 1 Discourses on biofuel investment of PTT  (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
Discourse 
strands  
2
0
0
1 
2
0
0
2 
2003 
2
0
0
4 
2
0
0
5 
2
0
0
6 
2
0
0
7 
2
0
0
8 
2
0
0
9 
2
0
1
0 
2
0
1
1 
2
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2 
2013 
2
0
1
4 
2015 
Help farmers 
   
 
-…and help provide 
more income for 
Thai farmers; PTT 
offered gasohol at 12 
locations in Bangkok. 
PTT first offered  
gasohol at its Head 
Office station. It was 
the first oil company 
to do so in Thailand 
 
 
          
 
-…biodiesel by BMTA (Bangkok 
Mass Transit Authority)   
buses in support of Thai farmers 
by lowering the palm oil   
glut 
  
 
-PTT invested in R&D of 
green energy and bioplastic 
while supplementing value 
to agricultural products of 
community 
Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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Table 1    Discourses on biofuel investment of  PTT  (continued) 
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Discourse 
strands 
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2
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2
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4 
2
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1
5 
Help alleviate 
consumers’ 
burden esp. 
during high 
crude oil prices 
   
-To provide a less expensive 
alternative for users of 95-
octane gasoline, support His 
Majesty the King‘s efforts in 
promoting  
alternative energy, and help 
provide more income for 
Thai farmers; PTT offered 
gasohol at 12 locations in 
Bangkok. 
 
    
-PTT Gasohol 91 Plus, … 
and – above  
all – Baht 2/liter lower 
price than 91-octane 
gasoline 
 
 
- In addition to helping 
alleviate consumers’ 
burden during a time of 
high oil prices, PTT led 
others in the  
procurement of alternative 
energy. During 2008, PTT 
has launched E20 & E85 
Gasohol while developing B5  
biodiesel. 
       
Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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Table 1   Discourses on biofuel investment of PTT  (continued) 
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Discourse 
strands 
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-Over the years, PTT has 
played a key role in 
supporting research and 
development of 
environment-  
friendly petroleum 
products and 
environmental 
technology.  
In 2005, the Company 
developed and expanded 
the  
markets for the 
alternative fuels to 
reduce air  
pollution including 
NGV, gasohol, and 
biodiesel 
 
 
-As a leader in the supply 
of alternative energy 
forms for a better 
environment      -An active 
promoter of  
research and development 
of products and 
technologies for the 
environment, in 2006 PTT 
expanded its market of  
alternative energy to lower 
petroleum imports and air 
pollution. 
     
-As a commitment to 
business-driven 
technical expertise   
through 
environmentally 
friendly technology, 
we are sparing   
no resource to explore 
other alternative-
energy products that   
can be further 
developed to establish 
viable sustainable-  
energy businesses in 
the future. A notable 
example is bio-jet   
fuels 
 
    
- Signed a cooperative 
agreement on   
exploitation of the land 
and public utility 
systems in the WEcoZi. 
The business unit 
secured palm  kernel 
shells to make biofuels 
in response to PTT’s  
Green Roadmap and the 
optimal application of   
alternative energy 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
 
     
221 
 
Table 1  Discourses on biofuel investment of PTT  (continued) 
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   -Committed 
to finding 
and  
developing 
alternative 
energy 
products to 
reduce the 
national 
burden of 
long term oil 
imports, we 
have 
expanded  
our gasohol 
sales outlets 
to over 
1,000 
- in 2006 
PTT 
expanded 
its market 
of  
alternative 
energy to 
lower 
petroleum 
imports 
and air 
pollution. 
-Promoting 
alternative 
energy  
like 
Gasohol, 
Bio-diesel,  
and NGV 
for greater 
self-
reliance 
- Gasohol and 
biodiesel 
were the 
publics’ other 
choices in the 
collective 
efforts for 
greater self-
reliance 
- E85 
gasohol,  
with a higher 
ethanol 
content, will 
lead to less 
dependence 
on imported 
fuels. 
 -PTT 
distributed  
over13,925 
million 
liters and 
constantly 
promoted 
bio-fuels-  
gasohol to 
replace 
gasoline, 
and 
biodiesel to 
replace 
diesel 
-PTT 
continued 
to promote 
biofuel 
energy as 
an 
alternative   
option, 
with 
gasohol to 
replace 
gasoline 
and 
biodiesel to   
replace 
diesel. 
-PTT 
continued to 
promote 
biofuel 
energy as   
an 
automotive 
option, with 
gasohol to 
replace 
gasoline   
and 
biodiesel to 
replace 
diesel. 
 
-PTT 
continued to 
promote 
biofuel 
energy as an   
automotive 
option, with 
gasohol to 
replace 
gasoline 
-PTT also 
constantly 
promotes 
biofuels—
namely   
gasohol to 
replace 
gasoline, and 
biodiesel to 
replace   
diesel. 
  
 
 
Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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Table 1   Discourses on biofuel investment of PTT  (continued) 
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-…To provide a less expensive 
alternative for users of 95-octane 
gasoline, support His Majesty the 
King‘s efforts in promoting  
alternative energy, and help 
provide more income for Thai 
farmers; PTT offered gasohol at 12 
locations in Bangkok. 
    
-PTT Gasohol 91 Plus, a new 
product, made its debut  
in response to His Majesty the 
King’s initiative.  
  
 
        
Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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Table 1  Discourses on biofuel investment of PTT  (continued) 
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- PTT and Toyota Group joined hands in the 
research and development of a new  
diesel technology called Bio-Hydrogenated 
Diesel or BHD, the first of its kind in 
Thailand. This was  an innovation of 
biomass fuels created from various raw 
materials, such as jatropha and algae,  
which can reduce the risk of raw-material 
shortage from using agricultural products. 
       
Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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                    Year 
 
 
Discourse strands 
2
0
0
1 
2
0
0
2 
2
0
0
3 
2
0
0
4 
2
0
0
5 
2
0
0
6 
2
0
0
7 
2
0
0
8 
2
0
0
9 
2010 
2
0
1
1 
2
0
1
2 
2
0
1
3 
2
0
1
4 
2
0
1
5 
Business benefits to company 
 
 
         
-PTT is committed to development of novel alternative energy 
forms amendable to value addition 
     
Environmental reasons 
         -Equally important, PTT is committed to the development of 
novel alternative energy forms amenable to value addition   
or regarded as friendly to the environment, including power 
generation from wind energy, solar energy, and compressed   
biogas for vehicles in place of NGV. T 
 - Bangchak’s suuny project.. as well as to   
promote electricity generation from clean energy to reduce   
health and pollution impacts 
     
Enhance national energy security 
         -August  
• Bangchak’s foundation laying ceremony and   
the launch of electricity from the solar-cell project   
“Sunny Bangchak” with an installed capacity of 38 MW. 
Electricity from the project will be sold to EGAT and the 
Provincial Electricity Authority (PEA) in the fourth quarter of 
2011. The project aims to enhance national energy security 
and increase electricity reserves to meet the demand of  the 
business sector and private households, as well as to promote 
electricity generation from clean energy to reduce   
health and pollution impacts. 
     
Respond to consumers’ demand 
 
 
         
-Bangchak’s sunny project… increase electricity reserves to 
meet the demand of business sector and private households 
     
Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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Table 2 Discourses on wind energy investment of PTT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
Discourse strands 
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1 
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2 
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3 
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0
0
4 
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5 
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6 
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0
8 
2
0
0
9 
2010 2
0
1
1 
2
0
1
2 
2
0
1
3 
2
0
1
4 
2
0
1
5 
Positive benefit for business           
-PTT is committed 
to development of 
novel alternative 
energy forms 
amendable to value 
addition 
     
Environmental reasons           
-…regarded as  
friendly to the 
environment 
 
     
Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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Year 
 
Discourse strands 
2
0
0
1 
2
0
0
2 
2
0
0
3 
2
0
0
4 
2
0
0
5 
2
0
0
6 
2
0
0
7 
2
0
0
8 
2
0
0
9 
2
0
1
0 
2
0
1
1 
2
0
1
2 
2013 2
0
1
4 
2
0
1
5 
Positive benefit for business 
 
            -add value to PTT Group   
Energy security of Thailand 
 
            -enhance energy security   
Economic benefit for Thailand 
 
 
            -generate revenue for 
Thailand 
  
Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
 
     
227 
 
 
 Table 2  Discourses on biogas investment of PTT 
 
 
                      Year 
 
 
Discourse strands 
2
0
0
1 
2
0
0
2 
2
0
0
3 
2
0
0
4 
2
0
0
5 
2
0
0
6 
2
0
0
7 
2
0
0
8 
2
0
0
9 
2010 2011 2
0
1
2 
2013 2
0
1
4 
2
0
1
5 
Alternative to normal 
fossil fuels 
          
-Agree to buy 6 tons/ day of 
biogas to substitute to diesel 
-Buy biogas from company 
producing CBG and sell it as an 
alternative to NGV for car fuel 
in areas far from NGV stations 
in the northeast 
 
-…substitute for NGV in 
remote areas  
  
-To cut demand energy  
for truck or vans by some 
320,000 liters or some 
baht 9.6 million baht per 
year 
  
Environmental reasons            
-Research on global 
warming mitigation: 
production of biogas from 
the resulting biomass 
    
Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
 
     
                          
Year 
Discourse 
strands 
2
0
0
1 
2
0
0
2 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2
0
1
1 
2012 2013 2014 2
0
1
5 
R
esp
o
n
d
 to
 g
o
v
er
n
m
en
t p
o
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  - Expansion of 
sales of 
"Bangchak 
Gasohol 95" at 
99 service  
stations in 
Bangkok 
Metropolitan to 
honour His 
Majesty the  
King for the 
royal initiative 
on gasohol 
promotion 
project in  
Thailand, to 
support the 
"Clean Oil 
Policy" of the  
Government and 
to promote more 
utilization of 
Gasohol 95  
especially in big 
cities with heavy 
traffic. 
-in response to 
the policy to 
replace total 
utilization of 
normal unleaded 
Gasoline by 
Gasohol 
-cooperated with 
Department of 
Alternative 
energy 
Development and 
Efficiency 
(DEDE) in a 
project to 
research the 
biodiesel 
production and 
utilization 
-in compliance 
with the National 
Agenda 
-support to 
development of 
biofuel…in line 
with Ministry of 
Energy’s strategy 
of sustainable 
development of 
alternative energy 
 
-in 
consistence 
with the 
government 
policy to 
emphasizing 
utilization of 
alternative 
energy 
-biodiesel 
utilization 
would also 
be 
encouraged 
in 
accordance 
with the 
government 
policy 
-with the 
expansion, the 
Company helps 
support the 
government 
policy of 
promoting 
production and 
distribution of 
biodiesel 
-due to 
government 
policy to 
promote the 
production and 
use of biodiesel 
replacing diesel 
at 8.5 million 
liters per day, 
the company 
supports by 
expanding the 
number of 
service station 
which sell B5 to 
200 stations. 
-under 
the 
govern
ment’s 
alternati
ve 
energy 
promoti
on 
policy 
for 
energy 
security 
and 
lower 
energy 
imports 
Correspond
ing with the 
government
’s policies 
and 
measure to 
promote 
RE, for 
economic 
and energy 
security of 
the country 
this move 
is in line 
with the 
governme
nt policy 
to 
promote 
RE to 
strengthen 
the 
national 
energy 
security 
and 
economy 
in 
cooperation 
with the 
Ministry of 
Agriculture 
and 
Cooperative
s, Ministry 
of energy 
and Bank 
for 
Agriculture
…will 
initiate a 
conversion 
of 
abandoned 
orange farm 
to palm 
plantations 
 Bangchak 
Biofuel 
Co.Ltd 
was set up 
In support 
of the 
public 
policy on 
alternative
-energy 
promotion
… 
Bangchak 
Biofuel 
Co.Ltd 
was set up 
In support 
of the 
public 
policy on 
alternative
-energy 
promotion
… 
Palm 
plantatio
n … in 
line with 
the 
public 
sector’s 
alternati
ve/RE 
promoti
on plan 
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Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
 
     
                          
Year 
Discourse 
strands 
2
0
0
1 
2
0
0
2 
2003 
2
0
0
4 
2
0
0
5 
2
0
0
6 
2007 
2
0
0
8 
2
0
0
9 
2
0
1
0 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
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  -to 
promot
e more 
utilizati
on of 
Gasoho
l 95 
esp. in 
big 
cities 
with 
heavy 
traffic 
   -used 
vegetable 
cooking oil 
as its main 
raw 
material… 
this can 
help 
address the 
health 
problem of 
Thai people 
caused by 
the 
consumptio
n of the 
used 
cooking oil 
and tackle 
the 
environmen
tal problem 
stemming 
from the 
disposal of 
the used 
cooking oil 
in the 
public 
sewage 
system 
   -aware that 
refining 
business 
consumes a 
large amount 
of energy and 
emits 
considerable 
carbon 
dioxcide, the 
company has 
set a target to 
be Carbon 
Neutral 
Company 
-aware that 
refining 
business 
consumes a 
large amount 
of energy and 
emits 
considerable 
carbon 
dioxcide, the 
company has 
set a target to 
be Carbon 
Neutral 
Company 
-aware that 
refining 
business 
consumes a 
large 
amount of 
energy and 
emits 
considerabl
e carbon 
dioxcide, 
the 
company 
has set a 
target to be 
Carbon 
Neutral 
Company 
-aware that 
refining 
business 
consumes a 
large amount 
of energy and 
emits 
considerable 
carbon 
dioxcide, the 
company has 
set a target to 
be Carbon 
Neutral 
Company 
-Pursue the status of a low-carbon company :   
Set a goal of posting a minimal volume of carbon 
dioxide emission by relentlessly operating a 
project to improve energy and refinery resource 
efficiency, while investigating investment in 
renewable/alternative energy. 
-E20S gasohol features outstanding properties due 
to the S Purifier and S Modifier, which complete 
fuel combustion  
in the engine, thus providing power and 
environmental protection. With less combustion 
pollutants because of lower  sulfer content (10 
ppm), E20S is superior to the Euro 5 standard. 
-Bangchak is also the first in Asia to produce 
gasohol  
E20 of the Euro 5 standard. The product is 
environmentally friendly with a sulfur content of 
lower than 10 ppm 
-Bangchak developed and launched new products 
with “Green S” technology, namely “E20S”   
gasohol and “Hi Diesel S” diesel, blended with an 
additive that enhances efficient combustion while 
giving  
more power to the engine and reducing emissions 
from combustion, thus conserving the 
environment. 
 -The Company launched the “Bangchak E20 S, 
The new “E20 S” also contains lower sulfur than 
EURO 5 requirement, make it more 
environmental friendly 
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Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
 
     
                          
Year 
Discourse 
strands 
2
0
0
1 
2
0
0
2 
2
0
0
3 
2
0
0
4 
2005 
2
0
0
6 
2007 2008 2009 
2
0
1
0 
2
0
1
1 
2012 2013 2014 2015 
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    … the 
leading 
role 
concernin
g 
alternative 
energy 
would be 
emphasize
d by 
expanding 
the 
number of 
service 
stations 
for sale of 
gasohol 
95 and 91. 
-the 
Company in 
2006 
continued its 
2005 policy 
of being the 
leader of RE 
by 
consistently 
expanding 
sales of 
Gasohol 
95 ,91 and 
biodiesel. 
                          
Year 
2
0
2
0
2
0
2
0
2005 
2
0
2
0
2
0
2
0
2010 2011 
2
0
2013 
2
0
2
0
-After the 
Company 
achieved its 
goal of 
…as a 
leader in 
alternati
ve 
energy, 
joined 
hands 
with the 
Office of 
Basic 
Educatio
n 
Commis
sion in 
organizi
ng the 
contest
… 
  -for sustainable 
business value 
creation, the company 
will restructure its 
current revenue stream 
of 70%:30% which is 
vulnerable to the 
volatility of oil prices, 
within 2015, the 
targeted revenue 
structure will be 
50%:20%:30% for 
refining, marketing 
and new businesses. 
emphasis on new 
business will be on 
clean energy and 
alternative with steady 
income and low 
dependence on 
external factors 
-clean energy is 
Bangchak’s tool 
for sustainable 
development, a 
goal that is being 
achieved through 
our solar farm, 
biodiesel and 
ethanol plants 
-emphasis on new 
business will be on 
clean energy with 
steady income and 
low dependence 
on external 
factors…it will 
steadily add value 
to the business and 
diverse the risks of 
income sources in 
the future 
within 2016, 
the targeted 
revenue 
structure will be 
60%:20%:20% 
for refining, 
marketing and 
new business, 
with steady 
income and low 
dependence on 
external 
factors.. diverse 
the risks of 
income sources 
in the future 
-to diversify 
income 
risks… in 
harmony with 
the Greenergy 
Excellence 
vision 
- recognizing 
high volatility 
facing reefing 
business as 
well as 
volatile oil 
prices… 
Bangchak set 
its goal in 
2020 for 
refining 
income at 
50% versus 
50% for 
-to diversify 
income risks… in 
harmony with the 
Greenergy 
Excellence vision 
-committed to 
leadership in 
alternative and 
renewable energy  
-recognizing high 
volatility facing 
the refining 
business as well as 
volatile oil 
prices… Bangchak 
set its goal in 2020 
for reefing 
income50%:50% 
for emerging 
business  
-It has also spread its wings 
to other businesses, 
including power production 
from solar  energy (solar 
farm) - a clean source of 
energy from nature, biomass 
energy, petroleum 
exploration and   
production, and innovation-
oriented businesses. 
Bangchak’s mission is to 
enhance national energy 
security, while investing in 
new businesses to keep the 
organization moving 
forward and ensure 
sustainability. 
  
-Long-term managementof 
risks caused by world oil 
price fluctuation.New 
E
n
h
a
n
ce n
a
tio
n
a
l en
erg
y
 secu
rity
 b
y
 lo
w
erin
g
 o
il im
p
o
rts 
    Biofuel 
was 
concerned 
as 
alternative 
energy to 
replace 
total 
utilization 
of diesel  
 -Research on 
biodiesel 
production at Bang 
Pa-In … aside 
from strengthening 
the country’s 
energy security 
and saving foreign 
currency income 
-…has realized the 
importance of 
alternative 
energies, 
particularly those 
derived from 
vegetables which 
contributes to 
enhancement of 
energy security 
and reduction of 
country’s foreign 
exchange losses 
from the 
considerable oil 
import 
-the company is 
aware of 
importance of the 
alternative 
energy, especially 
ethanol and 
biodiesel which 
contributes to the 
country’s energy 
security and 
reduction of 
foreign currency 
losses from oil 
imports 
 
-contributes to the 
country’s energy 
security, 
reduction of 
foreign currency 
losses from oil 
imports 
  Recognizing 
the 
significance of 
alternative 
energy, which 
benefits 
national energy 
security and 
lowers trade 
imbalances 
resulting from 
fuel imports 
Recognizing 
the 
significance 
of alternative 
energy, which 
benefits 
national 
energy 
security and 
lowers trade 
imbalances 
resulting from 
fuel imports 
Recognizing 
the 
significance 
of 
alternative 
energy, 
which 
benefits 
national 
energy 
security and 
lowers trade 
imbalances 
resulting 
from fuel 
imports 
Recognizing 
that 
renewable-
energy is 
imperative for 
national 
energy security 
by reducing 
trade deficits  
from oil 
imports, 
Bangchak 
promotes 
ethanol and 
biodiesel for 
blending in 
gasoline and 
diesel. Its 
products   
in this category 
include 
Gasohol 91, 
Gasohol 95, 
Gasohol E20, 
Gasohol E85, 
and Hi-diesel. 
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    … the 
leading 
role 
concernin
g 
alternative 
energy 
would be 
emphasize
d by 
expanding 
the 
number of 
service 
stations 
for sale of 
gasohol 
95 and 91. 
-the 
Company in 
2006 
continued its 
2005 policy 
of being the 
leader of RE 
by 
consistently 
expanding 
sales of 
Gasohol 
95 ,91 and 
biodiesel. 
-After the 
Company 
achieved its 
goal of 
becoming 
the leader in 
distributing 
Gasohol95, 
other oil 
traders have 
followed in 
the 
Company’s 
footsteps… 
…as a 
leader in 
alternati
ve 
energy, 
joined 
hands 
with the 
Office of 
Basic 
Educatio
n 
Commis
sion in 
organizi
ng the 
contest
… 
  -for sustainable 
business value 
creation, the company 
will restructure its 
current revenue stream 
of 70%:30% which is 
vulnerable to the 
volatility of oil prices, 
within 2015, the 
targeted revenue 
structure will be 
50%:20%:30% for 
refining, marketing 
and new businesses. 
emphasis on new 
business will be on 
clean energy and 
alternative with steady 
income and low 
dependence on 
external factors 
-thanks to its vision to 
forge environment-
friendly energy 
business for 
sustainable 
development, the 
company values 
investment n 
downstream ventures 
for the sake of its own 
sustainability  
-clean energy is 
Bangchak’s tool 
for sustainable 
development, a 
goal that is being 
achieved through 
our solar farm, 
biodiesel and 
ethanol plants 
-emphasis on new 
business will be on 
clean energy with 
steady income and 
low dependence 
on external 
factors…it will 
steadily add value 
to the business and 
diverse the risks of 
income sources in 
the future 
-Thanks to its 
Greenergy vision 
which entails 
sustainable 
development and 
to lower risks of 
engaging solely in 
the oil business, 
… 
within 2016, 
the targeted 
revenue 
structure will be 
60%:20%:20% 
for refining, 
marketing and 
new business, 
with steady 
income and low 
dependence on 
external 
factors.. diverse 
the risks of 
income sources 
in the future 
-to diversify 
income 
risks… in 
harmony with 
the Greenergy 
Excellence 
vision 
- recognizing 
high volatility 
facing reefing 
business as 
well as 
volatile oil 
prices… 
Bangchak set 
its goal in 
2020 for 
refining 
income at 
50% versus 
50% for 
emerging 
businesses.. 
designed to 
ass secure 
value to 
Bangchak’s 
business while 
effectively 
diversifying 
risk to future 
income 
-to diversify 
income risks… in 
harmony with the 
Greenergy 
Excellence vision 
-committed to 
leadership in 
alternative and 
renewable energy  
-recognizing high 
volatility facing 
the refining 
business as well as 
volatile oil 
prices… Bangchak 
set its goal in 2020 
for reefing 
income50%:50% 
for emerging 
business  
-It has also spread its wings 
to other businesses, 
including power production 
from solar  energy (solar 
farm) - a clean source of 
energy from nature, biomass 
energy, petroleum 
exploration and   
production, and innovation-
oriented businesses. 
Bangchak’s mission is to 
enhance national energy 
security, while investing in 
new businesses to keep the 
organization moving 
forward and ensure 
sustainability. 
  
-Long-term managementof 
risks caused by world oil 
price fluctuation.New 
investments that can 
generate steady revenue 
have become more and 
more significant.  
Bangchak has expanded its 
investment to power 
production and energy crop 
(plant) businesses. 
  
 
Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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    -As a 
responsible 
Thai 
petroleum 
company 
    -this business model 
(change orange farm 
to palm plantation) 
benefits the 
environment and 
provides higher 
income to support 
social development in 
agricultural 
communities 
-these (alternative energy 
projects) represent business 
development approaches that 
align with environmental 
changes, reduce global resource 
consumption and thus least 
impacts the environment  
-aware that business operations 
that lack social and 
environmental activities are 
unsustainable, the company is 
determined to do business in 
such a way that not only can it 
sustain continuous growth but 
also simultaneously generate 
positive impacts on society and 
the environment 
 -palm production…this 
business model benefits 
the environment and 
provides higher income 
to support social 
development in 
agricultural communities 
-committed to 
undertaking its energy 
business in an 
environmentally friendly 
way for sustainable 
development… 
  
           Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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Year 
Discourse 
strands 
2
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0
1 
2
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2
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5 
Help alleviate 
consumers’ 
burden esp. 
during high 
crude oil prices  
    …willingly 
aimed to alleviate 
impacts of rising 
oil prices to the 
public 
…provide the public with quality oil at a time 
when oil prices are rising 
         
Thailand has 
potential as an 
agricultural 
country 
     For Thailand, an agricultural country, the most 
appropriate RE is biofuels 
         
Follow HM the 
King’s 
initiative on 
biofuels project 
and self-
sufficient 
philosophy  
  …expand of sales 
Bangchak 
gasohol95 to 
honor HM the 
King for Royal 
initiative on 
gasohol promotion 
project in Thailand 
  -with our gratitude to His Majesty grace and 
wisdom of RE, the Bangchak Petroleum Plc. 
has adopted the royal initiative on alternative 
energy to develop gasohol and bio-diesel for 
sale at our service stations 
-To celebrate on the auspicious occasion of the 
60th Anniversary of HM Accession to the 
Throne in 2006 and HM the King’s 80th 
birthday Anniversary in 2007, the company 
has launched many projects and activities to 
mark and to publicize HM works on RE. 
-HM the King recognized the benefits of 
biofuel… 
-For more than 20 years, HM the King has 
been embarking Thailand on the 
experimentations with bio-based fuels under 
the Royal Chitralada Project 
-the Bangchak has 
integrated the 
philosophy into 
business operations and 
we have produced and 
marketed crops-based 
gasohol and biodiesel 
upon the initiate 
research at HM’s 
Chitralada Palace 
-…to promote HM’s 
ideas and to honor on 
his 80th birthday 
anniversary 
 …apply the 
initiatives on RE 
of HM the King, 
in line with HM 
the King’s 
Sufficiency 
Economy 
philosophy 
      
           Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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2
0
0
3 
2
0
0
4 
2005 2006 
2
0
0
7 
2
0
0
8 
2
0
0
9 
2
0
1
0 
2
0
1
1 
2
0
1
2 
2
0
1
3 
2
0
1
4 
2
0
1
5 
Enhance Thailand to step 
forward in the era of RE 
 
 
 
 
 
    -…enhance Thailand to step 
forward into the era of development 
and utilization of alternative energy 
sources as in counties in EU and 
USA 
          
Respond to demand from 
consumers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    -…provide convenience for 
customers and the public in using 
gasohol instead of benzene 
-…in order that customer can find 
gasohol more easily 
- …to ensure that there will be 
enough bio-diesel for sale 
consistently, the company invested 
in installing a bio-diesel production 
unit which uses palm oil, soap, or 
used cooking oil. 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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Year 
Discourse 
strands 
2
0
0
1 
2
0
0
2 
2
0
0
3 
2
0
0
4 
2
0
0
5 
2
0
0
6 
2007 2008 2009 
2
0
1
0 
2
0
1
1 
2012 2013 2014 2015 
 
 
Help farmers 
      -The Research 
Centre at Bang Pa-
In initiated its 
biodiesel production 
development project 
which will lift the 
living quality of 
farmer 
-the other benefit… 
is it can help shore 
up the falling farm 
product prices, 
create jobs and 
generate more 
incomes to farmers 
-…helps increase 
the price of 
agricultural 
products, create 
jobs and generate 
more incomes for 
farmers 
 
-…supports of local 
agricultural sectors in 
terms of local 
employment and 
improve their quality 
of living 
  -…while 
generating 
income for 
farmers 
-…while 
generating 
income for 
farmers 
-…turning 
deserted 
orange groves 
into palm oil 
plantation to 
generate 
income for 
Rangsit 
farmers 
-A deserted   
orange plantation was 
turned into a palm oil 
planting area to 
attract farmers to 
palm oil 
planting,which gives 
higher financial 
benefit than other 
plants in such an area 
with acidic soil. 
           Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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                                      Year 
Discourse strands 
2
0
0
1 
2
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2 
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3 
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4 
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0
0
5 
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0
6 
2
0
0
7 
2
0
0
8 
2
0
0
9 
2010 2011 
2
0
1
2 
2013 
2
0
1
4 
2
0
1
5 
Enhance national energy security 
by lowering oil imports 
          - Recognizing the significance of 
alternative energy, which   
benefits national energy security 
and lowers trade imbalances 
resulting from fuel imports, the 
Company has launched the   
Sunny Bangchak solar power 
plant project at Amphoe Bang Pa-
in of Ayutthaya province 
  
     
Be a responsible company, run 
business model with benefit to 
environment and social 
development 
          -These represent 
business development 
approaches that align 
with environmental 
changes, reduce global 
resource consumption 
and thus least impacts 
the environment  
 -…committed to undertaking 
its energy businesses in an 
environmentally friendly way 
for sustainable development  
  
           Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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         -investment…have 
been made to 
strengthen the 
Company 
-for sustainable 
business value 
creation, the 
company will 
restructure its current 
stream of 70%:30% 
between refining and 
marketing which is 
vulnerable to 
volatility of oil 
prices…within 
2015,the targeted 
revenue structure will 
be50%:20%:30%...E
mphasis on new 
business will be on 
clean energy with 
steady income and 
low dependence on 
external factors… 
-thanks to its vision 
to forge environment-
friendly energy 
business for 
sustainable 
development, the 
company values 
investment in 
downstream ventures 
for the sake of its 
own sustainability  
-clean energy is 
Bangchak’s tool for 
sustainable 
development 
- Emphasis on new 
business will be on 
clean energy with 
steady income and 
low dependence on 
external factors… 
-it will steadily add 
value to business 
and diverse risks of 
income sources in 
the future 
-Thanks to its 
Greenergy vision 
which entails 
sustainable 
development and to 
lower risks of 
engaging solely in 
oil business 
-this year, our 
solar power plant-
one of our flagship 
RE business 
ventures-began 
accrual income 
which has grown 
our income base 
and lowered risks 
associated with the 
refinery and 
marketing, our 
traditional core 
business 
-Within 2016, the 
targeted revenue 
structure will be 
60%:20%:20% for 
refining, 
marketing and 
new businesses 
-to diversify 
income risks, 
Bangchak  has 
constantly grown 
its alternative-
energy 
businesses. 
-recognizing high 
volatility facing 
the refining  
business as well 
as volatile oil 
prices 
and…Bangchak 
set its goal in 
2020 for the 
refining income 
50% versus 50% 
for emerging 
businesses 
- committed in 
alternative 
energy leadership  
-to diversify 
income risks, 
Bangchak  has 
constantly grown 
its alternative-
energy 
businesses…in 
harmony with the 
Greenergy 
Excellence vision 
-recognizing high 
volatility facing 
the refining  
business as well 
as volatile oil 
prices 
and…Bangchak 
set its goal in 
2020 for the 
refining income 
50% versus 50% 
for emerging 
businesses, 
commanding 
steady income 
and low risks 
posed by external 
factors 
- Strive for financial stability by diversifying 
income risks through investment in renewable-
energy businesses, marked by income certainty and 
regularity, including solar power plants and 
geothermal power plants. 
- For corporate sustainability, Bangchak has   
diversified and expanded investment to related  
businesses, namely the renewable energy, power   
from renewable energy, … 
- It has also spread its wings to other businesses, 
including power production from solar   
energy (solar farm) - a clean source of energy from 
nature, biomass energy, petroleum exploration and   
production, and innovation-oriented businesses. 
Bangchak’s mission is to enhance national energy 
security, while investing in new businesses to keep 
the organization moving forward and ensure 
sustainability. 
 - Strive for business growth and diversify risks 
toward businesses with secure revenue :   
Set growth goals by supplementing sustainable 
value to businesses through growing the proportion 
of revenue  from new businesses of clean energy 
and other energy businesses, marked by constant 
revenue stream and  low risks due to external 
factors. 
 - New investments that can generate steady 
revenue have become more and more significant.  
Bangchak has expanded its investment to power 
production and energy crop (plant) businesses.   
Its solar energy business has a current production 
capacity of 118 MW 
           Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
 
     
Table 2  Discourses on Solar PV investment of Bangchak (continued) 
239 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
Year 
 
Discourse 
strands 
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          -aware that 
refining business 
consumes a large 
amount of 
energy and emits 
considerable 
carbon dioxcide, 
the company has 
set a target to be 
Carbon Neutral 
Company 
-aware that 
refining business 
consumes a large 
amount of 
energy and emits 
considerable 
carbon dioxcide, 
the company has 
set a target to be 
Carbon Neutral 
Company 
-aware that 
refining 
business 
consumes a 
large amount of 
energy and 
emits 
considerable 
carbon 
dioxcide, the 
company has 
set a target to be 
Carbon Neutral 
Company 
-aware that 
refining 
business 
consumes a 
large amount of 
energy and 
emits 
considerable 
carbon 
dioxcide, the 
company has 
set a target to be 
Carbon Neutral 
Company 
- Pursue the status of a low-carbon 
company :  Set a goal of posting a 
minimal volume of carbon dioxide 
emission by relentlessly operating 
a project to improve  Energy and 
refinery resource efficiency, while 
investigating investment in 
renewable/alternative energy. 
- It has also spread its wings to 
other businesses, including power 
production from solar  energy 
(solar farm) - a clean source of 
energy from nature, biomass 
energy, petroleum exploration and  
production, and innovation-
oriented businesses.  
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
           Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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           Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
 
     
Year 
 
 
Discourse 
strands 
2
0
0
1 
2
0
0
2 
2
0
0
3 
2
0
0
4 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
2
0
1
0 
2011 
2
0
1
2 
2
0
1
3 
2
0
1
4 
2
0
1
5 
                   R
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n
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o
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n
m
en
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o
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    -Thaioil and our subsidiaries 
operate under laws, rules 
and regulations, changes to 
which may affect the 
operational and business 
performance of Thaioil 
Group as a whole. For 
instance, the government’s 
campaign for energy 
conservation,for the use of 
gasohol as an alternative to 
gasoline, and other drives 
may require future 
investments in or 
modifications  
to the production processes 
of Thaioil Group. 
-Our policy on business 
development and strategic 
planning involves studying 
new business opportunities 
and challenges that align 
with government policies 
while promoting programs 
of public merit. Our 
preliminary study on the  
production of high quality 
ethanol fuel from cassava 
indicated a satisfactory 
return on investment 
  
 
-This project-
(Ethanol 
production ) is 
being study to 
cope with new 
business 
opportunity 
arising from the 
national energy  
policy on the 
promotion of 
biofuels. 
-This decision was 
made in light of the 
domestic   
supply-demand 
situation which is 
contingent on the 
government’s 
energy policy in 
providing support to 
the blending of   
ethanol in gasohol. 
The regional 
ethanol market 
indicates a  demand 
growth in the future 
and requires further 
study 
  
 
-Thaioil further 
aims to invest in 
additional projects   
to produce ethanol 
from cassava and 
sugar cane juice. 
This is in response 
to the anticipated 
high  growth in 
ethanol demand 
resulting from the 
energy policy of the 
government to 
promote gasohol   
usage. 
  
 
 
-Ethanol production business support 
the government’s policy in 
developing clean fuels and 
alternative energy  
-the ethanol business through joint 
venture projects… in support of the 
country’s gasohol project which will 
serve the government policy with 
respect of gasohol usage 
-Alternative Energy  
To address the government’s 
alternative energy policy, Thaioil has 
studied the viability of investing in a 
number   
of alternative energy sources, such as 
biomass, solar and wind power 
plants. 
 -As for alternative 
energy, Thaioil Group 
plans to develop its 
ethanol business by 
following   
the government-sector 
approach of 
alternative-energy 
application.  
  
 
    
Table 1  Discourses on biofuel investment of Thai Oil 
242 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
Discourse 
strands 
2
0
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0
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       -Ethanol from sugar   
cane juice is another clean 
energy option that will help 
the environment and reduce 
global warming. The project 
balances our business 
objectives with environmental 
and social responsibility. 
  
 
-(ethanol production business) 
support the government’s 
policy in developing clean   
fuels and alternative energy to 
reduce pollution and   
enhance the quality of life of 
the Thai society 
  
 
 -The fact that Thaioil 
successfully produced 
gasohol, gasoline,  and diesel 
under EURO 4 standard ahead 
of nationwide enforcement in 
2012 enabled it to  sell these 
products to domestic 
customers for environmentally 
friendly consumption faster 
  
 
 -Through an affiliate, it 
also invested in the   
production of ethanol, a 
form of alternative energy 
popularly  blended with 
gasoline to form gasohol. 
When comparing  gasohol 
to other fuel, gasohol 
yields less greenhouse gas  
emissions and leads to 
less global warming in 
view of the   
product lifecycle.  
  
 
  
           Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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Year 
 
 
Discourse strands 
2
0
0
1 
2
0
0
2 
2
0
0
3 
2
0
0
4 
2
0
0
5 
2006 
2
0
0
7 
2
0
0
8 
2
0
0
9 
2
0
1
0 
2
0
1
1 
2
0
1
2 
2
0
1
3 
2
0
1
4 
2
0
1
5 
Help farmer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     -Besides reducing imported fuel products, the project will improve  
earnings of agricultural growers, create jobs and generate revenue in reduced labor 
movement areas, and add value to domestic agricultural products. 
-This project is being study to cope with new business opportunity arising from the 
national energy policy on the promotion of biofuels. The use of ethanol in gasoline 
will not only strengthen the country’s energy security but also reduce MTBE 
imports. In addition, the ethanol project will also help stabilizing revenue for 
agriculture sector as a whole. 
 
         
Enhance national energy 
security by lowering oil 
imports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     -In response to corporate social responsibility, we undertook a study to produce 
ethanol from agricultural products as an alternative fuel source 
-Besides reducing imported fuel products, the project will improve  
earnings of agricultural growers, create jobs… 
-The use of ethanol in gasoline will not only strengthen the country’s  
energy security but also reduce MTBE imports.  
         
           Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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     -Ethanol Production Projects. 
This project is being study to 
cope with new business 
opportunity arising from the 
national energy policy on the 
promotion of biofuels. 
   -As for alternative energy, Thai Oil 
Group is keen on developing its 
ethanol business from agricultural 
supplies since Thailand   
commands the potential to become 
an ethanol hub to meet regional 
needs. 
-In addition, Thai Oil   
is investigating more investment in 
the power and alternative-energy 
businesses to support its move 
toward leadership   
of the energy group in Asia Pacific. 
 
-…aligns with Thai Oil’s long-term 
strategic plans for alternative energy and 
ethanol market development for future 
export Thai Oil Ethanol Co., Ltd. and 
Bangchak  Petroleum Plc signed a share 
acquisition  agreement with Ubon Bio 
Ethanol Co., Ltd. (UBE), under which 
each was to hold 21.28%.UBE produces 
ethanol from fresh cassava  and cassava 
chips with a capacity of  400,000 liters 
per day, which aligns with  Tha i Oil’s 
long-term strategic plans for  alternative 
energy and ethanol market   
development for future export. 
-This in turn indicates an   
opportunity for other potential exporters 
of ethanol to  capture some of Brazil’s 
former markets. Thai Oil Ethanol has  
therefore planned to secure suitable 
warehouses to support  its ethanol export 
to the Philippines, whose government is 
set  (gasohol) to enforce a rise in the 
ethanol-blending content   
in gasoline from 5% to 10% by February 
2012. 
 
    
           Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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                          -In response to 
corporate social 
responsibility, we 
undertook a study 
to produce 
ethanol from 
agricultural  
products as an 
alternative fuel 
source. 
 
 
 
 
 
 -Ethanol from sugar 
cane juice is another 
clean energy option 
that will help the 
environment and 
reduce global 
warming.  The project 
balances our business 
objectives with 
environmental and 
social responsibility 
      -Aiming for relentless improvement in all work 
processes, the Company executed its 2014-2018 
Sustainable  Development Master Plan, 
resulting in its support to  greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emission reduction of 26,827   
tons of carbon dioxide through the more than 
19 projects  that increase the efficiency of 
energy; increase the  production capacity and 
sale of biodiesel;  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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Discourse strands 
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5 
 
 
Enhance quality of life 
of Thai people  
        -(ethanol production business) support the 
government’s policy in developing clean  fuels 
and alternative energy to reduce pollution and  
enhance the quality of life of the Thai society 
 
 
 
 
 
      
           Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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Table 1  Discourses on geothermal of PERTAMINA  
 
 
 
 
 
           Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
 
     
Year 
 
Discourse 
strands 
2
0
0
1 
2
0
0
2 
2
0
0
3 
2
0
0
4 
2
0
0
5 
2
0
0
6 
2
0
0
7 
2
0
0
8 
2009 2
0
1
0 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Respond to 
government 
policy 
        -support the 
second phase 
of the 
government 
program to 
supply 10,000 
MW of 
electricity 
 -PERTAMINA 
Geothermal 
exploration and 
production activities 
are conducted 
entirely within the 
country and are 
intended to support 
government 
programs providing a 
second stage 10,000 
MW of electricity  
- Geothermal is 
currently being 
actively developed in 
Indonesia for power 
generation purposes 
-intended to support 
government program 
providing a second 
stage 10,000 MW 
-actively developed in 
Indonesia for power 
generation purposes. 
In PLN’s program for 
accelerated 
development of power 
plant (fast track) 
10,000 MW Phase II, 
around 3,900 MW is 
planned to be obtained 
from geotehrmal 
-intended to 
support 
government 
programs 
providing a 
second stage 
10,000 MW of 
electricity 
-the government is 
expected to 
prioritize the use 
of geothermal 
energy considering 
that it will be lost 
if not used. 
-Government has 
rolled out a 
development  
acceleration 
program of 10,000 
MW power plant, in  
which 49% is 
sourced from 
geothermal. National 
energy  policy is 
targeting power 
supply of 9,500 MW 
in 2025  from 
geothermal power 
plant.   
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Table 1 Discourses on geothermal of PERTAMINA (continued) 
Year 
  
Discourse 
strands 
2
0
0
1 
2
0
0
2 
2
0
0
3 
2
0
0
4 
2
0
0
5 
2006 2007 2008 
2
0
0
9 
2010 
2
0
1
1 
2012 2013 
2
0
1
4 
2015 
Enhance 
national 
energy 
resilience 
         -The activity of 
developing RE and 
alternative energy is 
part of 
PERTAMINA’s effort 
in supporting national 
energy resilience   
 -…become the 
back bone of 
national energy 
security  
-the 
development 
of geothermal 
remains a 
strategic 
priority of 
PERTMINA 
in support of 
the national 
energy 
resiliency , 
especially the 
proportion of 
geothermal in 
the national 
energy mix 
  
Geothermal is 
upstream 
business of 
PERTAMINA 
 
     -The upstream 
business 
sector 
comprises 
exploration 
and 
production of 
oil, gas and 
geothermal 
energy 
-The upstream 
business 
sector 
comprises 
exploration 
and 
production of 
oil, gas and 
geothermal 
energy 
-The upstream 
business sector 
comprises 
exploration and 
production of oil, 
gas and 
geothermal 
energy 
      -PERTAMINA 
also places 
geothermal   
energy 
management in 
the upstream 
sector.   
  
 
 
           Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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Table 1 Discourses on geothermal of PERTAMINA (continued) 
Year 
  
Discourse 
strands 
2
0
0
1 
2
0
0
2 
2
0
0
3 
2
0
0
4 
2
0
0
5 
2
0
0
6 
2
0
0
7 
2
0
0
8 
2009 2010 2011 2012 
2
0
1
3 
2
0
1
4 
2015 
GHG emission 
reduction and 
obtaining CER 
climate credits 
 
        -PERTAMINA 
will obtain CER 
climate credits 
 -Geothermal is 
one of the 
environmental 
friendly RE  
- Geothermal is 
one of the 
environmental 
friendly RE 
   
Emission reduction is carried out 
through engineering 
efficiency/adjustment on emission 
sources from PERTAMINA   
operations, which are internal and 
external combustion, flaring, thermal 
oxidizer and incinerator, Sulfur 
recovery unit, fugitive emission, 
storage tank, Fuel loading and  
unloading activities, catalytic 
cracking unit, CO2  removal unit, 
geothermal power plant, and waste 
water treatment plant. 
  
 
Growth and 
profits for 
company 
        -PERTAMINA has 
invested and 
developed business 
in both upstream 
and downstream 
sectors to 
accelerate growth 
and increase 
profits. 
-PERTAMINA 
carries out 
investments and 
business 
development in 
upstream and 
downstream sectors 
as a strategy to spur 
growth and improve 
profitability 
     
           Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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Discourse 
strands 
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5 
Mitigate the 
risk of 
decreasing oil 
and gas reserve 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        -The risk of the 
irreplaceable Oil and 
Gas Reserves. The 
company mitigates 
this risk by looking 
for new reserves.. do 
alternative energy 
mining such as 
geothermal resources 
and coal bed methane 
-conducts risk 
mitigation to anticipate 
depleting oil and gas 
reserves by exploring 
new reserves, 
acquiring domestic 
and oversea blocks, 
developing alternative 
energy such as 
geothermal 
-Risk of 
non-
renewable 
Oil and Gas 
Reserves, 
the 
company’s 
main income 
depended to 
oil and gas 
reserve 
-non-
renewable 
oil and gas 
reserve: 
Income 
deficiency 
due to the 
company’s 
dependence 
on oil and 
gas 
reserves 
- non-
renewable oil 
and gas 
reserve: 
Income 
deficiency 
due to the 
company’s 
dependence 
on oil and gas 
reserves 
  
Economic 
prosperous and 
enhance well-
being of 
Indonesia 
people 
     -play 
strategic role 
in national 
stability and 
economic 
growth 
-
improvement 
of the 
economic 
activity for 
the purpose 
of the 
welfare and 
prosperity of 
the people 
-improve 
growth and 
revenue by 
increasing 
oil, gas and 
geothermal 
energy 
reserves 
and 
production 
-to 
contribute 
in growing 
the 
economy in 
pursuance 
of people’s 
well-being 
and 
prosperity  
-The company’s 
objectives are to 
generate profit based 
on effective and 
efficient corporate 
management and to 
contribute to the 
achievement of 
economic growth in 
pursuance of the 
people’s well-being 
and prosperity. 
-PERTAMINA 
manages the company 
effectively and 
efficiently to 
contribute to the 
improvement of 
economic activities for 
the welfare and 
prosperity of the 
people. 
-the company’s 
objective is to generate 
income and contribute 
to the improvement of 
the economy for the 
benefit of the 
Indonesian public 
 -become a 
driving 
force of the 
Indonesian 
economy 
now and in 
the future 
   
           Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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Year 
  
Discourse 
strands 
2
0
0
1 
2
0
0
2 
2
0
0
3 
2
0
0
4 
2
0
0
5 
2
0
0
6 
2
0
0
7 
2
0
0
8 
2
0
0
9 
2
0
1
0 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Company 
vision 
          -PERTAMINA’s vision to 
become a world class energy 
company is also reflected in 
the consistency of the 
Company in the development 
of new and RE sources. 
Currently, focuses on 
geothermal and Coal Bed 
Methane 
-PERTAMINA’s involvement 
in the geothermal is in  
accordance with its vision as 
an energy company  
-its vision of becoming a 
World Class Energy 
Company and Asia Energy 
Champion by 2025 
-PERTAMINA is committed 
to turn itself into an integrated 
energy company (CBM, 
geothermal ,new and RE) 
-Entrusted with the New 
Energy, utilization of new and 
RE as a means toward a 
position as a key player in the 
regional as well as global 
energy business 
-PERTAMINA’s involvement 
in the geothermal is in  
accordance with its vision as 
an energy company 
   
Potential 
geothermal 
in Indonesia 
            -Indonesia is the country 
with the greatest 
geothermal energy 
potentials in the world. 
Therefore the development 
of geothermal energy has 
excellent prospect, 
especially for generating 
power. 
-Indonesia has a huge 
potential for utilizing 
geothermal energy for the 
purpose of generating 
powers. 
-the use of geothermal 
gives a very promising 
hope in the future. 
Availability of geothermal 
in Indonesia is a valuable 
resource that should be 
utilized.   
-Indonesia is the third 
largest country producing 
geothermal energy with a 
production capacity of 
1,339 MW. This indicates 
a good prospect for 
geothermal energy 
development especially for 
electricity generation.  
-Indonesia has one of the 
largest potential 
geothermal  energies in the 
world with power source 
of 29 GW, and  recorded 
as the third largest country 
in the world producing   
geothermal energy with 
production capacity of 
1,339 MW.   
This indicates that there is 
still open broad 
opportunity of  geothermal 
energy development in 
Indonesia, particularly   
for power plan 
           Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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Year 
 
Discourse 
strands 
2
0
0
1 
2
0
0
2 
2
0
0
3 
2
0
0
4 
2
0
0
5 
2006 2007 2008 
2
0
0
9 
2
0
1
0 
2
0
1
1 
2
0
1
2 
2
0
1
3 
2014 2015 
R
esp
o
n
d
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o
v
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n
m
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o
licy
 
     -in 
compliance 
with the 
Instruction of 
the President 
of the 
Republic of 
Indonesia 
No.1 
Year2006 
regarding 
Supply and 
Use of 
Biofuel as 
Alternative 
Fuels and 
Presidential 
Decree of the 
Republic of 
Indonesia 
No.5 Year 
2006 
regarding 
National 
Energy Policy 
-in compliance 
with the 
Instruction of 
the President of 
the Republic of 
Indonesia No.1 
Year2006 
regarding 
Supply and Use 
of Biofuel as 
Alternative 
Fuels and 
Presidential 
Decree of the 
Republic of 
Indonesia No.5 
Year 2006 
regarding 
National Energy 
Policy 
-the government 
program 
(mentioned 
above) 
encouraged 
SOEs(State-
owned 
enterprises) to 
develop and use 
bio fuel 
-to date, the 
Company 
supports 
Government 
policy in 
increasing 
biofuel usage 
enhanced oil 
fuel products 
such as Bio 
Premium and 
Bio 
Pertamax… 
and Bio Solar 
     -Since the issuance of the 
Presidential Regulation No.5 fo 
2006, the development of new 
and renewable energy potentials 
in Indonesia is growing. At 
present, PERTAMINA fulfills its 
responsibility in biodiesel 
utilization with 10% mix 
-the government also issued a 
Regulation from the MoEMR 
No.20/2014 that supports the 
acceleration of biofuel use for 
transportation and power plants, 
PERTAMINA responded with a 
positive NRE (new and RE) 
contribution target for 2025 which 
was 5% from biofuel, 5% 
geothermal 2% liquefied coal, and 
5% combination of biomass, 
nuclear, water, solar power and 
wind power.  
-In order to comply with 
Government  policy regarding 
mixture of Biofuels (BBN)  of 
15% in this year and as much as 
20%  in the next year, PT 
Pertamina (Persero)  cooperates 
with 11 companies of BBN  
producer in Indonesia. 
Procurement of  mixture Oil Fuel 
with this biofuels will  supply 63 
TBBM belong to Pertamina   
to fulfill the period needs of 
November  2015 up to April 2016 
with total volume  of 1.84 million 
kiloliters (KL). 
-Government commitment towards 
biofuel (BBN) development   
was increasingly visible by the 
issuance of a number of   
regulations at Minister level… 
The regulation requires all 
enterprises of Fuel  business 
license holders to deliver Fuel that 
was mixed with   
15% Biofuel, effective from 1 
April 2015.   
 
 
 
 
           Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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Year 
 
 
Discourse 
strands 
2
0
0
1 
2
0
0
2 
2
0
0
3 
2
0
0
4 
2
0
0
5 
2
0
0
6 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
2
0
1
2 
2
0
1
3 
2
0
1
4 
2
0
1
5 
Company 
mission 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      -the year of 2007 is the initial 
period of PT PERTAMINA 
(PERSERO) Transformation 
Program…the perfection of 
the company’s vision from To 
be a leading,advanced and 
respected company to “To be 
a world class national oil 
company with the mission “to 
carry out an integrated core 
business in oil,gas and 
biofuel,based on strong 
commercial principles” 
-Mission: 
integratedly  
performing core 
business of 
oil,gas and 
biofuel, based on 
strong 
commercial 
principles 
-Mission:To 
conduct the core 
business of oil, 
gas and biofuels 
in an integrated 
fashion based on 
sound 
commercial 
principles 
-Mission:To 
conduct the core 
businesses of 
oil,gas and 
biofuels in an 
integrated fashion 
based on sound 
commercial 
principles 
-The Company’s 
Mission focuses on 
running the Company’s 
core business in oil, gas 
and biofuels in an 
integrated way, based 
on strong commercial 
principles.  
    
           Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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           Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
 
     
Year 
 
 
Discourse strands 
2
0
0
1 
2
0
0
2 
2
0
0
3 
2
0
0
4 
2
0
0
5 
2
0
0
6 
2007 
2
0
0
8 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
2
0
1
4 
2
0
1
5 
 
Mitigate the risk 
of decreasing oil 
and gas reserve 
      -reduce the use 
of non-
renewable fossil 
fuel 
 -The risk of the 
Irreplaceable Oil and 
Gas Reserves… the 
company mitigates 
the risk by looking 
for new reserves, 
block acquisition 
inside and outside 
country, do 
alternative  energy  
-oil and  gas are 
non- renewable 
natural resources. 
PERTAMINA 
conducts risk 
mitigation to 
anticipate 
depleting oil and 
gas reserves. 
-Risk of Non-
renewable Oil 
and Gas 
Reserves 
-development of 
biofuel to replace 
diesel fuel 
-Non-renewable 
Oil and Gas 
Reserve Risk: 
income deficiency 
due to the 
Company’s 
dependence on oil 
and gas reserves 
 
- Non-renewable 
Oil and Gas 
Reserve Risk: 
income 
deficiency due to 
the Company’s 
dependence on oil 
and gas reserves 
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Table 2   Discourses on biofuels investment of PERTAMINA (continued) 
 
Year 
 
 
Discourse strands 
2
0
0
1 
2
0
0
2 
2
0
0
3 
2
0
0
4 
2
0
0
5 
2
0
0
6 
2007 
2
0
0
8 
2009 2010 2011 
2
0
1
2 
2
0
1
3 
2014 
2
0
1
5 
Economic prosperous 
and enhance well-
being of Indonesia 
people 
      -the company’s 
objective is to 
generate income 
and contribute to 
theimprovement 
of the economy 
for the benefit of 
the Indonesian 
population 
  -the company’s 
objective is to 
generate income and 
contribute to the 
improvement of the 
economy for the 
benefit of the 
Indonesian 
population 
-the company’s 
objective is to 
generate income and 
contribute to the 
improvement of the 
economy for the 
benefit of the 
Indonesian 
population 
    
GHG emission 
reduction and 
obtaining CER climate 
credits 
        -PERTAMINA 
will obtain 
Certified Emission 
Reduction (CER) 
climate credits 
because there is a 
significant 
opportunity for the 
company to reduce 
GHG emissions 
through RE 
projects 
      
Business opportunity 
for company 
             -PERTAMINA sees good 
beneficial business prospects 
from the new and RE sector. 
The demands for biofuel in 
2025 will be sizable due to 
government policy to use 
30% biodiesel, 20% of 
bioethanol and 5% of 
bioavtur 
 
           Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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Table 1   Discourses on Solar PV investment of PETRONAS  
               Year 
 
Discourse 
strands  
2
0
0
1 
2
0
0
2 
2
0
0
3 
2
0
0
4 
2
0
0
5 
2
0
0
6 
2
0
0
7 
2
0
0
8 
2
0
0
9 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2
0
1
4 
2
0
1
5 
Positive 
results for 
business 
         -Sign MOU with Mitsubishi 
Corporation  to jointly develop a 
solar photovoltaic 
Demonstration project in 
Malaysia. The signing  of the 
MOU marked an important 
milestone for   
PETRONAS in harnessing 
renewable energy for   
future growth 
-Signing MOU with 
Mitsubishi on October 
2010, it also acts as a 
catalyst for PETRONAS 
to explore further 
opportunity in RE that 
offers synergy with 
PETRONAS’s existing 
core business 
 
 
    
Reduce GHG 
emissions 
           -the clean energy generated 
can reduce our GHG 
footprint by 500,000 kg of 
CO2 annually  
-Solar Independent Power 
Producer Plant at Gebeng, 
Pahang was completely in 
2013. The project is in line 
with national commitment to 
pursue RE sources and reduce 
carbon emissions 
  
Respond to 
Government 
policy 
            -Solar Independent Power 
Producer Plant at Gebeng, 
Pahang was completely in 
2013. The project is in line 
with national commitment to 
pursue RE sources 
  
Sustainability 
commitment 
          -in line with our 
commitment to operate in 
a sustainable manner, 
PETRONAS has taken 
steps to explore the 
application of Solar 
-in line with our 
sustainability agenda, 
PETRONAS successfully 
installed Solar PV 
-signifying the Company’s 
commitment to sustainable 
development 
- in pursuing this sustainability 
agenda, PETRONAS 
successfully install several 
solar PV 
  
           Frequency 
 
O time 1 time 2-3 times 4 times or 
more 
No annual 
reports 
Color legend 
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Company 
 
Solar Wind Biofuels Geothermal  Hydrogen Battery  Tidal Fossil fuels 
ExxonMobil -1977 Exxon reported that its 
solar investment were meant 
to greatly expand the 
usefulness of solar energy 
and that the investment were 
beginning to show favorable 
economics 
 -Spent $600 million on a 10-
year effort to turn algae into 
oil (Csomos, 2014) 
-Exxon’ algae project is a 
partnership with Synthetic 
Genomics, a La Jolla (Calif.) 
Company co-founded by 
human genome pioneer J. 
Craig Venter.  
(Ken Well, Bloomberg 11 May 
2012) 
  Exxon has more than 
1000 Esso-branded 
service stations in 
the UK, sent slides to 
Department for 
Transport Officials 
saying the 
government should 
avoid policies that 
support electric cars 
because cutting 
carbon emissions 
from power stations 
was cheaper.  
  
Chevron -use solar to enhance oil 
production (Csomos, 2014) 
-shut down its solar i.e. cancel 
a pair of giant solar farms in 
Hawaii (Davis Ferris 2014) )in 
2014 
 
 
  -Indonesia in 
Darajat and 
Salak. Hold 
40% of the 
Philippines 
Geothermal 
Production 
Company 
(Csomos, 2014) 
    
StatOil  2015 announce the 
truly innovative 
floating wind-park 
off the coast of 
Scotland to begin in 
2016. The offshore 
windfarm will soon 
supply more than 
600,000 UK homes 
with energy. 
(Sverdrup Guardian 
27 Nov 2015) 
-2016 it outlined 
plans to spend 1.2 
billion Euro in 
partnership with 
E.On on the 
German Arkona 
windfarm in the 
Baltic sea. 
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Company 
 
Solar Wind Biofuels Geothermal  Hydrogen Battery  Tidal Fossil fuels 
Shell -Started in 1980s with an 
investment in a solar 
company called R&S Solar 
based in Holland 
-1997, Shell announced to 
make RE the 5th core division, 
and invested 500 million USD 
over 5 years , R&S Solar was 
absorbed and renamed as 
Shell Solar (Miller, 2013) 
-2002 integrate Shell Solar 
with Siemens Solar creating a 
vertically integrated company 
from silicon production to 
downstream sales of solar 
system, 
-1999-2006 spent 1.25 billion 
US to wind, solar and 
hydrogen , until 2009 stopped 
(Csomos, 2014) 
-2004Shell opened the 
world’s largest grid connected 
solar park (Guardian Fred 
Pearce 2009) 
-2006 Shell had problem with 
shortage of silicon and did not 
dare to take up the poly-Si 
producers’ offers to secure 
the supply.  So producers cut 
Shell Solar off. In the same 
year, it sold Shell Solar to 
Solar World from a Germany.  
-in 2009 Shell exited all Solar 
business, and said clearly that 
focus going forward is on 
biofuels in the RE sphere. 
(Miller 2013) 
- 2009, Shell was reported by 
guardian and other 
newspaper that it would no 
longer invest in RE 
technologies such as wind, 
solar, hydropower because 
they are not economic 
(Guardian Fred Pearce 2009 
Wind farms 550 
MW installed 
capacity around the 
world  
In 2016, Shell 
established a spate 
division, New 
Energies, to invest 
in RE and low-
carbon power, such 
as hydrogen, 
biofuels and 
electrical activities 
but will also be 
used as a base for 
new drive into wind 
power (Macalister 
Guardian 15 May 
2016), Shell 
announced it was 
bidding in a 
partnership to build 
two windfarms off 
the Dutch coast 
that will be big 
enough to power 
825,000 
households.  
-Partnership with Codexis 
uses enzymes to turn grass, 
stalks and sugar cane waste 
into biofuels. It has put about 
$60 million a year into the 
project, aiming to produce 
renewable fuels without 
displacing food crops. (Ken 
Wells, Bloomberg 11 May 
2012) 
-Spent 12 billion USD to do 
joint venture with a Brazilian 
sugar producer and ethanol 
producer-Cosan 
-Shell decided in 2009 to 
focus on biofuels in the RE 
industry and in 2010 set up 
the Raizen ethanol venture 
with Cosan SA 
Industria&Comercio. In 2010, 
it saw the share of RE in 
transport fuel doubling this 
decade, and since then has 
focused its research on 
biofuels made from sugar 
cane0farm waste after 
ending an algae project in 
Hawaii in 2011 (Bloomberg 
Eduard Gismatullin and Sally 
Bakewell, Mar1 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-Head of Shell 
hydrogen, a 
new division 
of Royal 
Dutch/ Shell 
is convinced 
that Fuel cell 
will soon 
begin 
replacing 
power 
stations and 
cars burn 
coal, oil and 
gas. 
(economist 
24 July 1999) 
 
-Like BP, its 
primary 
thrusts are 
solar and 
wind 
energy .Shell 
though 
casting a 
slightly wider 
net is also 
concentrating 
on biofuel 
derived from 
agricultural 
fibers, 
geothermal 
energy and 
hydrogen 
(Heesun 2002 
Bloomberg) 
 
-Electric car charging 
points could appear 
alongside petrol 
pumps at Shell’s UK 
service stations as 
soon as next year,. 
The diversification 
into infrastructure 
for battery-powered 
cars would mark a 
new departure for 
the company, which 
has largely backed 
biofuels as a greener 
alternative to petrol 
and diesel in the 
past. (Adam 
Vaughan Guardian 
13 Sep 2016) 
 Over 670billion 
USD was spent in 
2013 exploring new 
fossil fuel reserves. 
Shell is spending 
billions on Arctic 
exploration and 
Canadian tar sands 
projects 
Shell this year 
completed a $54bn 
acquisition of BG, a 
British producer of 
natural gas and oil, 
bring gas close to 
half of its energy 
mix. 
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Company 
 
Solar Wind Biofuels Geothermal  Hydrogen Battery  Tidal Fossil fuels 
Total -Since 1980s Held a half share 
in two solar 
firms:Photovoltech and 
Tenesol.  
Most important focus. Not 
only solar farm in Abu Dhabi 
(Shams concentrating solar 
power station, 100 MW 
capacity installed) but also 
manufactures high efficiency 
solar panels  
-2011 acquired a 66% share 
of SunPower Corporation for 
1.37 billions USD -2013 got a 
86 MWp solar farm project 
with South Africa’s 
Department of Energy  
-in 2012 SunPower with Mid 
American Solar began 
development of soalr plant, 
with 579 MW generation 
capacity in Califonia, the 
largest (Csomos, 2014) 
-In 2016 it planned to spend 
nearly 1 billion Euro on 
buying 100-year old battery 
manufacturer Saft. CEO said 
the deal would allow us to 
complement our portfolio 
with electricity storage 
solutions, a key component of 
the future growth of RE. 
(Macalister Guardian 21 May 
2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One of four arms in 
RE(Csomos, 2014) 
-in Company’s 2008 
registration 
document Total 
wrote, Total has 
decide to dispose of 
certain of its wind 
farm projects 
(Guardian 
McCarthy,2009) 
    One of 
four 
arms in 
RE 
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Company 
 
Solar Wind Biofuels Geothermal  Hydrogen Battery  Tidal Fossil fuels 
BP -established its solar division 
in 1981 and acquired Lucas 
Energy System 
(Johnson,2015),late 1990s 
merge with Amoco which got 
a 50% of shares in Solarex, 
then the largest solar 
manufacturers. In 1999 BP 
acquired the rest 50% of 
Solarex from Enron. Abandon 
solar in2011 after 40 years of 
business, saying that it could 
not make money from solar 
and point to low-cost solar 
panel produced in China 
which competed with its 
products (Miller, 2013nt) 
-in 2009, BP shut down its 
alternative energy 
headquarters in London, 
accepted the regination of its 
clean energy boss and 
imposed budget cuts from 
1.4billion USD last year to 
between 500million USD-1 
Billion this year(Guardian, 
Macalister, 2009) 
-In 2011 Tony Hayward , a 
successor of John Browne, 
closed down BP Solar in 2011, 
on the ground that it did not 
make money (Macalister 16 
April 2015 Guardian ) 
BP, 2013 said it 
owned 16 wind 
farms in the US  
And Sold Indian 
wind energy 
business in 
2009(Csomos, 
2014) 
-The company is 
selling some of its 
RE assets including 
three wind farms in 
India and has cut its 
solar-cell 
manufacturing 
capacity in Span 
and America. The 
investment will fall 
from 1.4 billion in 
2008 to around 
500million to 1 
billion in 2009 (The 
Economist 5 Dec 
2009) 
BP, is gingerly 
considering 
investing more in 
wind for the first 
time in five years. 
(Economist 26 Nov 
2016) 
 
-Mid2010 BP spent nearly 
100million USD for the 
cellulosic biofuel business of 
a listed US company 
(Verenum) 
-2011 spent 680USD to buy 
83% share in CNAA, a 
Brazilian ethanol producer 
(Miller,2013) 
-BP, 2013 said it owned  
three sugarcane ethanol mills 
in Brazil(Csomos, 2014) 
 BP is 
developing 
hydrogen-
related 
energy 
technology 
(around 
2000s) 
Heesun Wee, 
Bloomberg 
25 Sep 2002 
  Swap assets with 
Husky Oil, giving it 
an entrance ticket 
to the Alberta tar 
sands, in Canada 
(Macalister 
Guardian 11 Dec 
2007) 
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Appendix G:  Development of biofuel mandate of Thailand, Indonesia 
and Malaysia 
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I. Thailand biofuel mandate  
At the present, Thailand ranks the largest ethanol producer and third biodiesel 
producers (after Indonesia and Malaysia) in Southeast Asia (Chanthawong and Dhakal, 
2016). It is perceived that the rapid growth of biofuels in Thailand is a result of government 
policies which according to Chanthawong and Dhakal (2016) are comprised of more 
comprehensive set of polices than other Southeast Asian countries. The Thailand policies 
has targeted   both supply and demand side including ambitious national biofuels targets 
supported by fixing the price-floor for buying raw materials from farmers, blending rate 
mandates, fuel subsidies, not to mention tax waivers for importing biofuel production 
technology. It is noted that there is no blending rate mandate for gasohol or bioethanol. 
However, at the present gas stations of PTT and Bangchak commercialize Gasohol E10, 
E20 and E85. As for biodiesel, the blending rate varies on the supply for palm oil.  
Table 1 biodiesel blending mandate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date Mandatory biodiesel blending 
rates 
June 2007 B2 and voluntary use of B5 
June 2010 B3 and voluntary use of B5 
March 2011 B2 and voluntary use of B5 
May 2011 B3-B5 
July 2011 B4 
January 2012 B5 
July 19, 2012 B3.5 
November 1, 2012 B5 
January 2014 B7 
February 17, 2014 Adjust from B7 to B3.5 
May 14, 2014 Return to B7 
January 22, 2015 Adjust from B7 to B3.5 
April 17, 2015 Return to B7 
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Table 2 Targets on renewable energy and biofuels (DEDE, 2015; GAIN, 2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policy Renewable Energy 
Development Plan 
15years 
(2008-2022) 
 
Alternative Energy 
Development Plan 
10years 
(2012-2021) 
 
Alternative Energy 
Development Plan 
(2015-2036) 
 
RE in total energy 
consumption 
 
20.3% by 2022 25% by 2021 30% by 2036 
Ethanol production target  
 
(million liter/day) 
9 9 11.30 
Biodiesel production target   
 
(million liter/day) 
4.5 7.2 14 
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II. Indonesia biofuel mandate 
 
Oppositely, to Thailand, the government of Indonesia focused on biodiesel 
development than ethanol production thanks to its vast amount of palm oil plantations, 
main raw material for biodiesel. Ethanol development program was ended in 2010 and fuel 
producers claimed that it was a result from PERTAMINA’s insufficient purchase pricing 
scheme (GAIN, 2015). Table 3 presents the both biodiesel and bioethanol blending 
mandate which was adjusted several times. The latest adjustment was Regulation of 
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources No.12 issued in March 2015. Indonesia has 
more than 50 sugar cane mills providing plenty supply of molasses. However, since 2010 
Indonesia stopped the fuel grade ethanol (FGE) production program due to the price 
conflict between Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources and ethanol producers. As the 
result, Indonesia’ ethanol is used only in non-fuel products such as perfumes, cosmetics and 
pharmaceutical goods (GAIN, 2016). In addition, although there is mandate on bioethanol, 
the interview with government authority in Indonesia during December 2016 confirmed 
that there was no bioethanol available in the gas stations. 
 
Table 3 Biodiesel and bioethanol mandate of Indonesia  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of fuel 2014 2015 2016 2025 
Biodiesel 10% 15% 20% 30% 
Bioethanol 1% 2% 5% 20% 
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III.  Malaysia biofuel mandate  
Malaysia did not have bioethanol. Although being a world top palm oil producers, 
Malaysia’s biodiesel blending rate appears less than expected. The interviewees from 
government authority and Malaysian Biofuel Association mentioned the reluctance of oil 
companies including PETRONAS in producing biodiesel. Additionally, due to huge gap 
between low crude oil price and expensive palm oil price, the biodiesel B10 mandate got 
delayed. Table 4 presents a mandate which the actual roll out dates are usually later than 
the original schedule.   
 
Table 4 Biodiesel mandate of Malaysia  (Biofuels Annual, 2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Transportation sector Industrial sector 
Planned 
Government Roll-
out 
Actual Roll-out Planned 
Government 
Roll-out 
Actual Roll-out 
B5 2008 2011 (Central region) 
2014 Nationwide 
None  
B7 January 1, 2015 January 1, 2015 October 1, 2016 October 1, 2016 
B10 October 1, 2015 End of 2016 as reported but 1st 
quarter 2017-realistically  
No plans  
B15 2020  No plans  
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Appendix H 
Appendix H:  Photos from fieldwork in Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia  
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Figure 2 Service stations of oil companies 
in Malaysia (From up to down: 
PETRONAS, PETRON, an 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2  Service stations of oil companies in 
Malaysia (from up, PETRONAS, PETRON 
and BHP) 
 
 
Figure 3 Visiting a stakeholder for interviews  
(from up, PETRONAS headquarter, SEDA, and 
Biofuel Division, Ministry Of Plantation  
Industries and Commodities  Malaysia) 
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Figure 5  PERTAMINA service station in Jakarta, Indonesia 
Figure 6  PERTAMINA Energy Forum 2016 held on 13-14 December 2016 at Ritz Carton 
Pacific Place Hotel, Jakarta, Indonesia 
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